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3ABSTRACT
Traditionally, theories of European integration have focussed on the internal 
dynamics of this unique form of international cooperation. This also holds for the 
principal-agent approach, a newer and more sophisticated methodology. This 
thesis argues that this approach’s frame of reference needs to be broadened in 
order to offer a more coherent framework since the European Community is 
becoming an increasingly active player on the international stage. Consequently, 
the inward-looking bias in integration theory needs to be overcome to come to a 
better understanding of the development of the external role and position of the 
Commission. Through the analysis of case studies, the study of primary and 
secondary sources and interviews with policy-makers, this thesis shows that the 
external institutional framework impacts on Commission-Member States 
relations, and thus on the process of European integration.
Within the strong institutional framework of the World Trade Organisation, the 
Commission has more leeway vis-a-vis the Member States to gain influence and 
competences. Through its central role in the WTO’s dispute settlement system, 
the Commission has managed to gain broader competences concerning trade- 
related aspects of intellectual property rights. Furthermore, the Commission is a 
firm proponent of the strengthening of the dispute settlement system. It is 
actively trying to incorporate new issues of mixed competence, like investment, 
within this strong institutional framework in the hope of improving its position. 
This is not restricted to trade-issues either. Also in international environmental 
agreements, the Commission tries to strengthen its position by pushing for 
stronger institutional provisions and for the incorporation of environmental 
concerns within the WTO framework. The interaction between the European and 
the international level, and its impact on Commission-Member State relations 
necessitate complementing the principal-agent approach to make it more 
outward-looking so that it can also be used to study the external aspects of 
European integration.
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nonetheless like to take this opportunity to thank a couple of fellow-students in 
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1
CREEPING COMPETENCES? THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION IN INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
INTRODUCTION
The division of competences between the European Union (EU) and its Member 
States has always been at the core of the study of this strange, state-like 
international organisation. Indeed, in its essence, the process of European 
integration could be seen as a continuing stock-taking exercise, mapping out who 
is responsible for what. Some competences have been completely transferred to 
the EU level, making the European institutions exclusively responsible. 
Agriculture and competition policy are probably among the best-known examples 
of such competences. On the contrary, other policy areas, such as health care or 
taxation, remain under the exclusive power of the Member States. As usual, the 
most interesting category is the third one, which comprises issues that fall under 
the ‘shared’ or ‘mixed’ competence of the EU and its Member States. Here, the 
dynamic nature of the interaction between the different levels of government of 
the EU, which makes it such a unique entity, is most clearly revealed. For this 
reason, many studies of the EU and the European integration process have 
focussed on this category of competences, in the hope of discovering (some of)
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the driving forces behind the functioning of the EU, or sometimes even hoping to 
uncover the final destination and goal of the integration process.
With the steady emergence of the European Communities (EC) as an international 
actor, and against the background of an increasing body of case law of the 
European Court of Justice (henceforth ‘the Court’ or ‘the ECJ’) on the position 
and competences of the EC in the international system, ‘mixity’ also became an 
important element in the study of the EC’s external relations.1 It were mainly 
lawyers that were taking the lead in this debate, spurred on by the publication of 
an influential volume on ‘mixed agreements’ in the early 1980s, which made 
‘mixity’ and its consequences into an integral part of any legal study of the EC’s 
external relations (O’Keeffe and Schermers, 1983). This is understandable given 
the many repercussions and questions flowing from the joint participation of both 
the European Communities and its Member States in international agreements. 
These are not restricted to issues of representation or voting, but they also relate 
to questions about the external recognition of the EC, about the position of the EC 
in the international system, and about who should execute a particular agreement 
or who is liable in case of non-compliance. Many of these questions touch upon 
the internal division of power between the EC and its Member States. It is 
therefore somewhat surprising that the full repercussions of ‘mixity’ are often 
overlooked or ignored in political science studies of the EC’s external relations. 
All the more so because the interaction between the EC and its Member States on 
issues of shared or mixed competence, as noted earlier, can be fertile ground for 
studying some of the factors influencing or driving the European integration 
process -  and maybe even uncovering new ones.
This thesis provides a contribution in tackling this hiatus. What can political 
scientists studying the EC’s international relations learn from the rich legal 
literature on mixed agreements? How, if at all, can this help us to understand the
1 Given that only the EC (and not the EU) has legal personality, the EC will be referred to in the 
context of international agreements throughout this thesis. For general reference, the term EU is 
still used.
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dynamics of the European integration process better? The focus of this thesis will 
thus be on specific aspects of the EC’s international relations, which are 
characterised by ‘mixity’. Is there anything in these settings that can shed light on 
the driving forces of the interaction between the EC and its Member States? Or, in 
other words, is it possible to distinguish some factors that can influence the 
balance of power between the EC and its Member States in mixed settings? In 
short, the ultimate study object of this thesis is the process of European 
integration. More specifically, the focus is on the EC’s external relations in mixed 
settings. This forms the main frame of reference for this thesis and this is the 
background for the more specific research questions that will be introduced in this 
chapter and the next.
This chapter is further divided into five sections. In the first section, the 
difficulties that are associated with the position of the EC in the international 
system are discussed, with particular attention being paid to the topic of mixed 
agreements. Then the external role of the Commission will briefly be touched 
upon, before the core puzzle is introduced and the main research questions are 
operationalised in the second section. The last three sections explore the 
integration literature, identify some shortcomings in these approaches, and 
indicate how this research project aims to contribute to this literature. Each 
section deals with one major school in the integration literature.
1.1. The role of the EC in the international system
The role of the EC in the international system has long been (and often still is) 
controversial. The USSR, for example, consistently refused to recognise the EC 
throughout most of the Cold War-period, although it could not prevent the EC 
from becoming party to, for example, the International Wheat Agreement in 1971. 
Nonetheless, the Soviet Union declared in a letter to the agreement’s secretariat 
that “its [i.e. the EEC’s] accession did not imply recognition of the EEC and
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created no obligations for the USSR with regard to the Community” (quoted in 
Denza, 1996: p. 5). In more recent times, it is the US that has often had (and is 
still having) difficulties in accepting the EC as an international actor. Good 
examples of this are to be found in the context of international environmental 
agreements, where the US blocked the EC’s accession to CITES and 
(unsuccessfully) resisted the EC’s efforts to become a party to the Vienna 
Convention and its Montreal Protocol (see for example Sbragia, 1998: p. 293-303; 
Jachtenfuchs, 1990: p. 264).2 Among the main reasons for this US reticence to 
deal with the EC is the uncertainty that is generated by the complex structure of 
the EC. For outsiders, it is often very difficult to know who is responsible for 
what in the EU. But also insiders are often lost and the fact that the question over 
who is competent to sign an international agreement regularly is a point of 
controversy between the EC and its Member States does not exactly help in 
convincing third countries that it is worth dealing with the EC rather than with the 
individual Member States. The EC has nonetheless become party to an increasing 
number of international agreements since the 1980s. And while it still faces plenty 
of obstacles and difficulties in establishing itself as an international actor, over the 
course of time “[T]hird parties as well as the UN system have gradually 
acknowledged the Community’s unique status (...) and are in the process of 
adapting international institutions to accommodate its unusual demands” (Sbragia, 
1998: p. 302).
As mentioned earlier, the division of competences between the EC and its 
Member States is an important (even crucial) issue when it comes to the signing 
of international agreements. When the agreement deals with issues that fall under 
the (explicit or implicit) exclusive competence of the EC, it alone can sign, i.e. 
without the Member States. Conversely, the Member States can sign international 
agreements regarding issues that fall outside the scope of the EC’s 
responsibilities. However, the division of competences between the Community
2 CITES is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, the Vienna Convention 
refers to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, and the Montreal Protocol 
is the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
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level and the Member States is seldom as clear-cut as in the above cases, 
particularly when it comes to external powers. Usually there will be some aspects 
of an agreement that are Community responsibilities while others will require 
Member State participation. The result of this is a ‘mixed agreement’: an 
agreement that is signed jointly by the EC and one, some or all of its Member 
States (see O’Keeffe and Schermers, 1983 for an excellent overview). Mixed 
agreements have become the norm rather than the exception in EC Treaty 
practice, even in areas like international trade where there is a good degree of 
exclusive Community competence (see O’Keeffe and Schermers, 1983: p. ix; 
Leal-Areas, 2001: pp. 483-484). One of the reasons why mixity is so prevalent is 
that the European Court of Justice is of the opinion, expressed in Opinion 1/78, 
that Member States can co-sign an agreement with the Community even if there 
are only minor provisions that fall under their responsibility (Court of Justice, 
1979). While mixed agreements do indeed have useful functions (such as 
reflecting the political compromise in the EC, or avoiding turf wars between 
Member States and EC over exclusive competence), they can also cause many 
problems (for a tentative list, see Ehlerman, 1983). The most pressing or visible of 
these have to do with representation, implementation, and liability. In the context 
of this research, the issue of representation is probably the most interesting and 
important element.
Mixity does not only have repercussions for the participation of the Community -  
and the extent of this participation -  in certain agreements and regimes, but it also 
touches upon the position of the Commission as the external representative of the 
EC. With regard to issues that fall under the exclusive competence of the 
Community, the Commission negotiates for the whole Community with third 
parties. In mixed negotiations, however, the Commission often has to share the 
stage with representatives from the Member States. There is no fixed format for 
the composition of the Community delegation or even for Community 
representation. Groux (1983) distinguishes between four different formulas for 
Community representation. The first one is that there are separate delegations for 
the Community (composed of Commission and Council officials) and the
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Member States. A second option is a similar constellation, but with the difference 
that the Community delegation also includes representatives from the Member 
State presiding over the Council. In a third formula, the Community delegation is 
composed of Commission and Council officials and civil servants from all the 
Member States. The last formula provides only for one Community delegation (so 
no separate Member State delegations any more), again composed of Commission 
and Council officials together with representatives from the Member States. But 
while the negotiating position of the Commission is often weaker in mixed 
settings, its representation function is usually not directly affected by mixity. 
Within the functioning of agreements or institutions, the Commission represents 
the EC in line with its general representation function (see Nugent, 2001: pp.320- 
321; 2003: pp. 236-440; Smith, 1995). The thing with mixity, of course, is that 
both the EC and its Member States will normally be represented in the 
organisation concerned, so in that sense the Commission certainly does not have 
carte blanche as the EC representative and there is still plenty of scope for the 
Member States to exert control over what the Commission is doing. What is 
important, however, is that in representing the EC, the Commission has more 
options and more leeway compared to the negotiation phase in many mixed 
settings.
The large amount of specialist legal literature on mixed agreements is an 
indication of the core position that the ‘competence question’ occupies within the 
study of EU law. Simplified, there are two main issues of concern from this legal 
point of view. On the one hand, there is the question which role the ECJ plays or 
should play in determining the division of competences between the Member 
States and the EC. On the other hand, there is the issue of how the EC can 
participate in international agreements despite the complex and often uncertain 
legal situation on the ‘domestic’ (i.e. European) level. These issues are well 
documented in the ever-increasing legal literature on mixed agreements, but also 
in the more recent legal and political literature on ECJ agency (see for example 
Garrett, 1995; Chalmers, 2000; Pollack, 2003).
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From a political studies point of view, there are some other interesting angles to 
look at the external representation of the EC, and the Commission’s role therein. 
After all, if Weiler’s adage that “the foreign policy domain is notoriously the most 
jealously guarded area of national sovereignty” (Weiler, 1980: p. 156) still holds, 
then focussing on external relations must be very instructive for studying the 
European integration process and its dynamics. The competence question thus 
becomes particularly interesting in the international representation of the EC 
when seen in the light of the integration literature (and practice), and 
Commission-Council or Commission-Member States relations. Or, again in 
Weiler’s words,
“in broad terms of European integration, the evolution of truly meaningful 
external relations with an effective shift of powers to Community organs, 
principally the Commission, would represent a marked step forward, for this 
very reason, i.e., the traditionally nationalistic colour of anything to do with 
foreign relations” (ibid.)
This thesis will take up this line from a slightly different angle in that it 
approaches EC participation in international regimes from an ‘integration’ 
perspective. The focus will be on the Commission’s behaviour in international 
regimes or organisations. The main question will then be if  (and if so: under 
which circumstances) it succeeds in using its position as EC spokesperson to gain 
influence and thus strengthen its position vis-a-vis the Council and the Member 
States. This raises two immediate questions that need to be addressed, both of 
which have to do, one way or anther, with measurement. First of all, an increase 
in Commission influence (at the expense of the Member States) can only be 
identified against a benchmark, in this case the preferences of the Member States. 
This benchmark therefore needs to be conceptualised and operationalised, 
something which is made rather more difficult because of the complex structure 
of delegation in the EC (see next paragraph). Secondly, the concept of influence 
needs to be clarified and defined more substantially. The next sections will take 
up these two issues.
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a) Member States, the Council and preferences
Throughout this thesis, the preferences of the Council are interpreted as a proxy 
for those of the Member States. This is not to say that a Council position 
necessarily reflects the uniform preferences of the Member States. More often 
than not there will be many differences, some more serious than others, between 
the preferences of different Member States. Previous publications studying the 
principal-agent framework have already drawn attention to this phenomenon and 
some have started to explore the consequences and implications of the presence of 
multiple principals or a collective principal as opposed to the more 
straightforward -  but also more theoretical -  instance of there being one, unitary 
principal (see McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1989; Nielson and Tiemey, 2003; 
specifically regarding principals in the EC see Pollack, 1997; 2003). Within the 
EC, the delegation from the Member States to the European Commission (and the 
control mechanisms the Member States put in place) will vary in mixed settings 
and this will have an effect both on the possibilities for the Commission to drift 
from the preferences of the Member States and on the power of the Member 
States -  as principals -  to sanction the Commission and rein it in.
In the case when there are multiple principals, the agent can exploit conflicting 
interests between the principals in order to maintain a larger degree of autonomy 
than would be feasible when there was a unitary principal (or when the interests 
of the Member States are aligned). The reason is that these conflicting interests or 
preferences might make it harder for the principals to sanction the agent when it 
drifts too far from the principal’s preferences. To put it in Pollack’s words: “the 
model draws our attention to the conflicting preferences among multiple 
principals and the ability of an agent to exploit these conflicts, as long as the 
agent’s activities remain within the set of Pareto-optimal outcomes” (Pollack, 
1997: p. 112). A crucial factor in this respect is of course the voting rule in place, 
since this determines the agent’s “win-set”, i.e. it outlines the limits of what the
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agent can rationally anticipate to be acceptable to the ‘key’ principal. Here, 
attention should be drawn to earlier studies on voting and voting behaviour in the 
Council. Mattila and Lane, for example, point out that voting is a surprisingly rare 
occurrence in the Council, even after the switch from unanimity voting to 
qualified majority voting in many issue areas (Mattila and Lane, 2001; this is also 
confirmed in a study by Hayes-Renshaw, van Aken and Wallace, 2006). 
Whatever the explanation -  whether the Member States are socialised through the 
negotiating process or whether they are just acquiring bargaining chips and 
negotiating coinage for future negotiations -  this does suggest that Member States 
are only going to be outvoted in very close votes or in votes where an issue of 
fundamental interest is at stake for them. Apart from these cases, Member States’ 
preferences are often malleable enough to be ‘changed’ and put into the corset of 
revealed preferences in the form of a Council decision, declaration, or the like.
The decision-rule that is in force determines which size the ‘winning coalition’ 
required for a Council position or decision should minimally be. In the case where 
unanimity is required, equating Council preferences with those of the Member 
States is rather intuitive. But also in the case of decision-making by qualified 
majority voting, the revealed preferences of the Council should capture the -  
broad -  preferences of a critical mass of Member States. In short, on the basis of 
these two elements (the pervasiveness of decision-making by consensus in the 
Council and the broad coalition needed for a qualified majority), this thesis 
interprets Council positions as a useful proxy for reflecting Member States’ 
preferences. This is a pragmatic choice because it enables us to operationalise a 
benchmark against which to measure if  the Commission drifts from the 
preferences of the Member States. Furthermore, this benchmark is relatively 
easily accessible and readily available without having to difficult and extensive 
field work in several Member States. While the latter would certainly be the 
preferred option, unfortunately the limited resources of this PhD project made it
3 ‘Key principal’, refers to the principal that holds the key to the decision. For example, under 
unanimity this is the lowest common denominator, under simple or qualified majority this is the 
principal that can deliver the necessary majority.
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impossible to pursue this in a rigorous and methodologically correct manner. 
However, as an acknowledgement of the effects of the presence of multiple 
principals, the position of individual Member States will be examined within the 
context of specific case studies whenever possible. While this is not exactly the 
same as elaborately analysing the preferences of the individual Member States, it 
should nonetheless mitigate the main concerns linked to using revealed Council 
preferences as an initial benchmark for determining whether the Commission 
drifts from the preferences of the Member States.
As additional support for choosing this approach, it can be noted that the Member 
States themselves have sometimes blurred the line between their individual 
choices and those of the Council. One of the defences of the Council in Case 22- 
70, better known as the AETR-case, was that the Council decision that was 
challenged by the Commission was, according to the Council, “really nothing 
more than a coordination of policies amongst member states” (Court, 1970: para. 
36), who happened to be together in the framework of a Council meeting. While 
the Court struck this argument down, it nonetheless shows that -  at least on a 
political level -  it is often difficult to distinguish clearly between the preferences 
of the Member States and those of the Council.
In conclusion, within the EC decision-making process the Commission usually 
faces multiple principals or a collective principal. Because the preferences and 
interests of these multiple principals will usually diverge to a certain degree, this 
can play to the advantage of the Commission by potentially making the 
imposition of sanctions less likely (depending on the voting rules in place and on 
the default condition), thus cutting the Commission, as agent, more slack. The 
preferences of individual Member States will therefore be taken into account 
when examining the relationship between the Commission and the Member States 
in particular cases. On a more general level, however, we need a benchmark 
against which to assess whether or not the Commission has been able to increase 
its influence and whether the preferences of the Commission diverge from the 
decision-making aggregate of Member States in the first place. For this aim, the
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revealed preferences of the Council are being used as a proxy for the preferences 
of the Member States. The reasons for doing this are threefold: first, decision­
making by consensus is still the rule rather than the exception in the Council; 
second, in the context of this thesis it would not have been feasible to engage in 
an in-depth study of the preferences of the individual Member States; and third, 
the Member States themselves have sometimes blurred the picture between then- 
own preferences and the Council’s. For these reasons, Council preferences will be 
used as an initial, general benchmark against which to measure whether the 
Commission drifts from the preferences of the Member States.
b) Shaping outcomes by formal and informal means: Commission influence
While a lot of attention has been paid to the notion of ‘competence’ earlier in this 
chapter, this is certainly not the only -  nor always the best -  measure of the 
Commission’s ability to pursue its preferences in international settings. Strictly 
speaking, competence belongs to the EC. The Member States delegate 
competence to the EC and within the EC a further delegation takes place. The 
negotiating can be entrusted to the Commission, the Council (Presidency) or a 
combination of the two. Regarding the representation of the EC within 
international organisations, this is delegated to the Commission in accordance 
with its function as external representative (see for example Nugent, 2003). In 
other words, because of its position in the political system of the EC, the 
Commission benefits from the fact that certain competences have been attributed 
to the EC. The competence issue is very important, because it has serious 
repercussions for the Commission’s position in international settings. This holds 
for the negotiation phase as well as for the representation phase. Without the 
presence of at least some EC competences in a particular issue area, the 
Commission cannot negotiate for the EC or represent the EC. However, the 
division of competences is not the only element that allows the Commission to 
pursue its preferences (to various degrees) and to try and have an impact on policy 
outcomes. A more general, overarching concept is ‘influence’. And having the
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legal competences is one of many facilitating factors for exerting influence 
(albeit, admittedly, an important one).
The literature has already distinguished and discussed different means for the 
Commission to pursue its preferences and to influence the decision-making 
process. In a broad overview of the Commission’s role in the EU policy-making 
process, Peterson (2002) clearly distinguishes between power and influence. 
According to him, “two important sources of Commission influence -  as opposed 
to ‘power’ -  are its prerogative (under Article 211 TEC) to deliver opinions on 
any EU matter, along with its obligation (in Article 212 TEC) to publish an 
annual report on the activities of the EU” (Peterson, 2002: p.88). The concept of 
‘influence’ has a broader scope than the concept of ‘power’. It could be defined as 
the ability to shape attitudes, structures and outcomes without necessarily being 
linked to legal competences. The implication of this definition is that it points to 
an impact without necessarily putting this in a teleological perspective, i.e. 
without entailing a pre-fixed end-goal, such as the expectation to acquire more 
competences, for example.
There are certain elements that facilitate the Commission to influence decisions 
and to steer the European integration process. Elements that are often identified in 
the literature as contributing to the Commission’s influence are: various strategies 
for setting the agenda4, its role as guardian of the treaties and its day-to-day role 
as policy administrator (see for example Schmidt, 2000; Pollack, 1997; Marks, 
Hooghe and Blank, 1996; Peters, 1994; Kerremans, 1996). Such elements can 
enable the Commission to influence and change the costs and benefits of certain 
policy options for Member States and it can thus have an impact, on policy 
outcomes as well as on the broader process of European integration. A study by 
Green Cowles, for example, argues strongly that certain policy outcomes and 
major steps in the European integration process such as the ‘Europe 1992’ project 
cannot be explained solely by the interests of the Member States (see Green 
Cowles, 1995).
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In the light of this literature, the argument that is put forward in this thesis could 
be summarised as follows. The institutional framework of external organisations 
can also have an impact on the Commission’s ability to play a stronger role and 
gain influence vis-a-vis the Member States. More specifically, it will be argued 
that the Commission can make strategic use of certain characteristics of strongly 
legalised institutional settings that change the cost-benefit analysis for Member 
States, that change the default condition and that strengthen the Commission’s 
position enabling it to go above and beyond its legal competences. This matters 
because it means that the Commission succeeds in having its preferences (at least 
partly) reflected in policy outcomes more often than could be expected from an 
analysis of the division of competences between the EU and its Member States 
(and between the institutions within the EU). Given that both the neofimctionalist 
and the intergovemmentalist literature overwhelmingly consider the Commission 
to have pro-integrationist preferences, increasing the influence of the Commission 
can thus have a considerable impact on the integration process, even if  it is not 
accompanied by a formal transfer of competences.
1.2. The research puzzle
Even though there has been a veritable explosion of alternative theories to explain 
the European integration process in the 1990s, most of these can still relatively 
easily be categorised as being either predominantly intergovernmental in nature or 
being cast more into a neofunctional/supranational mould. The study of the 
European integration process tends to bounce like a yo-yo between periods where 
intergovemmentalist-inspired theories are dominant and those where 
supranationalist ones set the tone. Each of these paradigms has its own views on 
what the driving forces of the European integration process exactly are and how 
this process is best to be explained. The supranationalists tend to stress the
4 This includes, but is not restricted to, its formal agenda-setting powers under Art. 211 TEC.
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independent role of the supranational institutions (most notably the European 
Commission and the Court of Justice), whereas the intergovemmentalists claim 
that integration is based on a conscious decision made by the governments of the 
Member States.
The last decade of the 20th century seems to have been a period that was 
dominated by the Member States. The Commission had largely been denied 
strong supranational powers in guiding, policing and governing the functioning of 
the Economic and Monetary Union;5 contrary to the ‘Europe 1992’ project the 
Lisbon process took the form of national action strategies placing emphasis on the 
role of the Member States; and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, despite 
a lot of rhetoric claiming otherwise, was still firmly in intergovernmental hands, 
to mention just a few examples. This had cast further doubt on the claim of early 
supranational integration theories that the European nation state had become 
obsolete and that sub-, supra- and transnational networks, with the help and under 
the leadership of the Commission, had taken over. After the bout of Europhoria 
and the reinvigorated supranational interpretations of the integration process that 
accompanied the Single Market programme (from the Milan summit to the 
Maastricht summit), the difficulties in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
heralded the return of the intergovemmentalists.
Indeed, even with regard to the Common Commercial Policy (the traditional 
stronghold of EC exclusive competence in the field of external relations), 
intergovernmental pressure seemed to be growing with the signing of the 
Marrakesh Agreements establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The 
Commission, having had exclusive competence over traditional trade issues (i.e. 
trade in goods) since the Treaty of Rome, appeared to have overplayed its hand in 
claiming that the ‘new’ issue areas of trade in services (GATS) and trade related 
aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) also fell within the sphere of this
5 This became painfully evident in the Spring of 2005 with the stand-off between the Commission 
and the Council in the context of the application of the excessive deficit procedure vis-a-vis 
France and Germany, where the Commission eventually had to backtrack.
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exclusive competence. The ECJ, following the interpretation of most Member 
States, ruled differently. In its infamous Opinion 1/94 the Court confirmed that 
the EC enjoys exclusive competence with regard to trade in goods and also for 
cross-border services (see Court, 1994).6 But it denied the EC exclusive 
competence over other types of trade in services and for trade related aspects of 
intellectual property rights. What is remarkable about Opinion 1/94 is that the 
Court refused to stick its neck out and extend the exclusive competence to GATS 
and TRIPS, even though on legal grounds a coherent argument could be made for 
granting the EC these competences (see for example Bourgeois, 1995; Pescatore, 
1999; Hilf, 1995). This is remarkable because, since the 1970s, the Court had 
usually been a rather reliable ally of the Commission in the deepening and 
widening of the scope of Community competences. Now it put the ball back into 
the politicians’ court.
The deeper substantial issue was the background against which the ruling was 
issued. Confidence in the EU and in particular in its supranational agent and 
embodiment, the Commission, was at an all-time low. There were several reasons 
for this. One of them had to do with the difficulties with the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty in France and Denmark and the overconfident and intrusive 
attitude of the Delors Commission (see Duff, 1994: p. 55).7 Another was to do 
with the Blair House debacle in the Uruguay Round of global trade negotiations, 
supposedly caused by a ‘runaway’ Commission, going way beyond its official 
mandate. After the optimism surrounding the creation of the Single European 
Market, the prospects for Europhiles and assorted Federalists were looking rather 
bleak in the 1990’s.
6 Cross-border services are one of the four categories o f services that are mentioned in the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services. The others are the supply of a service: (a) ‘in the 
territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member’, (b) ‘by a service supplier 
of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member’, and (c) ‘by a 
service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons o f a Member in the territory 
of any other Member’ (WTO, 2002: p. 287).
7 Apart from the very narrow margin of the ‘yes’-vote in France, there was also the serious legal 
challenge before the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Germany. So both members of the Franco- 
German axis (often described as the motor of European integration) encountered serious 
difficulties in the ratification of Maastricht.
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Because the EC did not have exclusive competence over all the issues involved, 
the WTO charter was signed as a ‘mixed’ agreement (see earlier). Surprisingly 
enough, although the EC lacks exclusive competence with regard to the new trade 
issues (GATS and TRIPS), the Commission has nonetheless succeeded in playing 
a central role in the WTO (and most notably in its dispute settlement 
understanding, the centrepiece of the new organisation), also on TRIPS-related 
issues. The question that arises then is why the Commission has been able to 
become the key player in a field where many Member States tried so hard to push 
it back, and where even the Commission’s traditional and natural ally within the 
EU, the ECJ, has refused to support it. Or, put differently, how come the 
Commission has been able to gain powers in such a hostile environment of 
increasingly EU-sceptic publics, and faced with stiff resistance and hostility by 
the Member States? This brings us to the main research question of this thesis: 
when and why can the Commission strengthen its position and gain influence vis- 
a-vis the Member States in international settings?
In general, one can conceive, roughly, of three main roads to changing the 
division of competences in the EU. This can be done by formal Treaty change, it 
can happen because of judicial activism, or it can come about by Commission 
agency. From the initial description of the TRIPS-case, it will already have 
become clear that judicial activism can safely be ruled out as an option: Opinion 
1/94 excluded most of GATS and TRIPS from the exclusive Community 
competences. Nor has the creation of the WTO been accompanied by a Treaty 
change. Indeed, most of the Member States (and all of the big ones) dismissed the 
Commission’s broad interpretation of art. 133 EC. Therefore, the explanation for 
this puzzle has to be sought in the exertion of agency by the Commission. 
Although this might seem nothing more than logic itself because of the way these 
choices were presented, it is nonetheless neither as straightforward nor as self- 
evident as it might seem on the face of it. It is true that the exertion of 
bureaucratic drift on behalf of the Commission is probably the ‘easiest’ of the 
three options to change the balance of competences, in the sense that the barriers
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for change are lower than for Treaty change or judicial review, both of which 
entail tiresome, cumbersome and time-consuming procedures. However, agency 
by the Commission is arguably also the most contentious option since the 
Member States will often be loath to allow the transfer, de facto or de jure , of 
more competences, especially ones with external (i.e. international) aspects, to the 
Community level.8 On the other hand, in a dynamic and rapidly changing 
environment, the efficacy of static divisions of power is not always optimal and 
therefore the Commission will be strongly pressed to seek greater powers in order 
to cope with new challenges. The alternative is a relative decline in its powers 
(compare it with the ‘cycle theory’; see Preeg, 1995).
In this section I have indicated that the prominent role the Commission plays in 
the WTO with regard to TRIPS-related issues is surprising (this case study is 
worked out in more detail in chapter three). That is mainly because of the extent 
and intensity of Member States’ opposition for granting the EC exclusive 
competence in these areas (as confirmed by the ECJ). This matters because if 
these issues fell within the scope of exclusive community competences, then the 
Commission would be the sole and legitimate player with regard to these cases in 
the WTO. For this reason, Opinion 1/94 can be seen as yet another step in the 
continuous struggle for power and influence between the Commission (as the 
supranational defender of Community interests) and the Member States gathered 
in the Council (defending their sovereignty and national interests). This thesis 
claims that the Commission will act strategically and that it uses its influence and 
position in international regimes in order to increase its powers and competences. 
One of the main contributions of the thesis will therefore be to shed light on the 
reasons behind, and on the processes and dynamics of this Commission ‘drifting’ 
in international regimes, and to identify the facilitating conditions under which 
this process can take place. In the next sections of this chapter, the most important
81 use the terms ‘drift’ or ‘agency’ to refer to situations where the Commission pursues or tries to 
pursue policy options that differ from the preferences of the relevant body of Member States 
(depending on the voting rule in place and on the importance of the Member State(s) involved). 
This will be further discussed and clarified in chapter 2 when the principal-agent framework is 
presented.
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theories of European integration are briefly reviewed. After an approach is 
presented, attention will turn to the role the theory at hand attributes to the 
Commission, but also how this theory would try to explain the Commission’s 
surprisingly strong position concerning TRIPS-related issues. It will be argued 
that none of the main theories offers an adequate explanation for the puzzle that 
was presented.
1.3. The Commission in the supranational paradigm
The early studies trying to explain the process of European integration were 
firmly rooted in the liberal camp of the international relations debate. Indeed, the 
integration process itself, even though it was scarcely out of the egg, was seen as 
a vindication and a victory of the liberal approach of international relations over 
the predominant, realist, paradigm. Because of the importance they attach to the 
concepts of power and sovereignty, realist theories seemed particularly unsuited 
for explaining what was happening in Europe. They were sidelined by a regional 
integration process in which sovereign countries voluntarily and peacefully gave 
up some of their power to a supranational institution (the High Authority, later the 
European Commission). From a realist point of view, this Commission could not 
be much more than a tool for implementing the preferences of the Member States. 
Liberal theories, on the other hand, seemed to be in a much better position to cope 
with this new form of international cooperation because of their firm belief “that 
in the long run cooperation based on mutual interests will prevail” (Jackson and 
Sorensen, 1999: p. 109).
On the most basic level, the initial debate was about the (ir)relevance of the nation 
state with the supranationalists sounding the death-knell of the sovereign state as 
the key player (and thus the basic unit of analysis) in international relations. 
Instead, these approaches granted substantial influence to the new supranational 
institutions (and the Commission in particular). Later the debate became more
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sophisticated and centred around the limits of the powers and the sovereignty of 
the nation state in regional cooperation agreements or, alternatively, around “the 
limits of European integration” (Taylor, 1983; 1993).
Federalism and neo-functionalism
The supranationalist paradigm consists, roughly, of two schools of thought: 
federalism and neo-functionalism. The basic federalist reasoning went that the 
destruction and loss of yet another ‘Great War’ on the European continent led to a 
catharsis (see Spinelli, 1972). The insight gained was that the nation state is 
unsuitable as a unit for international relations since states were prone to fight each 
other and that a federation was the best alternative to ensure a peaceful existence.9 
Although the European Parliament is the natural habitat of the federalists, they 
acknowledge readily that the Commission is still at the heart of the Union. 
Because of its institutional position, it is much more central than the Parliament in 
the EU decision-making process (although there is a steady increase in the powers 
and influence of the Parliament since Maastricht). The stress, however, is on the 
federal ideas of “the political and administrative elites working in the 
Commission” (Burgess, 1989: p. 6) rather than on any inherent federalism of the 
Commission as an institution. These federal ideas find their origins, not in an 
ideological conviction, but rather in the practice of “the institutional dilemmas 
confronting a supranational body operating within a predominantly 
intergovernmental framework” (ibid.). In other words, federalism is just a 
practical solution to the day-to-day problems of running Europe.
Neofunctionalism, the other supranationalist school, is more widely known and 
has been more influential than federalism. The two pioneers of the 
neofimctionalist approach to European integration undoubtedly are Ernst Haas
9 Note that the first premise of this argument is in fact an acknowledgement of the explanatory 
power of classical realism since in a Hobbesian world states will always be competitors (and thus 
fight each other every now and again).
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and Leon Lindberg. They first developed the neofimctionalist theory in their 
studies of the European Community of Steel and Coal (Haas, 1958) and the early 
years of the European Economic Community (Lindberg, 1963). The foundations 
of the neofimctionalist approach were laid earlier by David Mitrany’s 
functionalism (Mitrany, 1943; 1965). Mitrany’s aim was to create a global 
“working peace system” with a functional approach. This works because
“[B]y entrusting an authority with a certain task, carrying with it command 
over the requisite powers and means, a slice of sovereignty is transferred 
from the old authority to the new; and the accumulation of such partial 
transfers in time brings about a translation of the true seat of authority” 
(Mitrany, 1943: p. 31).
This basic thought (cooperation in technical domains as the starting point for an 
integration process) was taken up by Haas and his followers and applied to study 
of the process of regional integration that was taking place in Western Europe in 
the 1950s.
The cornerstone of the neofunctional approach is the concept of ‘spill-over’. This 
comes in two forms: functional spill-over and political spill-over. Functional spill­
over refers to the process in which integration in one sector causes technical 
pressures that will push for and ultimately lead to integration in other sectors. The 
rationale behind this reasoning is the notion of (economic) interdependence. 
Political spill-over refers to the process whereby political pressure is created 
favouring further integration. Or, more precisely, “the process whereby political 
actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions 
possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1958: 
p. 16). Note that neofunctionalists usually ignore external pressures and the 
external environment. The integration process, according to them, works
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according to the internal logic of spill-over.10 The key actors to bring this change 
about are elites and the Commission.
The role o f the Commission in supranationalist theories
In this supranational logic, the Commission is the single most important 
institution in the Community since it is the pivot of the new, superior form of 
decision-making that was used in the EC and which Haas labelled 
‘supranationalism’ (Haas, 1963: p. 64; see also Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970 
who preferred to call it ‘the Community method’). The quality of supranational 
decisions was higher than that of intergovernmental decisions since supranational 
decision-making went beyond the lowest common denominator. The reason for 
this lies in the role that the Commission has to play. The Commission is seen as a 
dynamic force, constantly brokering agreement in the Council and forming 
‘coalitions of the willing’ with the governments committed to integration. On top 
of that, because of its institutional position (its right of initiative and withdrawal 
of proposals, the concentration of technical expertise, etc.) the Commission was in 
a strong position to define the alternatives to the Member States. In other words, 
the Commission could heavily influence the final outcome (see Haas, 1958: 484). 
The image of the Commission in the early neofimctionalist theories, then, is that 
of a dynamic force that leaves its mark on the final policy outcome in the sense 
that it succeeds in reaching outcomes that move beyond the lowest common 
denominator. This success can be explained by looking at the institutional 
position of the Commission, and, most importantly, the leadership it provides.
Ever since Haas and Lindberg first articulated their neofunctional approach to the 
European integration process, there has been a constant refining of the original
10 In this respect, it should be noted that the ‘extemalisation hypothesis’ that was introduced by 
the neofunctionalists (Schmitter, 1969) refers to the interaction of the group members with third 
parties rather than that it incorporates other external factors that impact upon the integration 
process into the analysis.
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theory and its assumptions, certainly in the light of the ‘Gaullist revolution’ of the 
1960s (see next section). The more radical propositions (eg that the sovereign 
state was dead) were nuanced, the teleological aspect was discarded of (see 
Muttimer, 1989; Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991), and the general importance of spill­
over was traded in for a focus on the partial relevance of spill-over in specific 
policy domains and policies.11 The two most important recent theories inspired by 
neo-functionalism probably are network analysis (Peterson, 1991; 1995; 
Richardson, 1996) and the multi-level governance approach (Marks, Hooghe and 
Blank, 1996; Kohler-Koch, 1996). These theories also stress the importance of the 
role of the Commission in influencing outcomes on the EU-level, as well as the 
fact that the Commission can act autonomously.
A supranational explanation for the TRIPS-puzzle?
How then would a supranational or neofunctional approach account for the 
position of the Commission with regard to TRIPS-issues in the WTO? Given the 
number of theories in the neofunctional mould and given their varying degrees of 
sophistication, the following account will inevitably fail to represent all the 
nuances of the various approaches. Instead, the three main principles for 
explaining the dynamics of European integration (and hence of Commission- 
Member State relations) that consistently arise in the most important theories are 
distilled. These are spill-over (functional and political), societal pressure 
(epistemic communities, transnational networks), and the autonomous role of the 
Commission.
Applying the notion of spill-over to the TRIPS-case, the basic argument would be 
that the already acquired exclusive competence in trade in goods creates pressure 
to extend this exclusive competence to the area of intellectual property rights. An
11 See for example Peterson, 1991; Cram, 1994; Fuchs, 1994; McGowan, 2000; Thatcher, 2001; 
Morth, 2000.
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important element in this process of spill-over, supranationalists might argue, is 
that trade-issues are increasingly technical and therefore tend to be dealt with on 
the lower, technocratic levels of decision-making rather than at the political level. 
However, we have seen that the political representatives of the Member States did 
take a keen interest in what was going on and that they were very eager to keep 
control over these new issues of services and intellectual property rights. On top 
of that, trade issues increasingly are very political matters. That certainly goes for 
the TRIPS-case since it was politicised from the moment the division of 
competences between the EU and the Member States was mentioned, thereby 
transforming a technical discussion into a political one about “creeping 
competences” and “federalisation by stealth”.
The second major characteristic of supranational theories is the stress on societal 
pressure. One of the clearest manifestations of this phenomenon is lobbying by 
various interest groups. A supranational explanation would then expect to see a 
debate among and positioning of pressure groups. For example, federations of 
industries which stood to gain from exclusive EC competence with regard to 
TRIPS issues would be expected to lobby their governments to transfer these 
competences to the EC level. The person responsible for dealing with WTO and 
international trade issues at UNICE, the largest and most important business 
lobby group, flatly denied that this was the case (interview with Adrian Van den 
Hoven). Dr Van den Hoven explained that there is a general unwillingness on the 
part of these organisations to be drawn into competence fights between the 
Commission and the Member States. An important reason for this is that their 
member organisations have their roots and activities within the respective 
Member States. Therefore, it is not very attractive for them to get involved in 
Community politics since that has the potential to erode their basis in their home 
Member State.
Stressing the autonomous role of the Commission looks more promising. Given 
the proactive role of the Commission in its fight for power and influence, the
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supranational portrayal of the Commission as more than just a Member State 
stooge gains credibility.
Conclusion
By stressing the relative independence of the Commission, and by depicting it as a 
dynamic policy entrepreneur, supranational theories claim that there is more to the 
Commission’s role than meets the -  intergovernmental -  eye. The Commission 
actively works to have its preferences reflected in the final outcome by exercising 
leadership (see for example Vahl, 1997), relying on its technical expertise (to 
‘depoliticise’ issues and thereby facilitating functional spill-over), and mobilising 
societal groups. However, neither the concept of spill-over, nor societal pressures 
provide a full and adequate explanation for the Commission’s behaviour in the 
TRIPS-case. In particular, two important questions remain unanswered. The first 
one is why the Commission succeeded in its ‘coup’ at this particular point in time, 
and not earlier (or later)? The second question is why the Commission succeeded 
in becoming an important player with regard to TRIPS issues, but not for other 
issues in other areas? As an example, reference can be made to the Commission’s 
weak role in the OECD. Any attempt to ‘solve’ the TRIPS-puzzle should also 
provide a satisfactory answer to these two questions.
1.4. The Commission in the intergovernmental paradigm
The realist paradigm, that had been dominating the study of international 
relations, was side-tracked by neofunctionalism in the early days of the European 
integration process. However, with the empty chair crisis in the 1960s and the 
attack on the supranational Commission by General de Gaulle, the re-emergence 
of the notions of ‘national interest’ and ‘sovereignty’ was a fact, and this paved 
the way for a strong realist comeback in the form of intergovemmentalism. If
43
supranationalism has its roots in the liberal IR theories, intergovemmentalism is 
firmly realist in nature. The basic intergovemmentalist claim is that the 
integration process is driven by the states and that these states are the main actors 
in the integration process since, ultimately, they are the ones who decide what to 
integrate, when to integrate, and how far to integrate. The guiding principle is 
self-interest since sovereign states will pursue their national interests. In this 
Hobbesian world, the moral imperative and the liberal idealism that characterises 
the early supranationalism is considered naive at best. The empty chair crisis and 
the solution to it -  the Luxembourg compromise -  put the states back on the map 
as relevant players in the European integration process and it presented a serious 
challenge to the neofunctional view and the explanatory power of this theory.
The basics o f intergovemmentalism
One of the first scholars in the intergovernmental camp to critically assess the 
neofunctionalist view on the European integration process is Stanley Hoffmann 
(see for example Hoffmann, 1964). This American scholar was highly sceptical 
about the supranational claim that the nation state had become obsolete. 
According to Hoffmann, the integration process was successful because its scope 
was limited and it dealt with issues of Tow’ politics. Integration, still according to 
Hoffmann, was inconceivable for issues belonging to the sphere of ‘high’ politics 
since this domain is dominated by the national interest of sovereign states. In his 
own words: “[a] common fate has created a unity of concern in this little ‘cape of 
Asia’ but there is no unity of reaction. For each nation fate has been slightly 
different, and the common fate is not perceived alike” (Hoffmann, 1964a: p. 
1272).
The main criticism of Hoffmann’s theory focussed on his notion of an inviolable 
boundary between the nation state and the environment in which it operates. The 
inspiration for these critics was the increasing global interdependence and the 
interdependence literature that emerged as a result of this. Later they were also
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strengthened by the surge in European integration that accompanied the creation 
of the Single Market. The counter-reaction to this liberal critique was a 
refinement of the intergovernmental paradigm. Paul Taylor took a leading role in 
this process in the mid 1970s by developing a confederalist model for 
understanding the European integration process (see Taylor, 1975). The key 
aspect is that states cooperate by pooling certain resources and working closely 
together in order to attain mutually advantageous outcomes or at the very least to 
come to a certain degree of convergence.
It was Moravcsik who in the 1990s developed the most recent, and arguably the 
most influential and best-argued intergovernmental account. Reacting against a 
supranationalist resurgence that accompanied the Single European Act (see 
Zysman and Sandholtz, 1989), Moravcsik proposed an alternative, 
intergovernmental explanation for the ‘Europe 1992’ project (see Moravcsik, 
1991). First, he looked at the negotiating history of the Single European Act and 
he concluded that
“[T]he findings challenge the prominent view that institutional reform 
resulted from an elite alliance between EC officials and pan-European 
business interest groups. The negotiating history is more consistent with the 
alternative explanation that EC reform rested on interstate bargains between 
Britain, France, and Germany” (Moravcsik, 1991: p. 20-21).
Moravcsik explicitly places his approach in the tradition of Keohane’s ‘modified 
structural realist’ view of regime change (see Moravcsik, 1991; Keohane, 1984). 
Here, states are still the principal actors in international relations and, in the best 
realist tradition, national interest and relative power are the elements that shape 
interstate bargains. However, Moravcsik avoids the neo-realist pitfall of the state 
as ‘billiard ball’ (see Waltz, 1954). He clearly argues that “[Sjtates are not “black 
boxes” (...). State interests change over time, often in ways which are decisive for 
the integration process but which cannot be traced to shifts in the relative power 
of states” (Moravcsik, 1991: p. 27). In a later reformulation of his ‘liberal
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intergovernmental’ theory, Moravcsik uses the two level game terminology more 
explicitly by stating that “state behaviour reflects the rational actions of 
governments constrained at home by domestic societal pressures and abroad by 
their strategic environment” (Moravcsik, 1993: p. 473).12 This liberal 
intergovemmentalism wants to offer a more complete and plausible theory of 
European integration by bringing together theories of preferences (the domestic 
level), bargaining (the international level), and regimes (the international level, 
two level games). Nonetheless, states still reign supreme and supranational 
institutions only play a marginal role in this approach
The role o f the Commission in intergovemmentalism
In confederalism, the role of the Commission is that of mediator: the 
Commission’s task is to actively try to get the governments to reach agreements. 
In Taylor’s words, the Commission “accepted the status of ‘interest group’” 
(Taylor, 1975: p. 348). The constraints that the Member States of the European 
Community faced were not the result of the dynamic force of ‘spill-over’ as the 
supranationalists claimed, but, rather, they were self-imposed in order to stimulate 
the (interstate) diplomatic contacts that lead to mutual benefits. The confederalists 
acknowledged that there were tensions between the supranational institutions 
(Commission, Court of Justice, Parliament) and the prime intergovernmental 
institution (the Council). But given its legislative dominance in the European 
decision-making structure, they reasoned that the Council (read: the Member 
States) should usually prevail over the supranational pressures from Commission 
and/or Parliament.
12 The image of the ‘two level game’ forged a compromise between the neo-realist model of the 
‘state as black box’ and the naive supranational image of obsolete states being replaced by a 
network of global transnational relations. Here, the domestic and the international level are not 
regarded as being insulated from each other, but instead they were seen to be constantly 
influencing each other. The international sphere becomes part of the domestic calculations and 
interests since some domestic problems cannot be solved unilaterally. On the other hand, the 
higher the degree of interdependence, the more often domestic decisions will have consequences 
in the international sphere. For a detailed account of the two level game, see Putnam, 1988; 
Evans et al., 1993; Milner, 1997.
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The confederalist dynamics of the integration process can be summarised as 
follows: because of global pressures (opportunities or constraints) states decide to 
cooperate (further), in order to facilitate this cooperation they create institutions 
and develop procedures by which they agree to be bound with regards to day to 
day decisions. However, since the states keep control of the key legislative 
institution they can still defend their interests once they have agreed to be bound. 
In other words, confederalists acknowledge that there are elements of 
supranationalism and supranational influence, but they concur with the realist 
notion that, ultimately, the states are in control and they are the ones steering and 
driving the integration process. And since these states are driven by national 
interest, integration can only go so far: these are “the limits to integration” 
(Taylor, 1983).
Also in Moravcsik’s liberal intergovemmentalism, the Commission is deprived of 
the dynamic entrepreneurial leadership attributed to it by some of the more recent 
supranational theories. The primary source of integration lies in the national 
interests of the Member States (and their relative power needed to have these 
interests reflected in the outcomes) rather than in Brussels. The Commission has 
some leeway, but only in so far as it concerns issues or areas where the Member 
States have already paved the way. Any claim of the Commission as a dynamic 
driving force in the process of European integration, pushing the Member States 
in agreements they dislike, is wildly exaggerated in Moravcsik’s view (see 
Moravcsik, 1991; 1993; 1995; 1998).
An intergovernmental explanation to the TRIPS-puzzle?
From the above description, it already becomes clear that the intergovernmental 
approach struggles to come up with an explanation for the Commission’s 
successful coup in the area of intellectual property rights. The chief explanatory 
variable, from an intergovernmental point of view, is Member State preference.
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This does not entail that the preferences of all Member States will be taken into 
account or reflected in the outcome, but at the very least there has to be a ‘grand 
bargain’ between the big three Member States: Germany, France, and the UK. 
However, all three countries (together with others) opposed the Commission’s 
interpretation that trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights fell under the exclusive competence of art. 133 EC. So the 
intergovernmental explanation that the Commission gained these de facto 
competences and powers because the Member States allocated them or did not 
object to the Commission claiming them, looks dubious at best.
Of course it could be argued that Member State preferences could change over 
time. In this interpretation, the fact that Member States denied these new 
competences to the Commission does not preclude the possibility of granting 
these powers at a later stage. Nonetheless, the centrality and importance of 
Opinion 1/94 in the legal literature together with the intensity with which most of 
the Member States fought the interpretation of the Commission seems to indicate 
that the issues at stake were deemed to be very important to those Member States. 
It would therefore be rather strange that Member State preferences on such a 
salient issue would change so drastically and dramatically in the span of only a 
couple of years.
Conclusion
In intergovernmental theories, there is very little space for autonomous action on 
behalf of the Commission. This is not to say that there can be no such action at 
all, but it will be confined to issues where the Member States decide to allow the 
Commission to act in that way. Ultimately, however, the Member States are still 
the ones pulling the strings. An intergovernmental explanation therefore also fails 
to provide a full and adequate answer to the TRIPS-puzzle.
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1.5. The Commission and new institutionalism
Even though the recent (and more sophisticated) theories within the supranational 
and the intergovernmental paradigm have partly bridged the ideological divide 
between the two paradigms, they still talk to each other in different languages, 
namely that of comparative politics and international relations respectively (see 
Dowding, 2000) so that neither approach finds much hearing at the other side of 
the theoretical spectrum. This section deals with the new institutionalist approach 
to the European integration process. This approach is an influential attempt to 
come to a more integrated study of European integration, reconciling the two 
traditional strands of thought with all their differences in ideology and 
methodology.
In the second half of the 1990s, some scholars applied the ‘new institutionalism’ 
to the study of the EU (see Pierson, 1996; Pollack, 1996; 1997; Bulmer, 1993; 
1998). From such a point of view, “it matters less whether politics occurs within 
or among nations. What matters more is that politics occurs within a framework 
of mutually understood principles, norms, rules, or procedures -  that is, within an 
institutional context” (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999: p. 431). Institutional 
approaches maintain the basic intergovernmental premise that power and 
preferences of the Member States are crucial in setting up and changing European 
institutions and that the Member States continue to play an important role. But at 
the same time they also point out that, once created, institutions become active 
players in the policy process. In other words, institutions become “intervening 
variables between the preferences and power of the member governments on the 
one hand, and the ultimate policy outputs of EC governance on the other” 
(Pollack, 1996.: p. 431).
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The basics o f  new institutionalism
As Dowding has noted “[s]ince Arrow (1951 -  1963) we have known that 
‘institutions matter’ because the outcome o f any preference-aggregating 
procedure depends on the principles adopted as much as the preferences o f the 
actors” (Dowding, 2000: 126). As this quote indicates, during the past decades the 
question gradually shifted from ‘do institutions matter’ towards ‘how or under 
which circumstances do institutions matter’. In the last two decades o f the 20th 
century institutionalist theory made a glorious comeback. New institutionalist 
theories and approaches shot up like mushrooms, and the term ‘institution’ shook 
off its negative connotation and moved back to the centre o f political science.
The term ‘new institutionalism’ was introduced by March and Olsen in their 
seminal article ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political 
Life’ (March and Olsen, 1984). However, the term ‘new institutionalism’ in the 
title o f March and Olsen’s article is a bit o f a misnomer since it seems to imply 
that it refers to a homogenous strand o f  thought. In practice, there are several, 
often very different, new institutionalist approaches. Therefore, the title o f an 
article by Hall and Taylor might be more appropriate: ‘Political Science and the 
Three New Institutionalisms’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Whether the range o f new 
institutionalist approaches is indeed limited to three is another matter open to 
discussion. An earlier version o f  their paper was titled ‘Political Science and the 
Four New Institutionalisms’ (see the references in Finnemore, 1996). And Peters 
goes even further. For him “it is clear that there are at least six versions o f the new 
institutionalism in current use” (Peters, 1999: p. 17).
The two most popular strands o f new institutionalism are the historical 
institutionalist variant and its rational choice counterpart. Despite some 
differences in emphasis, the basic premise o f  these two variants is the same: 
institutions matter and they influence outcomes. Since Scharpf published his 
article on the ‘joint decision trap’ (Scharpf, 1988), there has been an ever growing 
number o f  studies applying rational choice institutionalism to the study o f the
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European Union/Community.13 This literature has its origins in Shepsle’s work on 
institutions in the US Congress (Shepsle, 1979; 1989). Drawing on the 
observation that policy choices are unstable in majoritarian systems of decision­
making (McKelvey, 1976; Riker, 1980), Shepsle showed that also the institutional 
structure (and not only preferences) mattered in reaching equilibria. He called this 
institutionally-enriched equilibrium concept ‘structure-induced equilibrium’. In 
other words, Shepsle claimed that preferences are only part of the picture and in 
order to be able to more fully understand policy outcomes, institutions have to be 
taken into account as well. The historical institutionalist literature can be traced 
back to Thelen and Steinmo’s influential account of the historical institutionalist 
approach (see Thelen and Steinmo, 1992) and was subsequently applied to the 
EC/EU (see Pierson, 1996, 2000a, 2000b; Kerremans, 1996). The main 
differences between this approach and its rational choice counterpart are about the 
nature of preferences and the nature of institutional origins and change.
The issue of preference formation is, according to Thelen and Steinmo, the main 
difference between the two approaches: “[t]hus one, perhaps the, core difference 
between rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism lies in the 
question of preference formation, whether treated as exogenous (rational choice) 
or endogenous (historical institutionalism)” (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: p. 9; 
original emphasis). In the ‘hard core’ rational choice theory preferences are 
exogenous because of the assumption of rational calculus. Actors act strategically 
and this means that the process is characterised by extensive calculation of 
(perceived) costs and (perceived) benefits.14 Therefore, preferences have to be 
exogenous since otherwise it would be impossible for actors to rank their 
preferences and act accordingly. Historical institutionalists, on the other hand, 
claim that preferences are formed in the context of an institutional structure. In 
other words,
13 See for example Garrett and Weingast, 1993; Tsebelis, 1994; 2000; 2002; Garrett and Tsebelis, 
1996; Scharpf, 1997.
14 For a general view of these behavioural assumptions and their practical applications, see 
Shepsle, 1979; Shepsle and Weingast, 1987; Elster and Hylland, 1986.
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“[...] institutions are not just another variable, and the institutionalist claim  
is more than just “institutions matter too”. By shaping not just actors’ 
strategies (as in rational choice), but their own goals as well, and by 
mediating their relations o f  cooperation and conflict, institutions structure 
political situations and leave their own imprints on political outcomes” 
(Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: p. 9)
The rational choice institutionalists have answered this critique by stressing the 
interaction of individual (exogenous) preferences and institutional-induced 
(endogenous) preferences. This is aptly summarised by Peters who notes that:
“[f]or most rational choice theorists those conceptions are exogenous to the 
theories and o f little or no concern to the theorists. Institutional versions o f the 
theory, however, must be concerned with how individuals and institutions 
interact to create preferences. [...] As institutions become more successful they 
are more able to shape individual preferences, sometimes even before they 
formally join the institution. In institutional rational choice some preferences, 
e.g. a general drive toward utility maximization, appear to be exogenous, while 
some preferences also may be endogenous to the organization” (Peters, 1999: p.
44; a similar view is expressed by Milner, 1997: p. 66)
Pierson has attacked rational choice institutionalism for failing to adequately 
explain institutional origins and institutional change (Pierson, 1996, 2000a, 
2000b). He rejects the functionalist explanation that rational choice scholars use 
for addressing the creation of institutions (‘a certain institution is chosen because 
it is the most efficient for fulfilling a certain task’). According to Pierson, there 
are four main objections to this reasoning. Firstly, political institutions are more 
likely to be inefficient than economic institutions because of the lack of market 
pressures. The two efficiency generating market mechanisms, competition and 
learning, are far less effective when it comes to political institutions. The political 
environment, Pierson argues, is more permissive than the economic one thereby 
reducing competition (see Pierson, 2000). Learning is hindered by path
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dependency (see Pierson, 2000a). On top of that, Garrett and Weingast have 
indicated that often there are several alternatives. A functional approach cannot 
explain why a particular set of institutions is preferred since the alternatives are 
equally efficient (see Garrett and Weingast, 1993).
Secondly, Pierson points to the fallacy of the rational design of institutions. The 
notion that institutions are intentional, far-sighted choices of purposive, 
intentional actors is optimistic at best since every adjective in this description is 
questionable. Actors are sometimes motivated by what seems appropriate instead 
of by what would be effective. Thirdly, politicians usually have short time 
horizons, which creates a problem of time inconsistency. And fourthly, this view 
ignores the possibility of unintended consequences. Pollack takes heed of these 
“powerful criticisms” and concludes that “we should begin with the policy 
preferences and the institutional preferences of the actors, describe and explain 
the process of institutional choice, and take note of the subsequent evolution, 
including the unintended consequences, of that institutional choice” (Pollack, 
1996: p. 434).
In particular regarding the application of the new institutionalism to the study of 
European integration, a cross-fertilisation has taken place between rational choice 
and historical institutionalism. Scholars like Pierson and Pollack are not 
constrained by ideological borders between paradigms and the result is the 
creation of an approach that has a basic rational choice orientation, but avoids the 
pitfalls of the ‘hard core’ rational choice theory. In this approach, states are still 
firmly in control when it comes to the creation and/or changing of institutions, as 
is illustrated in the EU by the requirement of unanimity for treaty change (and for 
a new treaty to come into force of course). However, once created, these 
institutions will have their own preferences and they will exert influence through 
various sub-, trans-, and supranational channels in order to have these preferences 
reflected in policy outcomes. The new institutionalism has thus drastically 
redefined the debate when it comes to European integration. Now it is possible to 
acknowledge the (initial) primacy of the Member States without having to
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designate the supranational institutions as irrelevant. Or, alternatively, to point to 
the impact of the supranational institutions without having to broadcast the 
obsolescence of the sovereign state. Instead, the focus is back on the limits of 
sovereignty and supranationalism, or how actors (be they of an intergovernmental, 
supranational, or transnational nature) act strategically in response to the 
limitations they are confronted with.
The role o f  the Commission in the new institutionalism
The institutionalist approach attributes an independent role to the Commission, 
but this independence is constrained by the institutional structure put in place by 
the Member States. The role of the Commission will therefore vary from one 
topic to another and from one issue area to another, depending on a combination 
of Member State preferences, the institutional framework in place, and 
Commission preferences. The preferences of the Member States determine how 
much ‘drift’ they are willing to accept. The Commission’s preferences show the 
extent to which the Commission would have to drift if  it were to obtain its 
favoured outcome. There will usually be at least some divergence between the 
preferences of the Commission and those of the Member States. The two 
extremes of the continuum normally are not an option. Keeping such tight control 
on the Commission to make sure that no other option than the one most preferred 
by the Council is obtained, is not a viable strategy for the Council since it is 
prohibitively costly. Likewise, it will be impossible for the Commission to pursue 
its preferred strategy irrespective of the Council’s preferences since the Council 
would certainly block such a move. The result is a ‘grey zone’ that is 
characterised by turf wars and struggles for power between the Commission and 
the Council. The outcomes of the struggles in this zone are partly determined by 
the institutional framework in place.
For example, if  the Commission oversteps the Council’s ‘tolerance barrier’, the 
scope and force of the Member States’ reaction will depend on the institutional
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framework in place, i.e. the rules and how these rules are to be applied. The 
Commission will have less leeway if a Council decision on its proposals requires 
unanimity rather than a qualified majority. If there is a unanimity requirement, the 
Commission’s domain of potential action is determined by the preferences of the 
most and least reluctant Member States (vis-a-vis the status quo). As long as the 
Commission stays within the ‘unanimity’ area where all Member States prefer the 
Commission’s proposal rather than the status quo, there will never be a coalition 
against its actions. If only a qualified majority is required, the Commission will 
gain influence since there is no need to take the most divergent Member States’ 
preferences into account.15 Note, however, that the institutional framework not 
only refers to the formal rules, but that it also comprises informal rules and 
arrangements. In this respect, a proposal formally falling within the preferences of 
a winning qualified majority of Member States can still be defeated because of 
socialisation effects (a reluctance to go against the explicit wishes of fellow 
Member States) or pork-barrel politics (which change the costs and/or benefits of 
particular policies).
An institutionalist explanation to the TRIPS-puzzle
The institutionalist approach attributes a certain degree of autonomy to the 
Commission. This will be central in an institutionalist reading of the puzzle. 
Given that the Member States have tried -  and failed -  to rein in the Commission 
in the new issue areas in the WTO, the explanation for the success in Commission 
activism has to be sought in this autonomy that the Commission possesses. The 
reason why the Commission has succeeded in increasing its external powers, 
against the wishes of the Member States, is because of bureaucratic drift. 
However, this raises some other important questions. The most pressing one being
15 As Meunier has shown rather convincingly, this is not necessarily true externally, i.e. in 
international (multilateral) negotiations (see Meunier, 2000; 2005). However, we are referring to 
the situation internally, within the EC. And here the area of possible outcomes -  and thus of 
Commission influence -  increases with a shift from unanimity voting to QMV.
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why the Commission succeeds in ‘shirking’ in this case, but not in other, similar, 
cases. A good case in point is the comparison of the Commission’s role with 
regard to TRIPS-issues with its role concerning the issue of investment. Why did 
the Commission fail to play an important role in international investment issues 
when these were being discussed within the OECD, even though they are very 
similar to the trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property 
rights issues? Surely the same dynamics can be expected to be playing for similar 
issues? Yet, as will be shown later, the Commission’s role in the negotiations for 
a Multilateral Agreement on Investment was not nearly as prominent as it would 
have wished. To conclude, this institutional approach does come closest to 
providing a satisfactory answer. In the next chapter, the framework that applies 
this approach to the study of European integration (the principal-agent approach) 
will therefore be taken as a starting point. However, despite the promising start, 
some questions remain unanswered and this approach cannot offer a fully 
convincing explanation to the puzzle either. Therefore, it will have to be refined 
further if it is to be applied to the EC’s external relations. The next chapter will 
indicate how this thesis proposes to do that. After having tested the hypotheses in 
the empirical chapters, the concluding chapter will then incorporate these findings 
in a more coherent theoretical framework.
Conclusion
This section discussed the new institutionalism as an alternative approach to the 
study of the European integration process and Commission-Member State 
relations. The new institutionalism strikes a balance between the 
intergovernmental and the supranational paradigms by accepting the importance 
of the central concepts of both theories, but avoiding the pitfalls. Or, as one of the 
leading voices of the institutional approach states: “these [new institutional] 
contributions [on European integration] offer the promise of overcoming the 
current impasse of the neofunctionalist / intergovemmentalist debate and 
generating a new theoretical synthesis combining many of the fundamental
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insights of both approaches” (Pollack, 1996: p. 430). To achieve this, Pollack 
provides a new methodological toolbox in the form of the principal-agent analysis 
(see next chapter). The new institutionalism, similar to supranationalist 
interpretations, points out that the Commission enjoys some leeway, but it adds 
that the institutional framework in place limits this Commission autonomy. While 
this approach comes closer to addressing the puzzle, it, too, cannot account for 
most of the variation. The concluding chapter of this thesis will contribute to the 
further development of this approach by suggesting additions to enable it to 
explain more of the variation in the degree of integration in the EC’s external 
relations.
CONCLUSION
That there is a cleavage in the institutional set-up of the European Union between 
supranational and intergovernmental interests, is nothing new and it certainly is 
not surprising. Nor is the proposition that the European Commission is the natural 
ally of the supranationalists and the Council of Ministers the staunch defender of 
intergovernmental interests. The fact is that the European construction is a highly 
delicate balance of interests and conflicting ideas on where Europe stands and 
where it should be heading (or indeed about what Europe means). Even the 
slightest change in this balance can lead to frictions. A good illustration of this is 
the constant haggling at every Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which often 
more closely resembles a fratricide than the building of a new family house.
IGCs are not the only way of changing the balance of power, however. The 
European Court of Justice can tilt the balance in a more supranational direction, 
and has repeatedly done so in the past (most famously with its Cassis de Dijon- 
ruling, see Court, 1979a). But as Opinion 1/94 has shown, there are limits to this 
judicial activism. The ECJ is also susceptible to the mood of the times and will 
tread more carefully in periods of increased Euroscepticism (like the 1990s). On 
top of that, the single most important source of the ECJ’s influence and power
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stems from the principle of the supremacy of EC law. However, this supremacy 
was self-awarded and has limits in that it can only be maintained as long and in so 
far as the national courts uphold it. Being susceptible to the general mood is 
therefore not an irrational strategy for the ECJ.
The most common, but usually also lowest profile, way of changing the balance 
of power is by Commission activism. Many authors have studied the 
Commission’s strategies for gaining more competences by stealth in various issue 
areas, from big projects like the Single European Act and the creation of the 
internal market to very specific areas like social policy and technology (Cram, 
1994; Fuchs, 1994; Mbrth, 2000; Thatcher, 2001). The situation changes 
drastically when it comes to external competences. External competences and the 
representation functions that ensue are convenient ways for states to profile 
themselves. Furthermore, the international recognition and profiling can quite 
easily be used for domestic electoral gain by using the prestige of the company of 
international leaders to reflect true statesmanship. The visibility and the domestic 
usefulness of external powers should therefore make it harder for the Commission 
to increase its powers by stealth in this domain. Nevertheless it succeeds in 
gaining competences and powers in some international regimes, as the TRIPS- 
case has shown, though not necessarily in others.
Neither of the two main paradigms for studying European integration could give 
an adequate answer to the question why the Commission succeeded in playing an 
important role in the TRIPS-case, nor could they account for the variation in the 
Commission’s role in various international regimes. A new institutional approach 
added some valuable elements to the analysis, like a more sophisticated 
methodological toolbox and a renewed attention for the institutional framework, 
but ultimately it also failed to give a satisfactory answer to the questions posed. 
This thesis claims that the reason for this failure of even the more sophisticated 
institutional analysis is the lack of attention for the external framework in which 
Commission-Member State relations take place. The theoretical ambition of this 
thesis is to fill that gap and to offer some adjustments to the principal-agent
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analysis so that it becomes better suited for studying (and leads to a better 
understanding of) the European integration process when it comes to the external 
relations of the EU.
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2
DELEGATION AND AGENCY: 
INTRODUCING THE RESEARCH DESIGN
INTRODUCTION
This chapter puts forward an alternative explanation to the central puzzle that 
was presented in the previous one: why did the Commission succeed in playing 
an important role in TRIPS-issues within the WTO, despite seemingly adverse 
conditions? The scope of the research is then broadened and, based on the 
conclusions from this case, specific research questions and hypotheses are then 
formulated and a research design is developed in order to test these premises. 
The starting point is a specific application of the new institutionalist theory as 
discussed in the previous chapter: the principal-agent approach as it has been 
applied to the study of the European integration process (Pollack, 1996; 2000; 
2003). The previous chapter explained how the new institutionalist approach was 
deemed to be the most promising (combining the best of intergovemmentalism 
and neofunctionalism while avoiding most of the pitfalls), as well as the most- 
clearly operationalised one. It also referred to the principal-agent approach as one 
of the clearest and most promising frameworks for understanding the European 
integration process. However, it was also noted that even this approach could not
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provide an adequate explanation for the counterintuitive success of the 
Commission regarding TRIPS in the WTO, and that it needs to be refined 
slightly if  it is to be of use for scholars of the EU’s external relations as well. In 
this chapter it will be argued that the reason for this is that the integration 
theories that were discussed earlier are all too much focussed on internal 
dynamics and often lose sight of the external factors, something which cannot be 
ignored when studying the external relations of the EU. The general argument is 
then that the institutional characteristics of the international regime can also have 
an influence on the Commission’s ability to exert and gain influence and power.1
This chapter consists of three main sections. The first section focuses on the 
principal-agent approach. After a brief general overview of the essential 
elements, the principal-agent approach is presented as an integration theory and 
the concept of ‘delegation’ in the light of this approach is given particular 
attention. The second section forms the core of the research design. It contains 
the hypotheses and it constructs a research set-up to test the hypotheses. It also 
discusses alternative explanations. The third section presents the case studies that 
live up to the selection criteria and that will be used to test the hypotheses.
2.1. The principal-agent analysis as an integration ‘theory9
The principal-agent model was originally developed in America by scholars 
studying the US Congress and it builds heavily on transaction cost economics. 
More recently, Mark Pollack has applied it to the study of EU decision-making 
(see Pollack, 1996; 1997; 2000; 2003; 2003a). In the application of this model to 
the EU, the Member States are the ‘principals’ who, under certain conditions, 
delegate authority for certain functions to a supranational ‘agent’ such as the 
Commission (or the Court of Justice, or the European Parliament, ...). The
1 Throughout this thesis, the term ‘regime’ will be used as referring to a formal international 
organisation or international multilateral agreement.
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question now is to what extent the supranational agent can carry out its functions 
independently of the influence of the principals, or, alternatively, how the 
principals can keep an eye on the agent. Such oversight might be desirable for 
the principals since
“this initial delegation immediately raises another problem: What if the 
agent, say the Commission, has preferences systematically distinct from 
those of the member governments and uses its delegated powers to pursue its 
own preferences at the expense of the preferences of the principals?” 
(Pollack, 1997: p. 108).
At least some conflict between the interests of the principals and agents is 
inevitable, according to Kiewiet and McCubbins, since “[A]gents behave 
opportunistically, pursuing their own interests subject only to the constraints 
imposed by their relationship with the principal” (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991: 
p. 5). Therefore, delegation inevitably entails some side effects, or ‘agency 
losses’. The problem, in other words, is one of moral hazard: “the possibility that 
bureaucracies will choose policies that differ from the preferences of the enacting 
coalition” (Tsebelis and Yataganas, 2002).
The two major examples of agency losses are bureaucratic drift or ‘shirking’, and 
‘slippage’ (see Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991). Slippage refers to a process when 
the structure of the delegation itself provides incentives for the agent to act 
against the preferences of the principals. Bureaucratic drift, also -  somewhat 
counterintuitively -  called shirking, refers to the process of agents pursuing their 
own preferences (that differ from those of the pnncipal) as described above. 
Moe notes that there are two preconditions for drifting. Agents should have an 
incentive and they should have the ability to pursue their own preferences (Moe, 
1995). In this context, as Pollack rightly remarks, “the importance (...) of
2 Because of the potential for confusion when using the term ‘shirking’, I will henceforth refer to 
‘drifting’ by the Commission. This refers to the Commission pursuing or trying to pursue policy 
options that differ from the preferences of the relevant body of Member States (depending on the 
voting rule and on the importance of the Member State(s) involved).
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information, and of asymmetrically distributed information in particular, can 
scarcely be overstated” (Pollack, 1997: p. 108). The reason is that information 
about the agent and its activities is asymmetrically distributed in favour of the 
agent (see also Balia and Wright, 2001). So the installation of oversight 
mechanisms will enable the principal to monitor agent activity and to sanction 
the agent (to punish or reward it) in the light of the information gathered.
However, Kiewiet and McCubbins distinguish another measure to contain 
agency losses, namely enhanced screening and selection mechanisms (Kiewiet 
and McCubbins, 1991: pp. 29-31). These mechanisms are an attempt to tackle 
the ‘adverse selection’ problem (the inherent problem that the ‘wrong’ agents are 
attracted to apply for the job since they have an incentive to misrepresent their 
abilities and preferences). In this light, it is particularly informative to take a 
closer look at the selection of Commission officials. The concours, the entrance 
exam to hire Commission officials, is highly competitive and aimed at attracting 
the best candidates. While the majority of Commission officials have indeed 
passed an ‘entrance exam’, there are also some other kinds of Commission 
officials. Parachutage refers to the process whereby outsiders are parachuted 
into the services. This is “sometimes linked to the alleged planting of national 
flags on certain posts” (Stevens and Stevens, 2001: p. 84), although it is also 
used to provide members of Commissioners’ cabinets with a permanent post 
after the Commissioner’s term has ended. The positive aspect of this is that it is 
an infusion of knowledge and expertise into the services since the people who are 
guided into these positions tend to be senior civil servants in the national 
administrations. The sousmarin approach differs from parachutage in that it 
originates from within the Commission. If a DG has set its eye on someone but 
that person cannot be recruited via the normal competition route, for example on 
grounds of age,
“he or she may be employed on a contract as a consultant, thereafter obtain 
the status of auxiliary agent, graduate to a full temporary agent contract and
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thus be eligible for the internal competition for establishment, for which the 
age requirements are waived” (Spence, 1997: p. 80)
Again, this way of recruiting people has the advantage that the DGs can attract 
experts or experienced bureaucrats without having to go through lengthy 
recruitment procedures. It is probably fair to say that after the Kinnock-reforms 
the agency losses through enhanced screening and selection by the principal(s) 
have increased. After all, parachutage -  or the planting of national flags on 
certain posts -  was the most direct way through which Member States tried to 
limit agency losses. Such measures have become much more difficult after the 
Kinnock-reforms and after enlargement. Yet another way for the Member States 
to limit agency losses is by sending officials from their national bureaucracies on 
secondment to the Commission for a certain period of time. While this would 
look like a perfect example of increased principal control, there are some 
mitigating factors at play as well. First of all, seconded officials are often 
technocrats, experts in their field. A secondment to the Commission is also often 
regarded as a career-booster. Consequently, they are less prevalent in the more 
senior and more politicised regions of the Commission bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, many Commission officials also suggest that there is a 
socialisation-effect playing whereby seconded officials quickly identify as 
European civil servants (rather than national ones) while working in the 
Commission.
Nonetheless, the in-house knowledge and expertise of the Commission varies 
greatly from one issue area to another (see Nugent, 1995). But even in domains 
where Commission resources do not come up to the mark, there are several ways 
for the Commission to keep its informational/technical lead over the Member 
States. For example, the Commission can serve as a repository of knowledge by 
requiring the Member States to provide the necessary information. This way, the 
Commission will usually be better informed than any individual Member State. 
A second way of gathering the necessary information or expertise is by 
outsourcing. The Commission frequently contracts consultants and research
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institutes and orders studies from them. Thirdly, the Commission can accumulate 
knowledge by working through the system of advisory committees. Basically, 
there are two types of such committees: expert committees and consultative 
committees (see Nugent, 2003: pp. 129-131). The expert committees are made up 
of “national officials, experts and specialists of all sorts” (ibid.: p. 129) whereas 
the consultative committees “are composed of representatives of sectional 
interests” (ibid.: p. 130). For our discussion here, it suffices to say that both types 
of committees provide the Commission with information, knowledge, and 
expertise. Finally, we can also point to the rich and long institutional memory of 
the Commission services, especially of the Secretariat General which can give 
the Commission an informational advantage over the other players in the 
legislative process.
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) identify two types of monitoring. Police-patrol, 
or direct monitoring, is the most effective method, but it is rather costly and time- 
consuming. In EU decision-making, the phenomenon of comitology (see Pollack, 
2003a; Franchino, 2000; Docksey and Williams, 1994) is a good example of such 
police-patrol oversight. Through these committees, the Member States can 
collect information about what the Commission is up to and limit drift by the 
Commission. The alternative is fire-alarm oversight. Here, principals rely on 
third parties to monitor agents and to “seek redress through appeal to the agent, 
to the principals, or through judicial review” (Pollack, 1997: p. 111). The major 
advantages of this approach are that the costs of the monitoring are carried by the 
third parties and that the principals can focus on violations that are of importance 
to their constituency (see McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). The drawback of this 
approach is that the monitoring is restricted to an (often quite small) subset of 
agency behaviour, namely activities that can spark sufficiently large political 
action by third parties (see Moe, 1987). In the EU context, article 230 TEC offers
3 Pollack (2003) convincingly shows that there is a lot to be said for this rational choice 
interpretation of the comitology phenomenon (as opposed to the ‘deliberative supranationalism’ 
of Joerges and Neyer (1997). He concludes that “the available quantitative, qualitative, and case- 
study evidence supports the rationalist hypothesis (...)” (Pollack, 2003: p. 152).
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the possibility for judicial review of (among others) Commission actions and on 
top of that, the Council gets a lot of information on the Commission from other 
institutions (the Parliament, the Court of Auditors, COREPER) and lobby 
groups.4
As with monitoring, the cost of sanctioning can be quite high and this affects the 
efficacy and credibility of the use of sanctions. Indeed, as Moravcsik rightly 
notes, “threats, like promises, must be ratified” (Moravcsik, 1993: p. 29). 
Sanctions usually require a positive decision from the principals and the agent 
will seek to exploit differences in the preferences of the principals in order to try 
to escape sanctioning. The extent of an agent’s discretion, then, “depends on the 
voting rules and the default condition governing the application of sanctions” 
(Pollack, 1996: p. 446; see also McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1987; 1989 with 
regard to the importance of voting rules, and Scharpf, 1988 for an analysis of the 
impact of the default condition).
The important conclusion is then that neither the strictly intergovernmental (the 
Member States control the Commission, there is no agency) nor the strictly 
supranational position (the Commission as a runaway, largely independent 
bureaucracy) holds the truth. Instead, the autonomy the Commission enjoys 
varies over time and from one function to another, depending on the mix and the 
credibility of the control mechanisms (Pollack, 1996: p.448; see also Majone, 
2001, although Majone is more critical of the use of the principal-agent model). 
In other words, comitology, and the type of committee involved (advisory, 
management, or regulatory) will influence the Commission’s scope for drifting. 
Also, the organised interest groups that are active in a particular domain can 
influence the decision-making process (this is the ‘fire-alarm oversight’). It has 
even been claimed that it is not the voters, but the interest groups that really
4 For a formal model of the impact of lobby groups and the mitigation of asymmetric information 
on the outcome of the bargaining game, see Milner, 1997.
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matter in intervening in and influencing policy-making (see Moe, 1995, in 
particular pp. 129-131).
Another particularly important aspect of Commission agency is the agenda- 
setting powers of the Commission. It is often claimed that the Commission’s 
right of initiative, as laid down in article 211 TEC, is a major channel through 
which it can have its preferences reflected in the policy outcomes. However, the 
effectiveness of this tool is restricted by the voting rules. If unanimity is required 
in the Council to adopt a proposal, the Commission’s proposal will have to 
reflect the lowest common denominator, i.e. the preferences of the most 
recalcitrant Member States, if it wants to stand a chance of being adopted 
(depending on the position of the status quo vis-a-vis Member States’ 
preferences). Under qualified majority voting (QMV), on the other hand, the 
Commission has a lot more leeway (see Meunier, 1998; Pollack, 1996;,2000). 
The same goes for the amendment rules: the harder it is for the Council to amend 
a Commission proposal, the more leeway the Commission has. Note, however, 
that these examples relate only to formal agenda setting. Kingdon has shown 
convincingly that informal agenda setting matters as well (Kingdon, 1995). In 
this view, the Commission acts as a ‘policy entrepreneur’, exerting leadership by 
proposing innovating ideas and proposals. The key to successful informal agenda 
setting is imperfect or asymmetric information among policymakers. Or, as 
Pollack puts it:
“(...) when policymakers have difficulties identifying policy problems, 
drafting appropriate solutions, and finding compromises among varying 
interests, a policy entrepreneur may secure the adoption of a policy, and 
influence its content, by stepping forth at the right time (a “policy window”) 
with a proposal that identifies a common problem and proposes an 
acceptable solution” (Pollack, 1996: p. 449).
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If the Commission has a lot of expertise in a certain area, and the Member States 
face uncertainty or imperfect information, then the Commission has an 
opportunity to exert influence (see Sandholtz, 1992; 1993; Garrett and Weingast, 
1993). Of course the preferences of the Member States (and the decision rules) 
still matter as became clear from the discussion of the formal agenda setting. 
Note that policy networks could be seen as a condition for entrepreneurship. By 
mobilising domestic interest groups, Member States’ preferences can be shaped 
or transformed so that there is a convergence with the Commission proposal.
To summarise, the principal-agent approach claims that the Member States have 
delegated certain functions to the Commission. However, the Commission, as 
agent, does not simply implement the Council’s directions. It has its own 
preferences and will drift to effectuate them. In response or as prevention, the 
Council sets up control mechanisms to monitor and sanction the Commission. 
This principal-agent analysis offers a convincing theoretical framework for 
understanding Commission actions in particular and Commission-Council 
relations in general. The attractiveness of this approach is not that it offers a 
completely new theoretical framework, but rather that it builds on the existing 
theories and makes them operational. Most of the concepts that are presented in 
the principal-agent approach (delegation, agenda-setting, oversight, monitoring, 
sanctioning ...) are ‘testable’, and this is probably the most important 
contribution of this approach. Even though it provides us with some 
methodological tools, however, this approach does not add anything to the 
‘content’, i.e. it does not come up with new insights that shed new light on the 
Commission’s role regarding TRIPS-issues. The next section puts forward an 
alternative explanation, which will be tested in the empirical chapters of the 
thesis. In the final chapter, the elements that are being brought forward in this 
alternative explanation will be integrated in the principal-agent approach, making 
it a more complete way of studying and understanding the European integration 
process. One of the important theoretical contributions of this thesis, is that it 
will refine the principal-agent approach so that it can also be applied as a
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framework for better understanding the European integration process when it 
comes to external relations.
2.2. Institutions and the dynamics of agency: towards an explanation of 
Commission behaviour in international settings
The general argument of this thesis (also explaining the TRIPS-puzzle) could be 
summarised as “the Commission can exert more discretion in settings that are 
more strongly institutionalised”. However, two conceptual problems immediately 
catch the eye. Firstly, what does the term ‘institutionalised’ entail? Here, a 
distinction is made between two aspects of ‘institutionalisation’ of international 
regimes. On the one hand ‘institutionalisation’ refers to a dynamic process, 
incorporating the negotiations establishing the regime, any negotiations within 
the framework of the regime, and the regular interactions between the members 
of the regime. On the other hand, it is also a static concept, referring to a set of 
characteristics that a regime possesses at a certain point in time. Secondly, the 
question arises as to what ‘strong’ institutions are. Here, I take a legalistic 
approach in that the focus is on the strength of the dispute settlement, 
enforcement and/or compliance mechanisms of regimes. Strongly 
institutionalised settings correspond to what Jackson has dubbed rules-based 
systems and they are characterised by the fact that there are legal mechanisms to 
settle disputes between parties (Jackson, 1983; 1990; 1998, in particular chapter 
4). This is in contrast with power-based systems that rely on diplomatic 
approaches for solving disputes (sitting around the table and trying to negotiate a 
compromise solution rather than having an independent body rule on the issue at 
hand).
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The static aspect o f institutions: the first hypothesis
The first hypothesis takes the static interpretation of institutionalisation as its 
departure point, and aims to offer an adequate answer to the puzzle introduced in 
the first chapter. Building on the notion that institutional provisions influence 
outcomes, the hypothesis is that the Commission has more leeway in institutions 
that have a strong and legalistic process for ensuring compliance and/or 
enforcement. This can be a strong dispute settlement mechanism. But also strict 
compliance procedures or other enforcement mechanisms can qualify, as long as 
there is a judicial system in place. The more legalistic the process and approach, 
the easier the Commission will find it to compel attention and play a bigger role. 
The question that comes to mind at this stage, then, is why this is so, and -  if  the 
claim is true -  how this process exactly works. The next paragraphs describe this 
process as a virtuous circle (virtuous from the point of view of the Commission 
at least), consisting of three steps.
Firstly, as a precondition, the Commission has to be a player within the context 
of the international agreement concerned. This means first and foremost that at 
least some of the issues the international regime deals with are Community 
competences. On the other hand, there also has to be some scope for gaining 
competences, so there should also be issues on the table that do not fall under the 
Commission’s (exclusive) competence (mixity, see chapter one). Secondly, the 
actions of the Commission in the framework of the enforcement/compliance 
mechanism cannot be separated from the context within which they take place. 
These actions will have repercussions internally (vis-a-vis the Member States) as 
well as externally (with regard to the other parties to the regime). Thirdly, the 
Commission can then try to exploit these internal and international ‘externalities’ 
of its behaviour in the enforcement or compliance mechanism to gain more or 
wider competences and acknowledgement. The following paragraphs describe 
the dynamics of the second stage of this process by looking at the potential 
multiplier effect that might occur if the Commission cashes in on the internal and 
external effects of its performance in the enforcement or compliance mechanism.
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The external dimension refers to the reaction of other countries to the 
performance of the Commission, as representative of the EC, in the enforcement 
or compliance mechanisms of international regimes. They are forced to 
acknowledge the Commission as the legitimate EC representative and as an 
important actor. This will lead to an enhanced legitimisation of the EC, and in 
particular the Commission as its representative, as an international actor.
Internally there are several elements that may contribute to the strengthening of 
the Commission’s position. Good representation and/or success in the handling 
of disputes may lead to an acknowledgement by Member States that the 
Commission is doing a good job and that it is beneficial for them to be 
represented by the Commission. From this point of view, the Commission can 
use its success in dispute settlement in areas of exclusive competence to lay the 
basis of extending its competences. It can drift further, making use of the dispute 
settlement provisions, de facto acquiring new competences. Thus it can lay the 
foundations for more easily acquiring these competences de jure  in a later stage. 
This line of thought can be backed up with other arguments as well.
First of all the Commission is in a good position in judicial settings because this 
way of solving disputes requires a lot of legal expertise as well as technical 
knowledge. One of the important roles of the Commission is exactly that of 
‘technical body’. The Commission either has the in-house expertise and 
knowledge, or otherwise it can fall back on its vast network of contacts and 
‘epistemic communities’. Furthermore, its institutional position enables the 
Commission to act as a repository of Member States’ knowledge and expertise. 
The argument here is quite similar to that put forward in the interpretation of the 
Single European Act and Economic and Monetary Union. With regard to these 
policy developments, it has been claimed that the Commission (or an 
entrepreneurial leader in the Commission) can succeed in pushing through highly 
controversial political reforms by presenting them as technical matters and thus 
pulling them away from the political bargaining (one such example is the Delors- 
committee, see Featherstone and Dyson, 1999).
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A different interpretation would be that the strong enforcement mechanisms 
weaken the position of the Commission. The reason for this is that, because cases 
get more complicated (and the stakes are higher), the Commission needs help 
from specialists from the Member States and industry. This could then erode the 
monopoly position the Commission normally enjoys and thus weaken its 
position. However, the Commission acts as a repository for specialist knowledge. 
It still enjoys a monopoly over the co-ordination of the collection and use of 
information, it is still the hub in the hub-and-spoke model and therefore it will 
remain the prime and ultimate technical specialist. Not just because of its in- 
house expertise, but also because of its central position as mediator and co­
ordinator. In the European policy primeval soup, the central position of the 
Commission in the policy process becomes an important asset. Because of its 
monopoly on the initiation of legislation (art. 211 TEC), the Commission is being 
fed all sorts of information from very different comers, ranging from Member 
States to lobby groups to civil society in the broadest possible interpretation of 
the term. Furthermore, Member States might share important expertise with the 
Commission rather than extensively discuss it with all the other Member States 
for reasons of efficiency. In other words, even if the Commission does not have 
the in-house expertise, its central role in the policy-making process and the 
efficiencies generated by centralisation mean that it usually still has an 
information advantage over most of the other players, most notably the Member 
States.
Yet another element that can prop up the Commission’s role is the extra clout 
that comes with Community action. This can refer to a political signal the/some 
Member States want to give (e.g. about their vision where the EU should be 
heading).5 Or it can refer to efficiencies generated by Community action. This is 
for example the case if the international regime concerned provides for the
5 A good case in point was the 2003 Franco-German dominated initiative to dust off the plans for 
establishing an independent European military capacity. One of the aims was, in the light of the 
2003-2004 IGC and the coming enlargement, to make clear to other (current and future) Member 
States that these changes should not mean the sacrifice of the vision of a political Europe for that 
of a purely economic project.
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possibility of sanctions or retaliation for enforcing compliance with dispute 
settlement rulings. In situations like that, the individual Member States clearly 
have an incentive to be represented by the Commission (as representative of the 
Community). This is because, first of all, retaliation and/or trade sanctions will 
be more effective and less harmful for the individual states when initiated by the 
EC (in economic terms a big country). And, secondly, that the other country that 
is party to the dispute will take an EC threat more seriously because the threat of 
action by the EC is more credible than if it were uttered by, say, France alone. 
This is certainly true in the relationship with small countries (the costs for the EU 
of imposing sanctions on a small country is low, but the cost of EU sanctions for 
the small country is very high).6 But it also makes sense in the EC-US relation 
since the EC can deal with the US on equal footing, contrary to the individual 
Member States. Also, it would be extremely difficult for any one Member State 
to impose sanctions on a third country since that would inevitably have
n
repercussions for the single market. A good example of the problems that can be 
caused by individual action of the Member States is a case where cross­
retaliation is allowed. Whether in an offensive or defensive case, legitimate 
action by or against one Member State can have EU-wide repercussions when 
cross-retaliation affects other sectors (that might fall under EC competence).
The dynamics o f institutions: the second hypothesis
The second hypothesis takes the first one even further in that it looks at some of 
the more general consequences this has for the Commission’s behaviour in 
international organisations. If the Commission does indeed enjoy more discretion 
in organisations with a strong and judicial enforcement or compliance
6 Paradoxically, the existence of a rules-based system can thus give the other country an incentive 
to compromise and to try to come to a negotiated settlement, unless it is very sure about winning 
its case. And even then a negotiated settlement might be more efficient since imposing sanctions 
on the EU, by a small country, would be like shooting itself in the foot (or sometimes even in the 
head, if trade dependency is very high).
7 Conversely, for an excellent discussion on some of the unintended consequences of the Single 
Market programme on the EC’s trade policy and its position in the WTO see Young, 2004.
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mechanism, it will develop a preference for creating exactly such ‘strong’ 
organisations. This thus affects the Commission’s behaviour in international 
organisations. Particularly, there are two conceivable strategies the Commission 
could follow. Firstly, when the Commission negotiates for the Community, it 
will either aim to strengthen the existing enforcement or compliance 
mechanisms, or it will try to create such institutional provisions (if they were 
previously lacking or if it is a completely new institutional framework that is 
being negotiated). Or else, and this is the second strategy, the Commission could 
try to bring new issues under the scope of the existing framework if strong, 
judicial provisions for enforcing compliance are already present.
Testing the hypotheses
Now that the two main research hypotheses are formulated more precisely, a 
research design for testing these hypotheses should be constructed. The purpose 
is to demonstrate that the independent variable that was put forward in the first 
hypothesis (differences in the strength of institutional mechanisms of 
international organisations) plays an important role in explaining the variation in 
outcomes (differences in Commission influence and (gains in) power in different 
institutional settings). For the selection of the case studies, it is therefore 
important to make sure that there is sufficient variation in the independent 
variable, while at the same time striving for as much continuity as possible in 
other variables (ceteris paribus). After all, too much variation other than 
variation in the institutional dispute settlement, non-compliance or enforcement 
provisions will erode our claim that the institutional setting is the relevant 
explanatory variable. The next paragraphs spell out more specific criteria that can 
be derived and which the case studies have to live up to.
First of all, there has to be an international organisation and the EC and its 
Member States have to be party to it. In other words, the agreement establishing 
the organisation is a mixed agreement, signed by both the EC and its Member
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States. This entails that the Community has exclusive competence over some but 
not all elements that fall under the scope of the treaty of the organisation. As a 
consequence, ‘turf wars’ over competence between the Commission and the 
Member States are more likely than in scenarios where the issues concerned fall 
completely within the sphere of exclusive EC or exclusive Member States 
competences. Therefore, the focus is on mixed competences since any change in 
the relative influence of the Commission or the Member States here is a 
significant step in the process of European integration. This is particularly so 
when this change is then later codified so that it becomes a change in the division 
of competences between the EU and its Member States. Secondly, the 
requirement of variation in the independent variable entails that there should be 
different institutional settings, whereby one regime has a strong institutionalised 
setting (is more rules-based), and the other institutional setting is characterised 
by weaker provisions. This way, the difference in institutionalised dispute 
settlement can be put forward as the explanatory variable. Thirdly, the aim 
should be to reduce variation in variables other than the independent one to a 
minimum.
2.3. The case studies
When all these criteria are taken into account, there is one issue area that meets 
all the requirements: the multilateral global trade regime. Firstly, the multilateral 
trade regime deals with issues of exclusive EC competence (trade in goods), but 
also with issues that are mixed or shared competences. Furthermore, trade issues 
can touch upon very sensitive topics of national interest, like whether certain 
aspects of the income tax system of a country form an impediment to trade, for 
example. In short, the issue area of international trade is characterised by 
exclusive EC competences (and thus a strong role for the Commission) in some 
aspects, and more Member State involvement in other areas. Secondly, the 
multilateral trading system has experienced an evolution from a predominantly
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power-based system with rather weak dispute-settlement and enforcement 
provisions to one of the strongest rules-based international regimes in existence. 
This is important with regards to the third criterion (<ceteris paribus) as well, 
because it means that the variation can indeed be reduced to an absolute 
minimum. After all, the organisation has remained pretty much the same but for 
the institutional structure: both the EC and its Member States have been active in 
the organisation before and after the change of the institutional structure. And 
also the issue area under study has remained the same (while some subjects have 
been added, the organisation still deals with international trade, which is more 
consistent than comparing the Commission’s position in two organisations 
dealing with entirely different subjects).
However, if  only the Commission’s position in the trade regime is studied, the 
argument may be susceptible to the critique that the findings could be contained 
to the trade regime only. Therefore, after having argued the case that strong 
institutional settings influence the Commission’s position in view of the situation 
in the trade regime, another chapter will deal with the evolution of the 
Commission’s position in some international environmental regimes. After all, 
trade and environment probably are the two most ‘natural’ issue areas for 
providing evidence to test the hypotheses. The main reason for this is to be found 
in some inherent characteristics of these issue areas: they generate externalities 
or can take the form of public goods. At the most basic level, both issue areas 
create pressures for a broad approach involving international cooperation. With 
regards to international trade, mercantilist thinking -  still dominant in many 
governments -  combined with political sensitivities means that a global approach 
is probably one of the most acceptable and efficient ways to achieve trade
o
liberalisation, which in turn should result in higher welfare. Environmental 
problems also have this international dimension. They are usually associated 
with collective action problems since the environment (or, better, a healthy
8 At least from a point of view where also the political costs and benefits are taken into account. 
From a purely economic viewpoint, unilateral liberalisation should, in theory, be more beneficial 
than partial multilateral liberalisation.
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environment) takes the form of a public good. The result is a prisoner’s dilemma 
where the rational strategy for every participant (not complying with the 
environmental treaty) results in an outcome that is, overall, suboptimal (an 
environmental problem that deteriorates rather than gets solved). Institutionalised 
cooperation has the potential to overcome this problem by transforming the 
prisoner’s dilemma into an iterated game and by introducing mechanisms for 
monitoring and enforcing compliance (thus enabling other parties to make a 
more informed choice when choosing their strategy). So in these two areas, the 
prospect of potential benefits and increased efficiency creates incentives for 
engaging in international (multilateral) cooperation.
Trade
The selection of case studies in the trade area is simplified by the overwhelming 
dominance of one organisation: the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Since the 
creation of the WTO in 1994, the EC and its Member States are members of this 
organisation. As mentioned earlier, this institution lends itself rather well for the 
study of institutional change since, in terms of dispute settlement, it represents a 
paradigm shift from the approach of its predecessor (GATT ’47), thus reducing 
variation of many contextual variables to a minimum.9 Hence, even though the 
GATT and the WTO are two distinct and different institutions, they are closely 
related. Apart from the ‘usual’ enlargement of the content of the treaty, the main 
innovation of the Uruguay Round (in which the GATT was transformed into the 
WTO) was the establishment of an institutional setting, the creation of an 
organisation (see next chapter). And the most distinct aspect of this new 
organisation is its dispute settlement mechanism. Where dispute settlement in the 
GATT was based on a diplomatic approach, the WTO completely transformed 
the landscape by introducing a new, judicial dispute settlement mechanism. Thus 
the shift from GATT to WTO represents a strengthening of the institutional
9 From now on, I will refer to the original GATT-agreement of 1947 as ‘GATT’. The new 
GATT-agreement that is part of the Marrakesh agreement shall be referred to as ‘GATT 94’.
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structure in general, in particular in the area of dispute settlement where it 
represents a shift from a power-based, diplomatic approach to a rules-based, 
legal one (see Jackson, 1990; 1998). Before getting carried away, it should be 
noted that the GATT itself also represented an institutionalisation, albeit to a 
lesser extent than planned for at first. It is therefore important to keep in mind 
that these are points on a continuum rather than extreme poles.
The first hypothesis, that the Commission is more empowered in more strongly 
institutionalised settings, can be tested by building on the TRIPS-puzzle that was 
introduced in the first chapter. The explanation would then be that the 
Commission succeeds in playing an important role with regard to TRIPS issues 
because of the institutionalised dispute settlement system that is in place in the 
WTO. As a second case study, the issue of Member State income tax practices in 
GATT and WTO will be discussed. It will be shown that the Commission did not 
succeed in playing a leading role in the GATT-disputes, but that it did speak for 
the Member States concerned when very similar disputes arose in the WTO. In 
order to test the second hypothesis, a closer look will be taken at the 
Commission’s role in strengthening the institutional framework of the 
GATT/WTO and at the way the Commission dealt with the issue of investment 
in the WTO-framework. It will be argued that the Commission’s insistence on 
including the ‘Singapore issues’, and most notably investment, in the Doha 
Round Negotiations points to a preference for operating in the strong WTO- 
framework (rather than the OECD-framework, for example, in the case of 
investment) in order to obtain more external influence (and, ultimately, 
competences).
Environment
There are two major obstacles for developing the issue area of environment into 
a full-blown case study. First, there is a lot of variation between environmental 
regimes, both in terms of their substance as well as of their membership. This
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makes it harder to effectively ascribe differences in the role of the Commission 
to the institutional framework, since the variation in other elements (different 
subjects, different membership structure ...) could also be (partially) responsible 
for the variation observed in the role and influence of the Commission. Second, 
international environmental agreements tend to be ‘soft’ ones, i.e. the 
enforcement rules and compliance mechanisms in environmental treaties, if  they 
exist in the first place, tend to avoid confrontation as much as possible, casting 
the provisions of these agreements more in the ‘diplomatic’ mould (Victor, 1996; 
WTO, 2001c). This in itself need not be an insurmountable problem. After all, 
while it is true that no environmental agreement has a strong dispute settlement 
system in the style of that of the WTO, the strength of the enforcement and 
compliance mechanisms of environmental regimes does nonetheless vary. Some 
organisations have a much stronger or more judicialised non-compliance system 
in place than others. This variation in principle still allows for the testing of the 
research hypotheses, albeit in a murkier and a rather more oblique manner.
These two objections therefore greatly weaken the explanatory power of the 
environment as a case study, especially when compared to the situation in the 
trade regime. Yet on the other hand, only testing the hypotheses by referring to 
trade cases could lead to the suspicion that the findings might be constrained to 
the issue area of trade only. In order to avoid this, chapter six discusses the role 
of the Commission in some international environmental regimes. Chapters three, 
four and five rigorously test the hypotheses by developing the Commission’s role 
in the trade regime as a case study. This setting is the most straightforward one 
possible and should thus strip out as much interfering variation as possible, 
offering the clearest view on the impact of the institutional setting on the 
Commission’s position. The function of the environmental chapter, then, is to 
provide additional evidence that the Commission does indeed prefer strongly 
institutionalised settings (testing of the second hypothesis), and that these 
dynamics are also relevant for other issue areas than trade alone.
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The selection of environmental case studies looks more difficult because of the 
sheer number of and variety in multilateral environmental treaties. Given that the 
focus is on the role of the Commission in strong institutional settings, the 
strongest and most effective environmental agreement will be studied. In 
particular, the role of the Commission in the negotiations of the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and its role in the creation 
of its non-compliance mechanism will be explored. This Protocol is widely 
regarded as one of the most effective environmental agreements, and it was one 
of the first to include ‘hard’ enforcement elements, such as the possibility to 
impose trade sanctions. The expectation, derived from the hypotheses, would 
then be that the Commission should be very interested in having a strong 
institutional framework in place so that it can become a more important actor. 
However, there probably is a limit to the degree of institutionalisation that can be 
achieved for international environmental agreements given that their long 
tradition of soft enforcement elements also (at least partially) derives from 
inherent characteristics of environmental cooperation. If this is the case, then it 
would be a rational strategy for the Commission to try and incorporate 
environmental issues in another, highly institutionalised framework such as the 
WTO. Therefore, it will also have to be examined if, how and to what extent the 
Commission makes efforts to integrate trade issues and environmental ones 
within the context of the WTO, and whether this can be understood in the light of 
the wider scope for gaining influence of power for the Commission in more 
institutionalised settings.
Research methods
The information that is used in the empirical chapters to test the hypotheses 
comes from several sources. The core data are original documents detailing the 
position and actions of the Commission in international negotiations and in the 
working of the international organisations under study. These include, but are by 
no means limited to, position papers and Commission proposals, negotiating
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mandates, legislative documents, official reactions, etc. While official documents 
are useful to determine and compare the positions of the respective institutions, it 
rarely happens that they also reflect the dynamics and the politics behind the 
process. Usually they do not even contain every piece of information, potentially 
leaving out some information that could well be relevant to the research. 
Therefore, three kinds of sources are added in order to qualify, clarify and 
complement the information contained in official documents.
The first one is the press. Because a substantial part of the research focuses on 
disputes or negotiations that took place quite a while ago, articles in quality 
newspapers and specialised publications often offer the best possible background 
to these events. The reasons for this are threefold. First, those articles will offer a 
better insight in the general context and turf wars within which the negotiations 
or discussions were taking place. For obvious reasons, this context is lacking, or 
at best left implicit, in official documents. In other words, newspaper articles are 
needed for us in order to interpret the official documents. Second, journalists 
generally have a much better network within the policy-making community than 
a doctoral student can ever hope to build in just a couple of years. Their articles 
are therefore an invaluable source of information, often putting their finger on a 
sore spot, such as disagreements between the institutions or between the 
Commission and some or all of the Member States. This information would be 
very difficult to obtain as an outsider, even more so ten years or more after the 
facts. Third, the alternative way of obtaining similar information can be 
problematic. Interviewing the people involved would be the most obvious or 
intuitive road to acquiring a better insight into the dynamics and politics behind 
the negotiations or behind certain decisions and policy positions. There are two 
problems with this, one minor one and one major one. The minor problem is of a 
methodological nature and pertains to the phenomenon whereby the recollections 
of the actors tend to become less reliable as time passes by. Certain nuances tend 
to get flattened out and the information is more neatly fitted (actively or 
passively) into a certain view of what happened. The major problem relates to 
access. Most of the events took place ten or more years ago. The actors have
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since moved on and up. On the one hand, this means that some people that are in 
the Commission now were not actively involved in the issues under study or 
were at that time not even working in the Commission at all. On the other hand, 
it also means that many of the most active players at that time are now in such 
positions (career-wise of geographically) that it has not been possible to 
interview them. A good example of this is the EC’s main representative to the 
Montreal Protocol negotiations, Laurens Brinkhorst, who is currently the Minster 
of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands.
The second additional source of information is the academic literature on the 
topics under discussion. Incorporating these analyses and their findings into our 
own research provides a useful background and will certainly enrich the analysis. 
Third, these sources are complemented by and checked against the information 
obtained in interviews that have been conducted with a wide range of actors who 
have been (or still are) closely involved in the issues under study. These include 
current and former Commission officials, Member State representatives, officials 
from interest groups and other organisations, and experts on the topics under 
study. Not all the interviews have been conducted in the same manner, since it 
was not always possible to have a (semi-structured) face-to-face interview. Some 
interviews have therefore been conducted over the telephone or some have taken 
the form of email-conversations. Where face-to-face interviews have been 
conducted, no recording device has been used. This choice was made on 
methodological grounds. The rationale behind it is the idea that people, 
especially mid-ranking Commission officials, would be inclined to talk more 
freely if their every word is not recorded. Of course, every strategy also comes 
with a cost. In this case, the decision to opt for a loose, semi-structured interview 
and not to record the conversation or write down every phrase entails that no 
exact quotes can be distilled from the interviews. In the empirical chapters, it will 
be indicated in more general terms if a certain argument was used or confirmed 
by a Commission official. Where possible, the argument made by the official or 
officials will be paraphrased and reference will be made to the interview
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concerned. Annex 1 gives a list of people that have been interviewed, with a 
short description of their function and the time, place and mode of interview.
CONCLUSION
This chapter presented the principal-agent approach as an operationalisation of 
delegation in the EC in general and of the Commission as an agent in particular. 
Also, the core research hypothesis was put forward in this chapter: the external 
context, in the form of the institutional framework of the international 
organisation, should be taken into account as well in order to better understand 
the dynamics of the European integration process. This rests on two insights. The 
first one is that the vast majority of integration theories is inward-looking, 
meaning that the causes and dynamics of the integration process are usually 
sought in issue-specific or actor-specific elements (this was worked out in more 
detail for the three main paradigms of integration literature in chapter one). The 
second element on which the hypothesis is built is the insight, most clearly 
developed in the two-level game theory (see for example Putnam, 1988; 
Moravcsik, 1993a; Milner, 1997) that the ‘domestic’ and international levels 
cannot be separated from each other, but that they are mutually impacting on one 
another (specifically regarding the EC, see Smith, 1995). These two insights are 
mutually exclusive: if there is interaction between the domestic and international 
levels, then external elements should contain at least part of the explanation for 
the European integration process in external relations. Therefore, the hypotheses 
introduced in this thesis look at the impact of the external framework on the 
possibilities for the Commission to increase its influence and power.10
10 European integration in this thesis is understood as a zero-sum game for influence and power 
between, on the one hand, the Commission and, on the other hand, the Member States, gathered 
in the Council. Since this is a zero-sum game (power rests either at the EC level, or at the 
Member State level, or it is shared), any gain in power of one actor has to be at the expense of the 
other. This thesis will therefore usually focus on the Commission and refer to a gain in power 
and/or influence by the Commission as an ‘increase’ in European integration. This does not 
necessarily entail a value judgement.
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When taking into account the international framework, the expectation is then 
that the Commission should find it easier to gain influence and power in settings 
where there is a strong institutional framework for settling disputes or monitoring 
compliance. The higher the (monetary, reputational and other) costs of non- 
compliance with the dispute settlement system, the more likely a strong 
Commission position becomes because of the clout that comes with acting 
united, as a ‘big’ country. More technical settings -  as opposed to traditional 
diplomatic ones -  will also favour the Commission because of the technocratic 
nature and origins of this institution. If the external context does indeed impact 
upon the internal power balance within the EC and if stronger institutionalised 
settings do indeed favour the position of the Commission vis-a-vis the Member 
States, then the question arises as to the Commission’s awareness. The second 
hypothesis claims that the Commission is indeed aware of this extra flexibility. 
Furthermore, it is claimed that this awareness has an impact on the 
Commission’s negotiating strategies and its representation of the EC in the day- 
to-day activities of some international organisations. In the course of the 
following chapters, these hypotheses will be tested for the areas of trade and 
environment.
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3
STATIC INSTITUTIONALISATION AND 
TRADE: 
THE COMMISSION IN GATT AND WTO
INTRODUCTION
Having set out the research design in the two previous chapters, this chapter 
refers back to the core research questions and tests the first hypothesis. This 
stated that the institutional characteristics of the international regime can 
influence the Commission’s room for manoeuvre (vis-a-vis the Member States), 
with ‘stronger’ institutionalisation leading to more possibilities for bureaucratic 
drift. This is the first of four empirical chapters, which form the core of the thesis 
and contain most of the original analysis expected from a PhD. This chapter, like 
the next two, deals with the Commission’s position in the trade regime. Chapter 
six, on the other hand, focuses on the issue area of environment. While chapters 
four and five deal with the Commission’s role in negotiations (the ‘dynamic’ 
aspect), this one specifically focuses on the Commission’s behaviour in the 
functioning of the GATT and the World Trade Organisation (earlier referred to as 
the ‘static’ aspect). Hence, questions about why or how the system came about in 
the first place and the role of the Commission in that process, are not being
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addressed for the time being. As the title already suggests, this chapter is only 
concerned with showing that the Commission has gained influence and power 
because of the change from GATT to WTO and that an important reason for this 
was the institutionalisation of the organisation, in particular the creation of a 
strong, legal dispute settlement mechanism.
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section gives the 
background against which the case studies are set. It explores the changes that 
occurred with the transition from GATT to WTO and it examines the 
repercussions of this change for the position of the EC, and in particular for the 
Commission, in the world trading system. The second section studies two case 
studies to illustrate the impact of the institutional framework on the 
Commission’s position. The first case study deals with the Commission’s role in 
issues concerning trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) 
within the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This case has already been 
concisely introduced in chapter one as an interesting puzzle that the integration 
theories struggle to explain, and it will be discussed in substantial detail here. It 
will be argued that the Commission plays a more important role than could be 
expected given the circumstances. The second case study compares two similar 
sets of cases under GATT and WTO respectively. These are disputes concerning 
the effect of certain income tax practices (and their trade effects) that were 
initiated by the US against some EU Member States. The role the Commission 
played differed markedly, which can be explained by taking the changed 
institutional context into account. Before concluding, the last section of this 
chapter then discusses, and rejects, a number of alternative explanations that 
could discredit the institutional interpretation that is put forward in this thesis.
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3.1. A brave new world: the shift from GATT to WTO, and the EC in the 
new trade system
This section gives an overview of the most important changes that occurred with 
the transition from GATT to WTO. In particular, several differences between the 
GATT and the WTO are discussed in more detail to explain why this transition 
constitutes a process of institutionalisation. The discussion of the new dispute 
settlement system in the WTO takes up a special place in this section because of 
its centrality to the argument of the thesis. The second part of this section then 
briefly explores the impact of these changes on the role of the Commission in the 
trade regime. Without developing a fully-fledged legal analysis of EC 
competences, these paragraphs deal with the issue of the division of competences 
between the EC and the Member States. The expectations and assumptions about 
the role the Commission should play in this new trade organisation originate 
from this division of powers. In turn, these expectations (refined in the context of 
the specific case studies) form the benchmark against which the Commission’s 
role in the case studies is measured.
The institutionalisation o f the world trading system: from GATT to WTO
One particular problem with GATT was that the umbrella organisation it was 
meant to fall under (the International Trade Organisation, henceforth ITO) was 
never established (Jackson, 1998; Palmeter and Mavroidis, 1999). For legal and 
political reasons -  mainly the domestic political context in the US -  GATT 
nevertheless came into force, albeit only temporarily. Hence, GATT has never 
been an ‘organisation’ in the strict sense of the word, but it remained an 
agreement that was only provisionally applied for almost half a decade. This 
changed with the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and that is 
why GATT’s successor has been hailed as the “third leg” of the “stool” of the 
Bretton Woods system (see for example Jackson, 1998 or Paemen, 1995).
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The fact that GATT was an agreement that was provisionally applied is not only 
of mere academic relevance, but it also had very real implications for the 
evolution of the structure and the rules of this de facto organisation. For example, 
Jackson notes that “[bjecause of the fiction that GATT was not an 
“organization,” there was considerable reluctance at first to delegate any activity 
even to a “committee”” (Jackson, 1998: p. 41-42). Similarly, there were no 
provisions for a GATT secretariat, so GATT leased staff that were supposed to 
prepare the ITO and -  since it gradually became clear that the ITO would never 
come into existence -  these became the de facto GATT secretariat. In other 
words, because of the lack of a constitutional treaty the development of GATT 
happened in a trial-and-error way. Despite this uncertain and very special 
context, the participants in GATT nonetheless succeeded over the years in 
translating working practices into protocols and rules of procedure. Perhaps 
because of the success of this flexible approach, all of the attempts to transform 
GATT into a formal organisation that were launched before 1986 failed.
Another important implication of the fact that GATT did not start off as a full- 
fledged organisation was that there was more scope for flexibility than usual. 
While this was undeniably very attractive from a political point of view, the lack 
of a common constitutional ‘corset’ also led to a scattered organisational 
landscape when GATT expanded its field of action.1 Up to the Kennedy Round 
(1962-1967), the GATT Rounds were mainly concerned with cutting tariffs. The 
Kennedy Round also tried to tackle non-tariff barriers (NTBs), although this 
effort was not particularly successful. Eventually, it was the Tokyo Round of 
trade negotiations that really opened up the GATT-agenda. For the first time, the 
focus was not just on tariffs, but also NTBs were discussed extensively. This 
broadening of the scope of GATT was accompanied by fragmentation. Nine 
agreements (and four understandings) were signed at the end of the Tokyo Round
1 Because the costs are usually confined to a relatively small group, whereas the gains from free 
trade tend to be diffuse, issues o f international trade can easily become important issues in 
domestic political contexts. Therefore, a certain degree of flexibility can be rather appealing on 
the international stage (but it should be limited because otherwise one could not rely on any of 
the other parties to adhere to the international agreement).
88
negotiations, but these were signed as ‘stand alone’ agreements, i.e. they were 
only binding on the parties that had signed and ratified them. The result was a 
‘GATT a la carte’: besides the (core) GATT agreement, there were now other 
agreements with different degrees of strength in their obligations, separate 
dispute settlement mechanisms, different signatories, and different institutional 
provisions. This raised several questions and problems. Not least importantly, it 
created uncertainty about the relation between GATT and these codes. Also, the 
independent dispute settlement mechanisms of the codes raised questions 
concerning the appropriate forum for the settlement of disputes and the 
compatibility of the interpretation of GATT and code obligations by the 
respective panels (see for example Jackson, 1991: pp. 55-57; Jackson, 1998: pp. 
75-79).
Even though the Tokyo Round had achieved a lot, many still felt that it was 
incomplete. For that reason, a new negotiation round was started in 1986 in 
Punta del Este, Uruguay. This resulted, eight years later, in the signing of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (henceforth 
‘the Marrakesh Agreement’). Finally, after almost half a decade, the major 
institution for dealing with international trade issues was no longer a 
provisionally applied agreement, but rather a full-blown organisation: the WTO. 
The most important changes of this transition concern the scope of the issues that 
the organisation deals with, the creation of a common institutional framework, 
and the creation of a strong judicial dispute settlement mechanism.
The organisational structure of the WTO is outlined in article IV of the 
Marrakesh Agreement, and the decision rules are described in article IX. Article 
IX states that “[T]he WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by 
consensus followed under GATT 1947” (WTO, 2002: p. 8). However, it also 
adds that “where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue 
shall be decided by voting (...). Decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the 
General Council shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast” (ibid.). For the 
interpretation of the Agreement or one of the Multilateral Trade Agreements (see
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next paragraph), a three-fourths majority is required. Although the principle of 
decision-making by consensus is a continuation of GATT-practice, the 
importance lies in the fact that the decision rule is now codified and defined since 
in GATT, consensus grew as a practice, without being explicitly mentioned or 
defined (see Jackson, 2000: p. 405). Another institutional improvement 
introduced by article VI is that it provides for the establishment of a WTO 
secretariat. That means that the GATT-practice of ‘leasing’ secretarial staff from 
the Interim Commission for the ITO now is a thing of the past. One could argue 
that this institutionalisation of its role strengthens the hand of the secretariat to 
play an influential role in the activities of the WTO. Another institutional 
innovation is the creation of a Trade Policy Review Body, the aim of which is “to 
contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and 
commitments made under the Multilateral Trade Agreements” (WTO, 2002: p. 
380). It fulfils this task by carrying out trade policy reviews, and relies on name- 
and-shame effects and peer pressure as main vehicles for pushing countries into 
compliance.
In short, it can be said that the Marrakesh Agreement signals an 
institutionalisation and codification of the GATT regime, even though, to a 
certain extent, the legacy of the GATT a la carte is sometimes still visible in the 
WTO. For example, annex 4 to the Marrakesh Agreement contains four 
plurilateral agreements, leftovers from the Tokyo Round.2 But then again, even 
in this area there has been an important consolidation. After all, with the creation 
of a new Dispute Settlement Understanding in the WTO (DSU, see later), 
disputes concerning the plurilateral agreements are now being dealt with under 
the DSU rather than under their own, separate, dispute settlement systems (as 
was the case after the Tokyo Round).
2 Note that only two of these, the Agreement on Government Procurement and the Agreement on 
Trade in Civil Aircraft, are still in force. The other two, the International Dairy Agreement and 
the International Bovine Meat Agreement, expired in 1997.
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There are also clear differences regarding the substance of the issues dealt with 
by the GATT and WTO respectively. As the result of a long and rocky 
negotiation process during the Uruguay Round, the WTO agreement contains 
several ‘new’ issues. The most important of these are trade in services (dealt with 
in the General Agreement on Trade in Services, or GATS) and trade-related 
aspects of intellectual property rights (dealt with in the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS). Both of them are 
annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement (as Annex IB and 1C respectively). They 
go beyond the discussions about tariff reductions that were prevalent under 
GATT, and they are a good deal farther-reaching than the discussions that took 
place in the context of the Tokyo Round. The inclusion of these agreements thus 
definitely is a breach with the past and fits into the move towards the more 
‘complete’ approach to international trade relations that the WTO represents.
The most revolutionary aspect of the Marrakesh Agreement, however, is 
undoubtedly the new dispute settlement mechanism, as laid down in the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 
This is the centrepiece of the new organisation, and the most important 
achievement of the Uruguay Round talks. Here, the impact of the new rules for 
decision-making is most pronounced. This is not to say that the GATT dispute 
settlement system was static, on the contrary. The GATT dispute settlement 
system itself experienced a substantial evolution before the DSU took over, 
becoming increasingly formalised and showing signs of an increasingly legal 
approach (see Hudec, 1990; 1993; Jackson, 2000). Initially, the chairman would 
rule on disputes. Later, working parties (open to all GATT contracting parties, so 
also the disputants) were established (see McGovern, 1986: p. 76). Later still, 
there was a shift to the creation of panels, with three or five members acting in a 
personal capacity (rather than as representatives of their governments). The 
normal procedure was for the GATT Council (acting for the contracting parties) 
to set up a panel. This panel would then examine the complaint and produce a 
report that was sent to the contracting parties, which could then make a 
recommendation or give a ruling. The CONTRACTING PARTIES could even
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decide to authorise the complaining party to suspend concessions (although this 
only happened once: in 1953 the Netherlands was authorised to retaliate against 
the US, but it never used this authorisation). The main problem with this way of 
settling trade disputes did not lie with the range of decisions the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES could take, but with the decision-making rules that 
led to those decisions. Because of the practice in GATT of decision-making by 
consensus, the creation of a panel could always be blocked by one of the parties 
to the dispute. And even though Jackson notes that “by the mid-1980s such a 
blocking vote became diplomatically very difficult to use” (Jackson, 2000: 
p. 177), the losing party could still block the adoption of the panel report and thus 
formally prevent a ruling to be issued on a specific dispute.
In contrast, the WTO’s dispute settlement system, as codified in annex 2 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement, contains some major improvements to the GATT system. 
First of all, it establishes a unified dispute settlement system for the whole WTO 
system, also with regard to the new issues such as trade in services and 
intellectual property rights (although it has to be noted that the parties to the 
plurilateral agreements may make a decision how the DSU shall apply to these 
agreements). Secondly, the decision-making rules are reversed from consensus to 
negative consensus. This means that a report is now adopted unless there is a 
consensus among WTO members not to adopt it. Since that would require the 
support (or at least the abstention) of the winning party, this is highly unlikely 
and, at the time of writing, this had never yet happened. Thirdly, the dispute 
settlement procedure takes place within a strict timeframe, with the next steps 
following more or less automatically from this schedule. When consultations are 
still unsuccessful after 60 days, one of the parties can ask for the establishment of 
a panel. Hereafter, the rest of the process is determined by tight timeframes, 
resulting in a panel decision normally being taken within 15 months and an 
Appellate Body decision within just over a year and a half. This automaticity 
again derives from the negative consensus rule (a request for the establishment of 
a panel is almost guaranteed to be met). Fourthly, the DSU provides for an 
appellate procedure. The Appellate Body is composed of judges and independent
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trade experts rather than diplomats from the national missions, which further 
adds to the ‘judicialisation’ of the GATT since it narrows the scope for the 
creative, but usually very ambiguous, approaches and solutions that diplomats 
tend to concoct.
To conclude, the Uruguay Round signalled the end of the GATT a la carte by 
forming a single package, thereby considerably improving transparency. This is 
only one symptom of a more fundamental change, namely the institutionalisation 
from agreement (GATT) to organisation (WTO). This is reflected in the creation 
and codification of institutions and procedures, examples of which are the legal 
basis that is given to the secretariat, the clear institutional structure, the creation 
of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, and the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding. These last two elements could be seen as evidence of the greater 
supranationality of the new World Trade Organisation. The Trade Policy Review 
Body examines and publishes reports on the trade policies of countries. The 
dispute settlement system goes even further in that it can force countries to 
change their policies and/or legislation in the case of an adverse ruling. The 
guiding principle for these changes is easier, better and more effective 
implementation and enforcement of the rules.
The repercussions o f these institutional changes fo r  the EC
The EC was not involved in the early stages of GATT since the Treaty of Rome 
(TEC) did not come into force until 1958.3 In the Dillon (1960-1961) and 
Kennedy (1962-1967) Rounds of the GATT, the Commission participated and 
negotiated on behalf of the Member States. This happened even though the
3 But note that the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community already 
participated in the fourth multilateral round of trade negotiations in Geneva in 1956 (see 
Petersmann, 1986: p. 34), as well as in the two subsequent rounds. However, the 1979 Geneva 
Protocols, containing the results of the tariffs negotiations of the Tokyo Round, were not signed 
by the ECSC (for the issues falling under its competence), but by the ECSC member states (see 
Groux and Manin, 1984: p. 63).
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Community was not one of the contracting parties to GATT, “and in theory does 
not have the right to vote in GATT bodies” (Groux and Manin, 1984: p. 93). 
However, backed by several judgements of the European Court of Justice (for 
example Case 21-24/72, International Fruit; see Court of Justice, 1972), it has 
generally been recognised that the Community has taken the place of the 
Member States with regard to matters that fall within its exclusive competence. 
The fact that the Commission represented the Member States in GATT was thus 
not terribly controversial within the EC and it did not cause too many problems 
since the early GATT rounds were overwhelmingly concerned with tariff barriers 
(falling within the category of exclusive Community competences).
As was discussed earlier, tentative attempts had been made in the Kennedy 
Round to focus on non-tariff, as well as tariff barriers. This move was even more 
pronounced -  and successful -  in the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, where new 
issues (other than trade in goods) were added onto the agenda. This makes things 
a lot more interesting since the potential for conflicts over competence between 
the Commission and the Member States increases greatly in these situations. This 
evolution is illustrated by a change in the signing of these trade agreements by 
the EC. Most of the agreements emerging from the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds, 
and even many of the agreements concluded in the Tokyo Round, were signed as 
‘Community agreements’, i.e. they were signed only by the EC and not by the 
Member States (see Petersmann, 1986: p. 36-37). However, with more issues on 
the negotiating agenda, including issues where the Member States were not so 
accommodating in acknowledging the existence of exclusive Community 
competence, ‘mixed agreements’ (signed by the Community and its Member 
States; see first chapter) became the norm. The Uruguay Round agreements, for 
example, were signed as mixed agreements. But also some earlier ones were 
signed by the EC and the Member States alike, such as the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on trade in Civil Aircraft, both 
among the plurilateral agreements of the Tokyo Round.
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The only criterion for deciding whether an agreement is to be signed as a mixed 
or a Community agreement is a comparison of the provisions of the agreement 
concerned with the competences that are attributed (directly or indirectly, see 
chapter two) to the EC (Groux and Manin, 1984: p. 67). The problem is that 
interpretations of Treaty provisions can differ a great deal and differences of 
opinion between the Member States themselves and/or between the Member 
States and the Commission about who should sign a particular agreement are 
rife. Art. 300(6) TEC states that the opinion of the ECJ can be asked to assess the 
compatibility of an international agreement with the Treaty provisions, but this is 
not always a viable option given the political delicateness and the slowness of the 
procedure. Groux and Manin note that:
“In the majority of cases, the Member States have therefore to settle their 
differences with the Commission themselves and the compromise often 
reached has involved a ‘mixed’ agreement without specific identification of 
the parts of the agreement which fall, respectively, within either their or the 
Community’s jurisdiction” (Groux and Manin, 1984: p. 59)
Because of the increase in the range of issues dealt with and, consequently, the 
resulting rise in mixed agreements, the possibility for conflict over competences 
and influence between the Commission and the Member States increased 
significantly. Moreover, the lack of a clear division of competences in most 
mixed agreements arguably just shifted the burden to Commission-Member 
States relations within the functioning of the agreement.4 This already hints at the 
likely importance of the institutional provisions of the agreement since, if these 
turf battles are being fought when the problem arises, the institutional structure 
within which the conflict takes place could prove to be an important factor in 
influencing the outcome or the range of possible outcomes of the competence 
dispute. The question thus becomes when, or in what kind of agreement, the
4 There are instances of agreements that require ‘regional cooperation organisations’ to provide 
the secretariat o f the treaty with a list o f issues for which it is competent. An important example 
of such a treaty is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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Commission is more successful in ‘winning* these conflicts with the Member 
States, i.e. in gaining influence and power. Or, more specifically applied to the 
trade regime, why the Commission arguably is more successful in extending its 
influence and competences in the WTO than it was in GATT.
The argument made in this thesis is that the institutionalisation of GATT into the 
WTO has changed the incentive structure for the Member States to be 
represented by the Commission. It has been noted earlier that the most important 
aspect of this institutionalisation is the creation of the WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism. In case of disagreement over competences between the EC and the 
Member States in GATT, there is no clear incentive for the Member States to 
give up their central position. The main reason for this is that they, being GATT 
contracting parties, can control the dispute settlement system anyway because of 
the consensus requirement for forming a panel and adopting panel reports. 
Ultimately, every GATT member thus has a veto that might be used. Within the 
framework of the WTO, however, the situation has changed completely. Because 
of the negative consensus requirement, neither the creation of a panel nor the 
adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report can be blocked any more. On top of 
that, the WTO dispute settlement system has got teeth: the option of retaliation 
by the winning party in case of non-compliance by the losing party is not merely 
theoretical (like in GATT). On the contrary, the option to impose trade sanctions 
in order to enforce a WTO ruling is actually made use of and can indeed be 
effective. The threat to impose trade sanctions is therefore a credible one.5 Since 
this system, in which retaliation seems to be the ultimate means of enforcing 
compliance, favours big countries (in economic terms), the Member States now 
have a strong incentive to be represented by the EC.
5 In many of the intractable, high profile WTO disputes, sanctions have been imposed in case of 
non-compliance with the WTO ruling. For the EC, for example, this was the case in such high 
profile disputes as the beef hormones-case and the bananas case. That a threat to impose trade 
sanctions can be effective to enforce compliance is shown by the effect the publication by the EC 
of a ‘sanctions-list’ had on the behaviour of the US in the Foreign Sales Corporation case.
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3.2. The Commission and WTO dispute settlement: the cases
3.2.1. Trade-related aspects o f intellectual property rights in the WTO- 
framework
Opinion 1/94 and its context
Intellectual property rights and services were the two major ‘new’ issues on the 
Uruguay Round agenda. At the end of the negotiations, the Commission claimed 
that the agreements reached could and should be signed as Community 
agreements, i.e. only by the EC and not by its Member States. The reason was 
that the Commission interpreted article 133 EC, which gives the EC exclusive 
competence to conduct a Common Commercial Policy (CCP), to include the 
general agreement on trade in services (GATS) and the agreement concerning 
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS). Most of the Member 
States, on the other hand, disagreed and thought that these issues fell outside the 
scope of the CCP, and thus outside the scope of the exclusive competence of the 
EC. The Commission then requested the Court of Justice to give an advisory 
opinion on the competence issue, a procedure that is provided for by article 
300(6) TEC. The Court responded with Opinion 1/94 in which it basically 
backed the Council and most Member States. It argued that the EC and the 
Member States have shared competence to conclude GATS -  except for cross- 
border services, which are covered by art. 133 -  and that the EC and its Member 
States are jointly competent to conclude the TRIPS agreement, except for the 
fight against counterfeit goods, which also falls under the CCP (see Opinion 
1/94; Court of Justice, 1994). This mling of the Court surprised many in the legal 
community and it left some scholars fearing that “Opinion 1/94 is likely to have 
negative effects [...] on the status of the EC within the WTO” (Bourgeois, 1995: 
p. 786). Another influential academic and practitioner even described the Court’s 
mling as a “programmed disaster” (Pescatore, 1999) and it left yet another
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prominent observer pondering that the decision was “no surprise, but wise?” 
(Hilf, 1995).
This gloominess is quite understandable when the wider context within which 
this dispute between the Commission and the Member States went on is taken 
into account. Several events had taken place in the early and mid-1990s that had 
an impact on the relationship between the EU institutions and that significantly 
reduced the Commission’s stock of political capital. First of all, in the context of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations, the Commission went too far for the Member 
States (definitely for France) in negotiating the Blair House agreement on 
agriculture in November 1992. This agreement between the EC and the US was 
negotiated by an autonomous Commission, largely independent from Member 
States’ control. The outcome, however, proved to be unacceptable to France, 
which rallied enough Member States around its position to force the Commission 
to renegotiate the agreement (see Paemen and Bensch, 1995; Van den Bossche, 
1997; Meunier, 2005). The Blair House saga was certainly not the first -  nor the 
last -  time that there was friction between the Commission and (some of) the 
Member States, caused by disagreement about how to interpret the negotiating 
mandate. Another notable example during the same round of negotiations was 
the GATT Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in 1990 that was supposed to 
conclude the Uruguay Round. Here, the Commission was also blown the whistle 
on by the Member States, who feared the Commission might overstep its 
mandate. But even in the Tokyo Round there had already been discussions on the 
competence issue. There is, however, a substantial difference between the Blair 
House debacle and other disagreements over competence. While other arguments 
relating to competence manifested themselves either before the crucial stage of 
negotiations or in the implementation phase, in the Blair House-case the 
Commission was actually forced to re-open a sealed deal under pressure from the 
Member States while the overall negotiations were still ongoing. For this reason, 
it is certainly not exaggerated to claim, as Meunier and Nicolai'dis have done, 
that the result was “a turning point in the delegation of negotiating authority to 
the supranational representatives, seriously calling into question the informal
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flirtation with majority rule and increased autonomy of the negotiators that had 
started to prevail” (Meunier and Nicolai’dis, 1999: p. 484).
Secondly, the Commission had overplayed its hand in promoting the Maastricht 
Treaty, and was held at least partly responsible for creating the atmosphere in 
which a Danish ‘No’, an extremely narrow French ‘Yes’, and a challenge to 
Maastricht’s constitutionality before the German Bundesverfassungsgericht were 
possible. In other words, the Commission was not exactly at the height of its 
popularity: not with the Member States, nor with the European popular opinion. 
Eurobarometer polls indicate a decline in the percentage of people with a 
favourable impression of the Commission from 56% in 1990 to 47% in 1992 (see 
Eurobarometer 33 and 37; Commission, 1990; 1992) before plummeting to 34% 
in 1993 (Eurobarometer 39; Commission, 1993). Thirdly, the Court’s ruling in 
Opinion 1/94 can hardly be read as an endorsement for the Commission. It is 
stated quite clearly that (most) TRIPS and GATS issues fall outside the exclusive 
competence of the CCP. Finally, the general mood among the Member States 
was captured well by the sheer scale of their resistance to the Commission’s 
position. As many as eight Member States, as well as the Council and the 
European Parliament, submitted observations to the ECJ. All of them, even the 
Parliament, were arguing against the Commission’s interpretation (that TRIPS 
and GATS did fall within the scope of art. 133). Taking all these elements 
together, the logical expectation should be -  and was, witnessing the quote from 
Bourgeois earlier -  that the Commission would not really play a role of great 
significance with regard to TRIPS issues.
WTO dispute settlement: the Commission as the central actor
In practice, however, the Commission does play an important role in disputes 
concerning intellectual property rights. The focus here is on TRIPS-issues since 
they are the substance of the majority of disputes concerning the ‘new’ issues in
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which the EC has been involved.6 On a very general level, one could point out 
that none of the Member States has initiated a TRIPS dispute (or, for that matter, 
any other dispute). Hence, all offensive WTO disputes on intellectual property 
rights concerning the EC and/or (some of) the Member States have been initiated 
by ‘the European Communities and their Member States’. The implication of this 
joint action is that there is a clear need for coordination of positions and 
expertise, favouring the Commission.
Also, the decision-making process in the EC puts the Commission in a stronger 
position. For ‘spontaneous’ disputes, initiated through the procedure described in 
art. 133, the Community method of decision-making applies and the Commission 
has a monopoly on taking the initiative: it has to make a proposal to the Council, 
which then has to decide. For disputes initiated through the Trade Barriers 
Regulation, the Commission’s position is even stronger (for a comparison of the 
Commission’s role in the two procedures see Billiet, 2005). Under the Trade 
Barriers Regulation, it is the Commission that has to decide whether or not to 
initiate proceedings in the WTO. This decision holds unless a Member State asks 
to refer the decision to the Council within ten days. If the Council hasn’t made a 
ruling after 30 days, the Commission’s decision applies. These strict time frames 
play to the advantage of the party having the initiative, i.e. the Commission. On 
top of that, the Member States have an incentive to defend their interests 
offensively through the EC because of the better chances for a big country of 
enforcing compliance. Taken together, that means that the Commission is in a 
rather strong position since the Member States have an incentive to act through 
the EC, but there they are dependent on the Commission for obtaining their 
national objectives.
The primacy of the Commission in offensive TRIPS disputes can be illustrated 
by looking at specific disputes, for example the dispute initiated by the EC 
against the US concerning Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
1998 (WT/DS176; see WTO, 1999c). Section 211 basically forbids the renewal
6 This is also a general trend, see for example Zimmermann, 2005 (particularly pp. 34-35).
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or the registration in the US of a trademark that was previously abandoned by a 
trademark owner whose business and assets have been confiscated under Cuban 
law, or the recognition of and enforcement by American courts of such rights. 
The legal basis for the complaint is certain provisions relating to intellectual 
property rights, in particular “the TRIPS agreement, notably its Article 2 in 
conjunction with the Paris Convention, Article 3, Article 4, Articles 15 to 21, 
Article 41, Article 42 and Article 62” (WTO, 1999c). Nonetheless, the request 
for consultations “by the European Communities and their Member States” 
(ibid.) is circulated by the permanent delegation of the European Commission in 
Geneva, not by the permanent delegation of one, some, or all of the Member 
States. Also all the subsequent communications concerning this dispute (request 
for establishment of a panel and the notification of appeal) stem from the 
Commission’s delegation. So while it could have been expected that the Member 
States for whom (or for whose industry) the stakes are highest would take the 
lead in specific disputes, this is not the case in the formal WTO proceedings. 
There is no ‘enhanced cooperation’-like situation where a smaller group of 
interested or affected Member States takes action rather than the Community as a 
whole.
Since TRIPS are a mixed competence, the phrase ‘the European Communities 
and their Member States’ has to be used. But apart from that, there is no 
indication of the Member States actually playing a leading role. On the contrary, 
the minutes of the meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body where this dispute 
was discussed make no mention of any official from a Member State taking the 
floor. The only person who spoke on behalf of the EC was the representative of 
the European Communities, in other words the official from the permanent 
delegation of the Commission (see WTO, 2000: p. 13; 2000a: p. 11). This 
impression is unambiguously confirmed in interviews with DG Trade officials 
and an official of the Legal Service (interviews with Christophe Kiener, Stefan 
Amarasinha, Barbara Eggers, Soren Schonberg and Lothar Ehring). All the 
officials in DG Trade that were interviewed left no doubt about the fact that it 
was the Commission that was firmly in charge in initiating and dealing with the
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Section 211-dispute. In interviews, each of these officials claimed (independently 
of each other) that national officials and experts were hardly involved in the 
Section 211-dispute and that most of the work was done by officials in DG Trade 
and, for the pleading in Geneva, the Legal Service.
According to the interviewees, the decision to appeal the panel ruling in this 
dispute was also taken by the Commission. Soren Schonberg and Lothar Ehring 
pointed out that this decision was first communicated in draft form to the 133- 
committee (interview with Soren Schonberg and Lothar Ehring). When asked 
whether this did not point to an increased involvement of the Member States, 
these DG Trade officials pointed out that one of the functions of running 
proposals through the 133-committee is to take the political temperature and 
check whether there are any fundamental objections by some Member States. 
They stressed that the importance or the impact of this should not be exaggerated 
since the presence of such objections would not at all necessarily entail that the 
Commission would adjust its position accordingly. Usually, the effect would first 
and foremost be to signal to the Commission to spend more time explaining the 
rationale for its actions and making its argumentation more explicit in order to 
avoid being confronted with a blocking minority in the Council (interview with 
Soren Schonberg and Lothar Ehring). In other words, the involvement of the 
133-committee should not be exaggerated since its function here is primarily that 
of a consultative committee (in line with the jurisprudence of the Court, which in 
Case C-61/94 Commission v. Germany described the role of the 133-committee 
as “purely advisory”, Court of Justice, 1996; see also Rosas, 2003, particularly p. 
316).
When questioned, the Commission officials interviewed confirmed that the same 
applies to the other TRIPS disputes that were initiated by the EC and their 
Member States. Here as well, it is the Commission that is the most important 
actor in the dispute settlement process. It initiates the dispute settlement 
procedure, is responsible for the preparations, argues the case in Geneva and 
decides on possible actions to follow up a WTO ruling. At least this was the case
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for other TRIPS-disputes initiated by the EC such as WT/DS114 against Canada 
regarding patent protection of pharmaceutical products (WTO, 1998a), 
WT/DS186 against the US regarding section 337 of the tariff act of 1930 (WTO, 
2000d), or WT/DS160 against the US regarding section 110(5) of the US 
copyright act (WTO, 1999d; for an informative discussion of the legal aspects of 
some of these cases and of the effect of ‘mixity’ on the EC’s position in the 
WTO, see Heliskosi, 1999). This last dispute is particularly interesting given that 
it was initiated through the Trade Barriers Regulation based on a complaint by 
the Irish Music Rights Organisation (supported by the Groupement Europeen des 
societes d’auteurs et compositeurs). So the interests are very much concentrated 
in a particular Member State. But again, according to officials from the unit in 
DG Trade dealing with WTO dispute settlement, it is still the Commission and 
not (one of) the Member States involved that played the leading role in this 
dispute (interviews with Lothar Ehring and Soren Schonberg). This is also 
confirmed by the minutes of the meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body in 
which this dispute was discussed. Nowhere in these minutes is there an 
indication that a representative from a Member State was active. Instead, the only 
(European) actor that is named is the representative of the European 
Communities, i.e. the permanent representative of the Commission (see WTO, 
1999a: p. 11; 1999b: p. 4; 2000a: p. 14; 2000b: p. 2; 2001b: p. 9).
During the interviews, all of the DG Trade officials that were mentioned above 
also made the more general -  yet very interesting -  observation that they do not 
experience any differences in terms of how disputes that concern mixed 
competences are being dealt with compared to disputes involving only exclusive 
competences. In both cases, according to the officials interviewed, Commission 
people do the brunt of the work and national officials or experts are only 
occasionally involved (interviews with Christophe Kiener, Stefan Amarasinha, 
Soren Schonberg and Lothar Ehring). Interestingly, during an interview this point 
was also made spontaneously by an official from the external relations unit of the 
Legal Service, dealing with WTO disputes. She added that the 133-committee 
did usually not even come into the picture, even when TRIPS-issues are involved
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(interview with Barbara Eggers). This points to a substantial autonomy for the 
Commission in the practice of WTO settlement, when it comes to TRIPS-issues 
in particular and issues of mixed competence in general. It lends strong support 
to the claims that are being made in this chapter that the Commission is in a 
strong position in the WTO dispute settlement process, and not only regarding 
issues that fall under the EC’s exclusive competences. Furthermore, the fact that 
these remarks are made unhesitatingly by several of the practitioners dealing 
with WTO dispute settlement on behalf of the EU, independently of each other 
and -  in the case of Barbara Eggers -  spontaneously, means that this mode of 
action is strongly ingrained in the Commission’s practice of dealing with WTO 
dispute settlement. This provides strong empirical evidence for the hypotheses 
put forward in this chapter, namely that the Commission plays an important role 
in WTO dispute settlement and that this is not confined to issues that fall within 
the exclusive competence of the EC.
But also defensively there is considerable evidence for a strong Commission 
position. The US in particular has initiated several TRIPS-disputes against 
individual Member States. With the exception of a TRIPS-case against Portugal 
in 1996, however, all these TRIPS-cases involved the Commission’s delegation. 
In some cases the US also officially involved the EC by initiating the same 
dispute against both the specific Member State concerned and the EC. This was 
the case for a dispute dealing with the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
for motion pictures and television programs in Greece (cases WT/124 against the 
EC and WT/125 against Greece, see WTO 1998b; 1998c). Or for a dispute 
dealing with an Irish infringement on providing copyright and neighbouring 
rights (cases WT/82 against Ireland and WT/115 against the EC, WTO 1997a; 
1998d). In this last case, when the chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body 
proposed that these cases were considered together, the representative of the EC 
replied that “[T]his procedure was also appropriate from the Communities' 
standpoint as it corresponded to the internal organization of the Communities and 
their Member States regarding the subject matter under the review, namely the
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TRIPS Agreement” (WTO, 1998k: p. 5) Nowhere in the minutes of this meeting 
is there a record of the Irish representative taking the floor.
In other cases the US only aimed the dispute against the specific Member State. 
This was the case in WT/83 and WT/86, dealing with the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in Denmark and Sweden respectively (WTO, 1997b; 
1997c). However, even though the request for consultations is directed only at 
the ‘Permanent Mission of Denmark’ and the ‘Permanent Mission of Sweden’, 
the notification of a mutually agreed solution is distributed by the Permanent 
Mission of the US and Denmark or Sweden and the Permanent Delegation of the 
European Commission. It is interesting to note that, even though it is the Danish 
or Swedish parliament that has had to pass or amend national legislation in order 
to bring that country’s rules into line with the TRIPS agreement, the WTO 
documents consistently refer to “the European Communities -  Denmark” or “the 
European Communities -  Sweden”. When pressed on this issue, an official in 
DG Trade who is familiar with these disputes confirmed that Commission 
officials did indeed play an important role in these disputes. In particular, 
Commission people were pivotal in negotiating with their American counterparts 
(interview with Soren Schonberg). This strongly suggests that the Member States 
rely heavily on the Commission and its delegation in Geneva in WTO dispute 
settlement when it comes to TRIPS-issues, even when the dispute is initiated 
only against the Member State and concerns national legislation. However, this is 
by no means an unproblematic or automatic process. The Commission still has to 
force its way onto the stage sometimes. This was particularly relevant in the 
context of the Danish dispute, for example. Here, the Danes at first ‘forgot’ to 
inform the Commission that they were conducting consultations with the US so 
that it took some pressure from the Commission before it formally got involved 
(interview with Soren Schonberg).
This indicates that the involvement of the Commission is not always 
wholeheartedly agreed to by the Member States, meaning that the strong position
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of the Commission in the context of the WTO dispute settlement system cannot 
only be explained by the ‘big country’ argument, i.e. the clout that comes with 
action undertaken by the EC, as opposed to each Member State acting separately. 
While this argument certainly has its merits, for example in helping to explain 
the early delegation of powers to the Commission in the dispute settlement 
process, the above-mentioned Danish reluctance to include the Commission in, 
and even inform it of, its negotiations with the US over this particular WTO 
dispute shows that there are limits to the ‘big country’-argument for explaining 
the Commission’s role in the WTO dispute settlement system. Here, other 
elements, such as the entrenched position of the Commission (concentration of 
experience and technical expertise) and the institutional design of the WTO 
dispute settlement (possibility of sanctions and the credibility of this threat) to 
name but a few, can be called upon in order to explain the Commission’s 
involvement. It should be noted that this example of Danish intransigence in 
including the Commission in its consultations with the US lends credence to a 
discordant interpretation of the European integration process (see chapter 7.2.1.).
From 113 to 133: the internal consequences o f the Commission’s role in WTO 
dispute settlement
In the previous paragraphs it has become clear that, contrary to the expectations, 
the Commission nonetheless plays an important role regarding TRIPS-issues. 
Despite the efforts of the Member States to avoid that the Commission holds on 
(in the implementation phase) to the powers it enjoyed in the negotiation phase, 
the Commission nonetheless manages to profile itself as the most relevant and 
most important EC actor. The main driving force behind this is the central 
position the Commission enjoys in the new institutional structure of the WTO. 
This new structure, and in particular the provisions of the new dispute settlement 
system, has provided incentives for the Member States to be represented by the 
Commission. However, de facto power gains could still be reversed by the 
Council quite easily. That is why it is important to look at the evolution and
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legislative history of article 133 (ex art. 113). This is done in the next paragraphs. 
From this overview it will become clear that the Commission has long argued for 
the incorporation of services and intellectual property rights within art. 133, but 
that the Member States (backed by the Court of Justice in Opinion 1/94) strongly 
opposed it. Despite this opposition, the situation has nevertheless changed 
substantially since the new WTO dispute settlement system became operational, 
and this is reflected in the evolution of art. 133. Because of the Commission’s 
strengthened role in the WTO’s dispute settlement system, among other things, 
these de facto competence gains have subsequently been cemented in the treaty 
and, in the process, been given a more permanent character, becoming de jure  
competences.
The insistence of the Commission that art. 133 also covers trade in services and 
trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights is not new. The Commission’s 
position can be traced by looking at its contributions to the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) that was called at the European Council in Rome in mid 
December 1990. In the run-up to Maastricht, the Commission proposed to 
replace the Common Commercial Policy (then articles 110-116 TEC) by a 
common “external economic policy” (Commission, 1991: p. 92). The 
Commission interpreted this new concept very broadly in that it would not only 
deal with trade, but also with other “economic and commercial measures 
involving services, capital, intellectual property, investment, establishment, and 
competition” (ibid.). The primary aim of the Commission was to clearly establish 
or reinstate its authority as the sole negotiator, and thus “to put an end to constant 
controversy surrounding the scope of art. 113” (Commission, 1991: p. 99). In the 
end, “[T]he new Article 113 incorporates almost textually Article 113 EEC 
Treaty adding only a few minor and technical details and is therefore a far cry 
from what was originally conceived by the Commission” (Maresceau, 1993: p. 
12).
As was already discussed earlier, the positions had not shifted substantially two 
years after Maastricht. The Commission still claimed that services and
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intellectual property rights fell under the scope of the Common Commercial 
Policy. The Member States clearly did not agree, as is witnessed by the fact that 
two thirds of the Member States, including the three big ones (the UK, France 
and Germany), submitted observations to the ECJ when it was deliberating 
Opinion 1/94 in which they strongly argued against the Commission’s position. 
The Court’s ruling was pretty much a confirmation of what the Member States 
had already codified in the Maastricht treaty. Therefore, this could be interpreted 
as an equilibrium point: the Member States redrafted art. 113 in the light of their 
preferences in the IGC and the Court confirmed this situation. It seems therefore 
that there was not much the Commission could do about this since two of the 
most obvious ways of changing the situation (treaty change and judicial 
activism) were ruled out.
Yet at the Amsterdam summit in 1997, when the Maastricht treaty was to be 
reviewed, the same question was lying on the table yet again. Once more, the 
Member States found themselves debating over what to do with art. 133 and the 
new trade issues. In the end, art. 133 was amended so that the Council could 
expand the exclusive competence for the new issues with a unanimous vote. The 
importance of this is that “[T]his could be done on an ad-hoc basis without 
requiring an IGC” (Meunier and Nicolai’dis, 2001), thereby substantially 
lowering the barriers for bringing services and intellectual property rights under 
art. 133 and thus making this more likely in the future.
The issue was also on the agenda of the Nice summit in 2000, and the 
compromise reached here moved further still in the direction of the 
Commission’s preferred outcome. Art. 133(5) under Nice categorises trade in 
services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property rights as exclusive 
EC competences, but unanimity is still required if the voting rule to adopt 
internal rules is unanimity or if the EC has not yet exercised its powers internally 
(Cremona, 2001 provides an excellent discussion of the genesis as well as the 
difficulties with the Nice amendments of the CCP). For all the other aspects of 
intellectual property rights (other than the ‘commercial aspects’) the EC and the
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Member States remain ‘jointly’ competent. However, art. 133(7) states that “the 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, may extend the application of paragraphs 1 
to 4 to international negotiations and agreements on intellectual property”. So 
with regard to intellectual property rights, the commercial aspects are now 
covered under art. 133, and all other aspects can be transferred by the Council 
acting unanimously, without the need for an IGC.
Explaining the TRIPS-puzzle and the evolution o f article 133: institutional 
dynamics
The stronger institutional dispute settlement system of the WTO can account for 
this successful expansion of the Commission’s influence and competences. 
Because of the way the system operates, big countries have gained an advantage 
in the functioning of the WTO. Two elements in particular favour big countries, 
namely the loss of the power to veto the establishment of panels and the adoption 
of panel reports, and the credible and much used option to retaliate and impose 
sanctions or suspend concessions. Therefore, the Commission -  as representative 
of the EC -  benefits, and both its internal as well as its external role is 
strengthened. This is in turn boosted by the fact that the Commission is in a good 
position to take on this role given its function of (partly) technical body. Because 
of the legal approach to dispute settlement in the WTO, a lot of legal expertise as 
well as technical knowledge is required in order to be able to function effectively 
within this context. Through its function of technocratic expert, the Commission 
possesses the necessary expertise either in-house (eg its extremely good Legal 
Service) or it ‘borrows’ it from the Member States through its mediation function 
(see Nugent, 2001: pp. 13-14). The Commission’s expertise in trade issues 
should be particularly emphasised. While many players on the international trade 
scene might not agree with the goals and means of the EC’s trade policy, almost 
no one questions the fact that DG Trade has many extremely competent foreign 
trade officials. One particular study of the decision-making process in EU trade
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policy states in the clearest terms that “Commission trade officials have greater 
expertise than their national counterparts at every level of seniority” (WWF, 
2003: p. 13). The reason for this is not only the rigorous selection process (the 
concours) through which the Commission employs only the brightest and best 
people, but also the fact that many good national civil servants are seconded to 
the Commission. In this context, there might also be a spill-over effect at work 
since the exclusive competence of art. 133 could form the basis of a virtuous (or 
vicious, depending on your standpoint) circle. After all, if  the EC has exclusive 
competence over most trade issues, then it would not make much sense for a 
Member State to put its best and brightest civil servants in charge of this matter. 
And the weaker the national civil servants dealing with international trade are, 
the more important it is that their counterparts in the Commission are well- 
trained.
But there are also other structural characteristics of the new dispute settlement 
system that favour the Commission such as, for example, the principle of cross­
retaliation. Kuyper notes that cross-retaliation “demonstrates how «impossible» 
separate Member State action before panels has become” (Kuyper, 1995: p. 99). 
Consider the following hypothetical example. Say that a Member State wins a
• • 7dispute concerning TRIPS provisions. It could very well turn out that retaliation 
within the TRIPS agreement is not possible. Since cross-retaliation is allowed 
under WTO rules, this Member State could then retaliate in another issue area. 
The most likely area would be trade in goods since that still has the broadest 
WTO coverage. However, in this sector the competence to take retaliatory 
measures is in the hands of the Community, and the Community would probably
o
not be allowed to act. In other words, “cross-retaliation is not really a serious 
possibility for Member States and hence the dispute settlement system would 
lose much of its effectiveness for them” (Kuyper, 1995: p. 100). Whether in an 
offensive or defensive case, legitimate action by or against one Member State
7 This is perfectly possible since according to Opinion 1/94 the Member States retain a large 
measure of competence with regard to trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights.
8 For a more extensive and complete discussion, see Kuyper, 1995: pp. 99-100.
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can have EU-wide repercussions when cross-retaliation affects other sectors (that 
fall under EC competence).
This example is yet another illustration of how the WTO’s legalistic approach to 
dispute settlement has an influence on the position of the Commission in the 
internal division of competences in the EC. That does not mean that other 
factors, like the preferences of the Member States for example, have suddenly 
become superfluous. It will have become clear from the discussion of the gradual 
change in the scope of art. 133 that the Member States are the principals in the 
first place, delegating tasks and power to the Commission. But there are other 
influencing factors at work as well, not in the least the institutional context. The 
Member States, despite the preferences they might have and the central decision­
making role they occupy within the EC, are sometimes overtaken by the events 
on the ground, caused by their reliance on the Commission in the dispute 
settlement system. This then increases the pressure for a more formal shift in 
powers to the benefit of the Commission by transforming its gained de facto  
competences into de jure  ones.
In short, thanks to the strengthened institutional framework that was put into 
place with the creation of the WTO, the Commission has been able to gain 
competences it would otherwise probably not have gained, or at least not so 
quickly. When it first argued strongly in favour of integrally incorporating 
services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights in the CCP, the 
Commission was clearly rebuffed by the Member States. Barely two years later, 
the Court of Justice upheld this ‘status quo’. In the meantime, however, the 
Commission was becoming increasingly active in TRIPS cases in the context of 
the new dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organisation. It seems that 
the Member States have been overtaken by these events on the ground, 
continuously being pressured into bringing more and more elements of services 
and TRIPS under the CCP because of the Commission’s de facto involvement in
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such disputes.9 The changes to the scope of the CCP that the Commission could 
not push through during the Uruguay Round, suddenly came within reach after 
the WTO’s dispute settlement system was up and running.
Before moving on to discuss another case study, an important caveat should be 
added. Treaty changes and the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) 
negotiating those changes are notoriously complex events, where a multitude of 
negotiating games are being played simultaneously. For this reason, it is often 
very difficult to distinguish and identify the key independent variable in a single 
negotiation. In other words, there are many intervening variables that have the 
potential to blur the link between two issues. In the case of the EC's competences 
over TRIPS, a similar process might have taken place in the negotiations of a 
Draft Constitutional Treaty. While this text would make only relatively minor 
changes to the provisions of the Common Commercial Policy, it would scale 
back the EC's legal potential regarding TRIPS. The proposed Art. 111-217, the 
centrepiece of the CCP in the Draft Constitutional Treaty, states that "[T]he 
Common Commercial Policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly 
with regard to (...) the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade 
in goods and services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property" (Art. 
III-217 of the Draft Constitutional Treaty). Only the commercial aspects of 
intellectual property rights would thus fall under the CCP and the amendments 
that were made to the CCP in Nice would be overturned. In Nice, it was decided 
that the EC and the Member States remain ‘jointly’ competent for all the other 
aspects of intellectual property rights other than the commercial ones. But Art. 
133(7) was also amended to state that “the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, 
may extend the application of paragraphs 1 to 4 to international negotiations and 
agreements on intellectual property”. So while the Draft Constitutional Treaty 
still recognises that the commercial aspects of intellectual property rights fall
9 The uncertainty created by the blurry delineation of competences also generates pressure to 
codify the factual role of the Commission. After all, the effects of a WTO Member State 
challenging the Commission’s authority in a TRIPS dispute would not be very positive, neither 
for the EC, nor for the individual Member States.
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under the remit of the CCP, the possibility for the Council, acting unanimously, 
to extend the scope of the CCP to cover negotiations on all other aspects of 
intellectual property rights without the need for an IGC does not exist anymore.
These new provisions in the Draft Constitutional Treaty amount to a scaling back 
of the TRIPS provisions of the CCP and this seemingly goes against the 
argument that was developed in the previous paragraphs (that the increased 
Commission influence over TRIPS issues was a major driving force for the lower 
threshold for obtaining or the effective increase in legal competences for the EC 
in this field). However, it has been noted above that IGCs are complex 
negotiating games, with many potential intervening variables that can influence 
the impact that the Commission's increased influence on the field has on the 
distribution of competences between the EC and the Member States. To give just 
a few examples of such intervening variables: during IGCs, trade-offs within and 
between different sectors and policy areas are made, ideological issues play a 
more decisive role, because of the salience of these meetings and their output 
political considerations also gain in importance (increasing the potential to 
change the otherwise likely outcome), and so on. Any of these elements (and 
many more) could explain why the threshold for including intellectual property 
rights into the CCP has been raised in the Draft Constitutional Treaty. A more in- 
depth study of the negotiating history of the provisions of the CCP in the 
Constitutional Treaty would be needed in order to find out more precisely if  and 
to what extent this example goes against the argument developed in the previous 
paragraphs. Unfortunately, the limited resources of this project do not allow for 
this research track to be pursued further.
In short, while certainly disturbing the pattern that more Commission influence 
in intellectual property rights issues is being translated into more EC competence 
in this field, the CCP provisions of the Draft Constitutional Treaty are not 
interpreted as necessarily undermining this argument. The reasons for this are 
twofold. First, the uncertainty surrounding the key influencing factors for this 
demotion of intellectual property rights within the CCP in the Draft
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Constitutional Treaty as discussed above. Second, the fact that the previous 
changes to the EC Treaty since the establishment of the WTO do not raise these 
doubts. Indeed, as was shown earlier, the Amsterdam and Nice revisions of the 
Treaty did go a substantial way in accommodating the Commission's desires 
regarding the incorporation of intellectual property rights issues into the CCP, 
which it had already clearly expressed in 1990 in its proposals for the IGC 
leading up to the Maastricht Treaty. Before taking a slightly different angle and 
look at the Commission's role from a more comparative point of view, there is 
one more general issue that is worthwhile recalling. In chapter 1 it was clearly 
pointed out that this thesis first and foremost focuses on Commission influence. 
This matters because influence is a broader concept than just competence. 
Therefore, the absence of formal competence or -  in this case -  making the 
potential transfer of competences regarding intellectual property rights more 
difficult, does not mean that there would also be an absence or decline in 
Commission influence.
3.2.2. Tax disputes in GATT and WTO
One of the more interesting elements in the TRIPS-case study is the formal 
recognition of EC competences that derived from the Commission’s actions. This 
explicit, formal gain in competences is helpful to this research because of the 
difficulties involved in measuring ‘increased Commission influence’, ‘influence’ 
being a rather hazy concept and particularly prone to diverging interpretations. 
Therefore, even when measuring elements and standards are devised to 
determine how influence can be conceptualised, they will undoubtedly be 
challenged on their accuracy (or indeed whether they are at all measuring what 
they are supposed to) and on the assumptions under which they were devised, 
applied and are operating. For this reason, the discussion of the legislative history 
of art. 133 and the widening of the scope of the Common Commercial Policy is 
important because it undeniably shows that there has been a gain in (exclusive) 
competences for the EC, with the ensuing prominent role and increased influence
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for the Commission. On the other hand, the set-up of the case study is not ideal in 
that there is no clear counterfactual. The second case study, which will be dealt 
with in the following paragraphs, remedies that problem. The set-up here is as 
rigorous as possible: the same actors are involved and the issues at stake are 
almost identical, but there is variation in the institutional setting (GATT and 
WTO) and in the role of the Commission. Hence, while the TRIPS-case may 
have drawn attention to the impact of the institutional framework on the balance 
of power between the EU institutions, this case study pushes the influence of the 
institutional framework to the forefront.
In 1971, the US introduced the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) 
Act, which came into force on 1 January 1972. In very general terms, this act 
grants tax deferral to US companies since a company that qualifies as a DISC is 
not subject to US federal income tax on its export earnings. In 1974, the EC 
challenged this piece of legislation before GATT, arguing that it was inconsistent 
with GATT rules. The EC representative argued that the aim of the DISC 
legislation was to increase exports, and that it thus constituted an illegal export 
subsidy (GATT, 1976a).10 The reaction of the US was to initiate complaints 
against France, Belgium and the Netherlands attacking their income tax systems, 
claiming that certain elements of these systems constituted an illegal export 
subsidy (GATT, 1976b; c; d). These complaints also focussed on tax breaks and 
other measures in the tax code aimed at avoiding double taxation of exports or 
profits or compensating for it.
Because export subsidies of third countries distort their trade relationship with 
the EC, it seems fairly straightforward and intuitive that these issues should fall 
under the CCP. It is therefore not surprising that it is the EC, and not one or more 
Member States, that is the main official actor in the GATT complaint against the 
American DISC-legislation. Correspondingly, it probably does not come as a big
10 Such a subsidy should have been notified and explained under article XVI: 1 of the GATT 
1947 agreement.
115
surprise to learn that the retaliatory disputes the US brought against Belgium, 
France and the Netherlands were dealt with on a bilateral basis between the US 
on the one hand and Belgium, France and the Netherlands respectively on the 
other. The EC is not even mentioned once in these panel reports. Even though 
some authors have hinted at some behind-the-scenes involvement of Commission 
officials (Petersmann, 1983), Commission and Member State officials that were 
questioned about this claimed that this engagement was minimal and that the 
Commission was hardly involved in these disputes (interviews with David 
Maenaut, Henk Mahieu and Soren Schonberg). All this in spite of the fact that all 
three countries were EC Member States and that these cases were a clear 
retaliation for the initiation (by the EC) of the DISC-case against the US. The 
linkage between these income tax-cases and the DISC-case was explicitly made 
by the US, who suggested that “the four complaints on the DISC legislation and 
income tax practices in France, Belgium and the Netherlands should be 
considered together” (GATT, 1976b: p. 1).
The main problem is of course that the EC had no clear competences over tax 
issues in the late 1970s. Furthermore, taxation is often seen as being one of the 
very core elements of sovereignty and consequently it is a highly sensitive topic 
to discuss in the framework of the division of competences in the EU. Even the 
link between certain aspects of taxation and trade policy (or the internal market, 
for that matter) has not been sufficient to create a spill-over effect for taxation 
issues. Nor is this discussion confined to the period before the Single European 
Act. Consider, for example, the UK’s insistence on taxation (and the requirement 
of decision-making by unanimity regarding taxation issues) being one of their 
‘red lines’ in the negotiations over the Constitutional Treaty for the EU (see 
Financial Times, 2004; Press Association, 2004). Hence, while the EC had made 
modest inroads into the issue area of (indirect) taxation by the time of the coming 
into force of the WTO, its competence in this issue area was still very limited.
In November 1997, the EC requested consultations with the US (the first step in 
the WTO dispute settlement system) on their Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC)
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Act, which the EC claimed constituted an illegal subsidy for American firms 
(WTO, 1997d). The FSC Act is in fact the successor of the DISC Act, which the 
US had repealed in 1984 following a package deal on the handling of all four tax 
cases in the context of the Tokyo Round negotiations (Basic Instruments and 
Selected Documents, 1982: p. 114). In 1998 the Commission representative 
requested the establishment of a panel to rule on this dispute (WTO, 1998e). In 
reaction, the US initiated WTO proceedings against Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and Greece, claiming that certain elements within these 
countries’ national taxation systems constituted illegal export subsidies (WTO, 
1998f; g; h; i;j).
The context of these disputes (substance as well as initiation) is very similar to 
the situation within GATT when the DISC dispute and the related tax income- 
disputes were initiated. Unfortunately, the documentary evidence on these cases 
is rather thin. The only WTO documents to be found on the complaints initiated 
by the US are the requests for information and they are addressed to the 
individual governments concerned, so the documentary evidence does not shed 
much light on the role of the Commission in this dispute. However, interviews 
with officials from the Flemish and Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Commission’s Legal Service and DG Trade bring to light that the Commission 
did play an important role in these disputes (interviews with Barbara Eggers, 
Allan Rosas, Henk Mahieu, David Maenaut, Soren Schonberg and Lothar 
Ehring). DG Trade officials as well as officials from the Belgian and Flemish 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs confirmed independently of each other that there 
was only one round of consultations about these tax-disputes after the US’ 
request, and that in this round -  contrary to the situation in the similar tax cases 
in GATT -  it was the Commission that represented the interests of the Member 
States concerned, not the individual Member States themselves (interviews with 
Henk Mahieu, David Maenaut, Soren Schonberg and Lothar Ehring). Rather than 
Commission officials being discreetly involved in the background in (limited) 
support of the Member State officials dealing with the case -  as was the situation 
in the GATT-cases -  they were now firmly in the lead in defending the interests
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of the individual Member States. This increased role for the Commission can be 
considered highly unexpected because of the sensitivity of tax-issues for the 
Member States (certainly in this case, which relates to income tax). It does 
correspond, however, with the expectations flowing from the hypothesis that 
stronger institutional frameworks favour the Commission.
3.3 Alternative explanations and their weaknesses
In the previous sections, the hypothesis that the institutional framework 
influences the Commission’s position has been tested with the help of case 
studies. Since Popper, it is known that every research is inevitably reductionist 
(no hypothesis can be tested against the whole of the real world). This also 
makes it impossible to ‘prove’ a theory conclusively (since one simply cannot 
falsify against all possible events). Nevertheless, this section aims to boost the 
credibility of the proposed institutional explanation by contrasting it with several 
alternative explanations that can be derived from other major theoretical 
approaches. If these alternative approaches can be rejected, that greatly 
strengthens the position and credibility of the institutional interpretation. First, 
our attention will turn to how the major approaches to European integration 
would explain the role of the Commission in these cases. This is important given 
that the focus of this research is on the integration process, which makes these 
theories the main contenders for explaining Commission-Member States 
relations. Since this has already been discussed in chapter one, when the research 
puzzle was introduced, it will be dealt with rather concisely here. Then, a couple 
of other alternative explanations regarding the Commission’s role in the cases 
studied, or specific elements of this role, are discussed. Some of these 
explanations have to be rejected outright. Others are more promising, but in the 
end, none of these approaches matches the explanatory power of the institutional 
approach.
118
The concept of spill-over would undoubtedly take a central position in any 
supranational approach. The most obvious source of spill-over, then, would be 
the EC’s exclusive competence for trade in goods (the CCP). After all, this is a 
closely related field and, furthermore, the technicality of the issues at stake 
should facilitate a technocratic approach. As was already noted earlier, however, 
these issues were not at all merely technocratic matters but they were heavily 
politicised, with the Member State representatives taking a keen interest in the 
TRIPS-negotiations, for example. Furthermore, if the process of spill-over really 
was the explanatory factor, then the Commission should be expected to play an 
important role in the GATT as well, since a much higher percentage of issues 
dealt with in the GATT context fell within the sphere of exclusive EC 
competence. However, when agreements on standards or trade in civil aircraft 
were included in GATT, the Member States insisted on dealing with those issues 
themselves. This is not to say that the process of spill-over is meaningless. The 
fact that the EC enjoys exclusive competence in a closely related issue area 
definitely is a facilitating factor, but it cannot adequately account for the 
Commission’s role in the case studies.
For intergovernmentalists, the Member States are the key actors, and in 
particular the three big ones, Germany, France and the UK. It was shown, 
however, that all three countries (together with others) opposed the 
Commission’s interpretation that trade in services and trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights fell under the exclusive competence of art. 133 EC. 
The intergovernmental explanation that the Commission gained these de facto 
competences and powers because the Member States allocated them or did not 
object to the Commission claiming them, thus looks dubious at best. The 
situation is slightly different in the analysis of the change in the Commission’s 
role in the tax cases in GATT and WTO. After all, the argument that the 
preferences of the Member States had changed over time is more credible in the 
tax-case than it was in the TRIPS-case since more than 20 years passed between 
the GATT and WTO tax disputes, whereas the Commission started to tackle 
TRIPS-cases almost immediately after Opinion 1/94. But even then, the question
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remains as to why those preferences changed. Given the sensitivity of tax-issues, 
it seems highly unlikely that the Member States (at least those concerned, which, 
in the WTO-case include Ireland) came to the conclusion that they would like the 
Commission to gain more power over tax issues. This brings us back to the 
argument that the stronger institutional framework of the WTO, with its option to 
impose trade sanctions in order to enforce compliance, has created an incentive 
for the Member States to be represented by the Commission, and has thus 
strengthened the position of the Commission.
Even the most sophisticated analytical approach to the European integration 
process, the principal-agent analysis, fails to account for the variation in the 
Commission’s role. The major elements in this approach are the concepts of 
‘agency’ and ‘control’. In this view, the Commission will be able to pursue its 
preferred policy options, as long as the Member States do not create barriers that 
cannot be overcome. Within the context of the debates in the preparation of 
Opinion 1/94, it became very clear that the Member States, the principals, did not 
want to delegate these responsibilities to the agent. This created a formidable 
barrier, in principle severely curtailing the Commission’s room for manoeuvre. 
Nonetheless, the Commission succeeded in playing an important role in the 
TRIPS cases. Also in the case of taxation, there is no wish on behalf of the 
principal to delegate (part of) these competences to the agent. But while it plays 
no role in the GATT-tax cases, the Commission does represent the Member 
States involved in the WTO-cases.
Another explanation is rooted in rational choice theory, and more specifically in 
transaction cost economics. The argument here would be that the Member 
States allow, and indeed want, the Commission to act on their behalf in Geneva 
because they want to minimise costs. On the one hand this could point to the 
actual costs associated with being represented in the WTO: a representation in 
Geneva swallows up scarce diplomatic and financial resources that might be put 
to better use elsewhere. However, given the huge costs and benefits of trade 
policy choices, it would be short-sighted at best if Member States would take into
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account this relatively minor cost factor. Furthermore, there is no evidence for 
this since all Member States are still WTO members and still have their own 
delegations in Geneva. Similarly, if  the EC would formally substitute the 
Member State as WTO members, that would lead to a sharp fall in the 
contributions that are payable to the WTO. Meunier indicates that the combined 
contributions of all the (then) fifteen Member States make up 42% of the WTO’s 
budget, whereas this would only be 20% if only the EC represented the Member 
States (Meunier, 2005: p. 25). The WTO website indicates that its annual budget 
is around 160 million Swiss Franc. At an exchange rate of 0.63 (August 2006), 
that corresponds to a little bit more than €100 million. The savings for the fifteen 
Member States to cede their WTO membership would thus be a paltry €22 
million per year. This pales compared to the value of the trade flows that are 
being regulated at the WTO level. For example, the WTO values the EU’s 
exports at $1 643 560 million (source: WTO website). Hence, the Member States 
have a very strong incentive to remain WTO members themselves as well since 
the advantages this entails (in terms of information gathering, lobbying 
opportunities, maybe being in a better position to defend the national interest 
when the need/opportunity arises, ...) are substantially larger than the savings. 
On the other hand, the cost-minimising argument could also refer to the costs that 
can be incurred by another country imposing trade sanctions. This is indeed a 
very good point and it definitely gives a strong incentive for Member States to be 
represented by the Commission, as the EC representative. In this case, though, 
the Member States’ preference for Commission action is a consequence rather 
than a cause. Again it is the institutional framework that comes out as a decisive 
factor in determining trade-offs, and in influencing the Commission’s scope for 
action.
Another argument would draw attention to the decision-making rules. This 
would claim that more and more decisions in the EU have been taken by 
qualified majority rather than unanimity since the WTO came into force. Related 
to this, another question is whether, because of the fact that the creation of the 
WTO and the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty lie very close to each
121
other, the Commission had more influence because of a Maastricht-effect that 
was playing? For several reasons, this argument should be rejected as well. Most 
importantly, from the discussion of the legislative history of art. 133, it should 
have become clear that the Commission did not succeed in pushing through the 
changes to art. 133 it wanted in the run-up to Maastricht. It is only later, with the 
Amsterdam and Nice treaty revisions, that the CCP was gradually adjusted more 
in line with the Commission’s 1990 proposals. If there is a ‘Maastricht-effect’ at 
all, it probably means less leeway for the Commission to achieve its preferences 
(if they run counter to those of at least some of the Member States), given the 
Commission’s unpopularity at the time. Furthermore, the decision to alter art. 
133 still required unanimity and bringing TRIPS-issues under art. 133 also still 
requires unanimity (but no formal treaty change any more). Therefore, the issue 
of increased qualified majority voting does not hold since any decision to 
increase the use of qualified majority had -  and still has -  to be taken 
unanimously.
Yet another explanation would take into account the role of the Unites States. 
Could it not be the case that the US actively pushed for an increased Commission 
role? That would at least (and finally) give it a single European representative 
whom to talk to about trade issues. While Kissinger’s famous remark about the 
lack of a telephone number for Europe might have referred to what is now 
developing into a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the scattering of 
competences in the field of international trade is not exactly creating clarity for 
foreign trading partners about who is responsible for what in the EC. It is hardly 
surprising that third countries have difficulties in knowing who speaks and acts 
for Europe if the European actors themselves even have to turn to the Court of 
Justice for adjudication. This uncertainty, the argument then goes, could greatly 
be reduced if the Commission would be responsible for the whole CCP. 
However, the US has been rather ambiguous regarding the position of the EU in 
the world trading system. On the one hand the US was very supportive in the 
beginning, immediately recognising the EC’s exclusive competence in the CCP 
(and hence its role in GATT). On the other hand, it often still tries to use divide
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and rule-tactics when it comes to trade issues. A good example is the episode at 
the end of the Uruguay Round where President Clinton tried to break the 
European front in the final stages of the negotiations by directly contacting the 
heads of government of the three big Member States. In this case, “Mr. Clinton’s 
attempt to split EC leaders among themselves, and against the European 
Commission” (Brock, 1993: p. 10) failed, but this example clearly shows that the 
US will not hesitate to try and drive a wedge between the Europeans if it is in its 
strategic or commercial interest to do so (for more examples of such American 
negotiating techniques vis-a-vis the EC, see Meunier, 2005). Paradoxically, 
while one of the arguments to support EC competence for all trade issues is 
creating certainty, it is exactly the lack of such certainty regarding the 
implementation of agreements that often causes the US to hesitate to rely too 
much on the Commission as an interlocutor on the international stage. Given that 
the Commission is still largely dependent on the Member States for 
implementation and execution of agreements, there are often questions about its 
ability to deliver on its promise.11
CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter was to test the hypothesis that the institutional framework 
of an international regime can influence the Commission’s scope for drifting 
from the preferences of the Member States. This is not to say that the 
Commission gets carte blanche to pursue its own agenda. Of course there are 
certain limits within which the Commission should remain if it is not to be blown 
the whistle on by the Member States. This thesis argues that these limits are 
influenced and can be broadened by the institutional framework of the 
international regime. In particular the degree of ‘judicialisation’ of the 
institutional framework is important. Rigid, judicial frameworks favour the
11 The most notorious examples here are in the field of environment where the US has regularly 
opposed EC involvement in international environmental agreements on exactly these grounds 
(see Jachtenfuchs, 1990; Benedick, 1991).
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Commission for the reasons mentioned earlier (expertise, experience, incentives). 
Equally important, and closely related to a judicial approach, is the presence of a 
strong enforcement mechanism. This will offer incentives that reinforce the 
dynamics that favour Commission action.
The first case study focused on the Commission’s surprisingly (pro-)active role 
in TRIPS-related disputes within the WTO context. Because of this activity, the 
Commission succeeded in gradually adjusting the scope of its competences in 
international trade policy, not only de facto but also de jure , through adjustments 
in article 133 TEC. This case showed how the role of the Commission in trade 
policy has become more important, even though the EC was not exclusively 
competent for the new issue areas such as TRIPS or GATS. The second case 
study paid particular attention to the impact of the difference in the institutional 
setting between GATT and the WTO by comparing the Commission’s role in 
very similar cases in both organisations. In GATT, the Commission did not 
manage to play an important role in the defensive tax cases. In the WTO, by 
contrast, the Commission defended the Member States concerned, even though 
the complaints were specifically directed against the individual Member States. 
This evidence suggests that the institutional setting of an international regime can 
influence the Commission’s scope of action, which is a confirmation of the first 
hypothesis as it was formulated in chapter two.
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4
DYNAMIC INSTITUTIONALISATION AND
TRADE:
NEGOTIATING STRONG INSTITUTIONS
INTRODUCTION
The findings of the previous chapter raise other questions, which have important 
repercussions for the broader issue of how the European Commission behaves in 
the field of external relations. One of the questions that come to mind is whether 
there is any awareness within the Commission that it has more scope for drifting 
in more highly institutionalised settings. If there is, then this should be 
incorporated in the preferences of this institution. The expectation would then be 
that the Commission has a firm preference for strong institutional frameworks. In 
practice, this can show in two ways. Firstly, it can be reflected in the 
Commission favouring the creation of strong institutional frameworks in 
international negotiations. Secondly, efforts by the Commission to incorporate 
new issues in existing (strong) institutional frameworks can also be an important 
indication of its awareness that it is in a stronger position within such 
frameworks. The second strategy is particularly relevant for issues that do not
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fall under the exclusive competence of the EC because the scope for 
disagreement and conflict with the Member States is greatest here.
This chapter and the next one take a closer look at these two preference-revealing 
strategies. This chapter focuses on the first option. It explores the Commission’s 
role in the process of the institutionalisation of GATT into the WTO in general, 
and in the development of the dispute settlement system in those two 
organisations in particular. The emphasis is on the (changing) position of the EC. 
This is then linked to the dynamics of the negotiations so that their final outcome 
can be interpreted in the light of the respective preferences of the Commission 
and the Member States. Chapter five, then, turns its attention to the second 
explanation and discusses evidence that shows that the Commission actively tries 
to bring other issues within the strong institutional framework of the WTO.
4.1. The Commission and the institutionalisation of the world trade regime
The debate over trade authority has been above all a reflection and a test 
o f a larger ideological battle over European integration.
Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolai'dis (1999: p. 479)
The provisions of the Common Commercial Policy gave the Commission a 
central role in the Community’s external trade relations, not in the least because 
it became the spokesperson for the EC and its Member States. While the Treaty 
of Rome provided for a gradual transfer of competences, no time was lost over it 
and the Commission already started to represent the Member States in the Dillon 
Round (1960-1961), even before the CCP fully came into force (see Petersmann, 
1996). The role and functioning of the Commission in GATT was not always 
unproblematic, however. There are several reasons for this, but one of the most 
important ones undoubtedly was the Commission’s uncertain institutional 
position within GATT. Even though the Commission represented the Member 
States in areas where the EC had exclusive competence, the EC was not a
126
contracting party to GATT and thus the Commission found itself in a rather 
peculiar position. Indeed, the GATT working party that had been established to 
examine the compatibility of the EEC Treaty with the provisions of the GATT 
never reached agreement on this issue (Basic Instruments and Selected 
Documents, 1959: p. 70; see also Petersmann, 1996). One consequence is that 
one could expect the Commission to be in favour of an institutionalisation of 
GATT since this clearly had the potential to strengthen the Commission’s 
(institutional) position within the world trade regime.
Another important reason for the fact that the Commission’s position in GATT 
was often problematic relates to the behaviour of the EC Member States. While, 
according to the provisions of the CCP, the Commission represented the EC 
Member States in matters falling under the EC’s exclusive competence (i.e. most 
of the issues dealt with under GATT until the 1980s), the Member States all too 
often were not ill-disposed to undermining the Commission’s position in GATT. 
One of the most prominent WTO scholars has noted that “[TJhere have been 
occasional instances (...) when some tension on this question [the allocation of 
competences] arose between the EC Commission representatives and the 
member states” (see Jackson, 1990: p. 20). This could take the form of 
challenging the Commission’s position or trying to bypass the Commission in 
order to defend national interests or other specific interests, for example those of 
certain domestic industries. The most striking illustration of a Member State 
trying to undermine the Commission for domestic reasons is probably the 
conflict between the French representative and the Commission representative at 
the GATT Council meeting of June 1988. On the agenda was a request by the US 
for the establishment of a dispute settlement panel against the EC on oilseeds. As 
for all GATT decisions, consensus was required. When the Commission 
delegate, as EC representative, agreed to the establishment of the panel, however, 
the French delegate intervened and expressed his clear and strong objections. 
Consequently, he claimed that his objection meant that there was no consensus 
and, hence, that the panel could not be established. The reaction of the EC 
representative is described in the minutes of that Council meeting, which read:
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“[I]t was quite clear that France was a contracting party, but it was equally 
clear that France no longer had competence on matters of trade policy. That 
was the exclusive competence of the Community, which he represented in 
the Council as the representative of the Commission of the European 
Communities. [...] To take the French views into consideration would put 
into question all the current Community’s obligations and rights. For these 
reasons, even when France spoke as a contracting party, its views as to trade 
policies were null and void and could not be taken into account” (GATT, 
1988a: p. 15)
A fierce debate ensued between several GATT members, with France repeating 
its stance four more times, despite unfavourable opinions from the Commission 
representative, the chairman, the GATT Director-General and several 
Contracting Parties (among which the United States).1 After several attempts, the 
GATT Council nonetheless agreed to the establishment of a panel. The French 
representative, after being left with the short end of the stick, had to back down 
(and the French Prime Minister consequently apologised the following day, see 
Petersmann, 1996: p. 265). This account very clearly illustrates some of the 
tremendous difficulties the Commission faces when acting as the external 
representative of the EC. Surely it does not help in convincing third parties that 
the Commission acts as the spokesperson and negotiator for the EC regarding 
matters falling under its exclusive competence if the competence base is 
sometimes even questioned by EC Member States themselves. Of course, this 
example is an extreme case. It is certainly not the case that the Commission 
representative was facing challenges like this on a regular basis, but it does point 
out that the position of the EC within GATT was still not completely 
safeguarded. Even forty years of GATT practice and thirty years of EC 
participation within GATT could not avoid this argument about the very 
foundation of the role and position of the EC in the GATT system from taking
1 The contentiousness and intensity of the discussion is also reflected in the minutes of the 
meeting, 30% of which are devoted to the description of this debate.
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place. Two elements are particularly important in this ‘oil-seeds fight’. First, the 
fact that such a head-on challenge of the Commission’s authority was possible in 
the first place, given that there was no doubt that the issue fell under the EC’s 
exclusive competence and that the Commission had been representing the EC for 
close to 30 years. Secondly, the eagerness with which several other GATT 
member states joined to express their concerns about the legitimacy of the EC’s 
position in the GATT system. Australia and New Zealand, for example, were 
sceptical that the French position could be ignored in the GATT context. But 
particularly India and Brazil were openly hostile to the idea that the spokesperson 
for the Community could overrule the French position.
This touches upon a second important point, namely that Commission - Member 
States relations alone are not enough to determine and understand the EC’s role 
in an international context. In order for the position of the Commission in GATT 
to be effective and meaningful, it is not only the internal coherence of the EC 
Member States in terms of their delegation of competences (to the 
EC/Commission) that is important. A lot also depends on the acceptance of the 
EC by the other contracting parties, most notably the United States (the most 
important trading power among the third countries). In fact, this did not pose too 
much of a problem when the EC at first became a player on the international 
scene. It was noted earlier that the GATT-consistency of the EEC Treaty could 
not be agreed upon, which blanketed the position of the EC within GATT in 
uncertainty. The US, however, was quick to accept the EC, represented by the 
Commission, as a full partner on the GATT stage. This became clear from the 
reaction of the American delegation to the issue of the conformity of the 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome with those of GATT. According to Evans, “the 
American delegation had given its support to the Community’s refusal to submit 
to the procedures proposed” (Evans, 1971: p. 135). Furthermore, the same author 
notes that “[T]he Kennedy administration continued to lend sympathetic support 
to the EEC” (Ibid.).
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That does not mean that the US has always been unambiguous in its policies 
when dealing with the Commission. More than once, it has tried to break the 
European coalition and undermine the Commission’s authority by approaching 
Member States directly. This happened not only -  as one might expect -  in the 
early days of GATT when the Common Commercial Policy was not yet fully 
established, but it was even more pronounced later on. One of the most striking 
examples happened in the final days of the Uruguay Round negotiations when 
President Clinton tried -  and failed -  to set the Member States up against one 
another and against the Commission by directly dealing with Chancellor Kohl 
and Prime Ministers Major and Balladur, the representatives of the three big 
Member States (see Brock, 1993). Another, even more recent example reveals 
actions by the US that could easily be interpreted to be aimed at weakening the 
Commission’s position within the functioning of the dispute settlement system. 
In April 1997, the US requested the establishment of two panels challenging the 
customs classification of certain computer equipment. One panel was initiated 
against Ireland (WTO, 1997e), the other one against the United Kingdom (WTO, 
1997f), despite the fact that the US had already requested consultations with the 
EC on this very same issue as early as 8 November 1996 (WTO, 1996). The 
singling out of two Member States in these new requests for the establishment of 
a panel could indicate American frustration at having to deal with the EC rather 
than with individual Member States, which can much more easily be manipulated 
by a big player such as the US. This American move therefore prompted a strong 
reaction from the Commission representative. According to the minutes of the 
relevant meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body, he stressed that
“the issues raised in the request for a panel had to be properly addressed to 
the Communities as a whole. Application of the Common Customs Tariff 
with [s/c] the Communities and the implementation of the EC Schedules 
were matters on which the Communities’ [ric] had sole responsibility. [...]
To avoid all doubts, he confirmed that in addressing the issues raised by the 
United States before the panel, the Communities would be acting on behalf
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of the member States, including in particular Ireland and the United 
Kingdom” (WTO, 1997: p. 6)
In this light, it is understandable that the Commission would prefer a more 
institutionalised setting where its position as equal partner would be enshrined in 
a treaty that it would sign as an ‘original member’. From a more theoretical point 
of view, this also shows a conceptual problem in focusing on external relations to 
study the European integration process, namely the intrinsic links between the 
internal and the external level. On the one hand, external recognition is very 
important for the Commission in order to strengthen its position internally, but 
on the other hand internal coherence, the support of the Member States, is also an 
important element for the Commission in convincing third parties of its 
credibility. After all, third countries will want to have some guaranty that the 
Commission can deliver what it negotiates. This interaction between the internal 
and external levels will have to be integrated in the concluding chapter, when the 
theoretical framework is revisited.
In short, there are internal issues (Commission-Member States relations) as well 
as external elements (the Commission’s relation with the other contracting 
parties, and with the US in particular) that influence the Commission’s standing 
and credibility in GATT. The institutionalisation of GATT and the ensuing 
recognition of the EC’s and thus the Commission’s role could strengthen the 
Commission’s position in GATT in that it would lessen its dependence on the 
‘goodwill’ of the Member States and relevant third parties. This view that 
institutionalisation can benefit the Commission is also shared by close observers 
of the Uruguay Round. Raghavan, for example, claims that
“[0]ne of the EC Commission’s main objective [s/c] in pushing the 
Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO) in the Uruguay Round has been that 
with an MTO, and as a definitive treaty, it would not only strengthen the 
EC’s position vis-a-vis the US, but would have also strengthened the EC
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bureaucracy’s position vis-a-vis the member-states and national 
bureaucracies” (Raghavan, 1992)
Indeed, the same author had earlier suggested that “[T]he idea of creating such an 
ITO [International Trade Organisation] through the Uruguay Round (to 
implement results in the new areas that could not otherwise be incorporated into 
the GATT) appears to have been discussed informally at some consultations of 
the GATT Director-General”. And that “[T]he EEC is reportedly behind this 
idea” (Raghavan, 1990, see also Raghavan, 1990a). That this informal meeting 
took indeed place is confirmed by Jackson, who also adds that “[D]iscussions 
about a new organization began to develop in some delegations, particularly 
within the European Community” (Jackson, 1998: p. 27). This move by the EEC 
to press for an institutionalisation of the GATT was also acknowledged -  and 
criticised -  by Kenneth Dadzie, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD (quoted in 
Raghavan, 1990b). The EC formally tabled its proposal for the creation of a 
‘Multilateral Trade Organization’ on 9 July 1990 ( GATT, 1990; for a comment 
in the press regarding this development, see Dullforce, 1990a).
As indicated above, it should not come as a great surprise to find the 
Commission in favour of institutionalising the GATT by creating a formal 
organisation since that would substantially increase the Commission’s standing 
as well as strengthening its position. In order to achieve this, the Commission, 
negotiating for the EC, was forced to play a leading role. The main reason for 
this is that the US was not very excited at the prospect of creating a new 
international organisation and saw no need to create an ITO almost fifty years 
after the US congress had made clear it would not approve such an organisation. 
Paemen and Bensch note that “it was widely known that they [i.e. the 
Americans] had misgivings about the institutional aspects (...)” (Paemen and 
Bensch, 1995: p. 220). And Jackson states that “[T]he US, perhaps alone of the 
quad and other major participants in the negotiation, refused to commit itself to 
the establishment of anew organization at that time” (Jackson, 1998: p. 28). In 
his voluminous negotiating history of the Uruguay Round, Stewart describes
132
how, in the negotiations over the final package, the US reopened the discussion
on this institutionalization expressing the view that “an MTO was not necessary
» • 2 to accomplish the basic objectives of the negotiations” (Stewart, 1993: p. 52).
Furthermore, the Commission saw a window of opportunity in the interpretation
of some Member States, especially Italy and France, that the creation of a
coherent institutional framework would offer some protection against the
increasing unilateralism of the US. As a Financial Times article on the proposal
of Renato Ruggiero, then Italy’s trade minister, regarding reviving the idea of an
ITO indicates, officials within the Commission had already been playing with
this idea for a while (see Dullforce, 1990).
So, given that nothing happens if the two biggest players are against, and given 
the US resistance to the idea of creating an MTO, the EC would have had to have 
made a considerable effort to push through this institutionalisation of GATT (and 
thus have strong preferences for this outcome, given the cost in negotiating 
capital for becoming demandeur for this issue). Internally, there are indications 
that the Commission was already pondering the idea of creating “[S]ome kind of 
umbrella organisation” (Dullforce, 1990) some time before the idea was first 
uttered by the Member States. This interpretation of the Commission as the 
driving force for greater institutionalisation within the EC seems to be confirmed 
in an article in The Times, reporting on the final outcome of the Uruguay Round, 
which states that “[T]he European Commission (...) would be justified in 
claiming that it has kept the Gatt ball rolling towards the declared goal of a 
Multilateral Trade Organisation (MTO), armed with the means to judge and 
settle disputes” (Narbrough, 1993: p. 25). This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the Commission was proactive in bringing about an institutionalisation of the 
world trading system because this would have the potential to substantially 
strengthen its position, not only internally vis-a-vis the Member States, but also 
externally vis-a-vis other WTO members.
2 Regarding the American resistance to the creation and naming of the new organisation and the 
problems this created in the last moments of the negotiations, see also Williams (1993).
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4.2. The Commission and the evolution of the GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement system
The single greatest achievement of the Uruguay Round was the agreement on the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding. This provided, for the first time in the history of 
international trade negotiations, for the strict application of the rule of law (...)
Philip Lee, who represented the Eastern Caribbean States in the ‘Bananas’ dispute
(House of Lords, 2000: paragraph 248)
With regard to the dispute settlement system, the EC seemed quite content with 
the more ‘diplomatic approach’ (see Jackson, 1979) that dominated the GATT 
(certainly in the early stages). Unlike the US, which had always been a solid 
proponent of a strongly judicial approach to tackling trade disputes, the EC had a 
long tradition of opposition against any form of judicialisation of the GATT 
dispute settlement system at the beginning of the Uruguay Round. Since Jackson 
has noted that big countries could be expected to prefer a more diplomatic 
approach (where they can use their relative power to bully smaller states into 
acceptance), scholars have tried to explain the puzzle why these two trade giants 
have such different preferences (see Jackson, 1979; Hudec, 1979; Roessler, 
1987). What is important in the light of this thesis is the EC’s initial firm and 
consistent opposition to any attempt to weaken the control of GATT member 
states when it comes to dispute settlement. The EC position is summarised aptly 
by Phan Van Phi, ex-director of DG I and the EC’s permanent representative in 
Geneva during the Uruguay Round, who referred to the GATT as “un organe de 
meditation en cas de litiges (mais nullement une instance juridictionelle dont les 
decisions s’imposent aux Parties)” (Phan Van Phi, 1987: p. 40).4 A good ten 
years later the official position had changed dramatically. A European 
Commission information pamphlet on ‘The European Union and world trade’ 
states that “[DJuring negotiations on the WTO, the European Union worked hard
3 This seems quite counterintuitive at first since the EC has the strongest degree of judicialisation 
of any international organisation, if it can be regarded as one (see for example Jackson, 1990).
4 “an organ to mediate in disputes (but certainly not a judicial entity whose decisions are imposed 
on the parties)” (freely translated).
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to ensure that (...) its [i.e. the dispute settlement system’s] use would be 
compulsory and that no single country on its own could prevent an allegation 
being investigated” (Commission, 1999a: p. 5). This section investigates what 
caused this U-tum and how it relates to the main argument of the thesis.
There is widespread evidence of the Community’s hostile attitude towards 
greater legalisation of the GATT in the period up to the late 1980s. The earlier 
mentioned decision of the GATT contracting parties to abandon discussions on 
the compatibility of the Rome Treaty with the GATT, under pressure from the 
EC, can be regarded as one of the earliest indications of EC aversion for clear, 
legal settlements in the GATT context (see Petersmann, 1996: pp. 67-68). Then 
there is also the pragmatic approach that was adopted when examining some of 
the EC’s preferential trade agreements (those with the EFTA countries, the 
Mediterranean countries, and the Yaounde and Lome conventions) with Art. 
XXIV GATT.5 The compatibility of these agreements with GATT was “each 
time left undecided in view of the diverging views of, on the one side, the EC 
Member States and their preferential trading partners, which account for the 
majority in the GATT Council, and, on the other side, adversely affected third 
GATT member countries” (Petersmann, 1996: p. 68).
This EC propensity to avoid solutions and approaches in a judicial mould became 
especially clear in the Tokyo Round negotiations over the strengthening of the 
GATT dispute settlement system.6 The EC was strongly opposed to proposals to 
grant a country the right to a panel. Instead, the EC argued in favour of keeping 
the system in use where the GATT Council decided whether a panel should be 
established on a case by case basis. Obviously this decision had to be taken by 
consensus, as was the practice in GATT. The EC argued that “[GATT] Council 
action was desirable in order to stop trivial and meritless complaints” (Patterson,
5 Article XXIV basically states that the provisions of the GATT shall not prevent the creation of 
customs unions or free-trade areas if the duties are not higher or more restrictive than before. For 
both customs unions and free-trade areas, duties have to be eliminated on “substantially all the 
trade between the constituent territories” (Art. XXIV, 8 a(i) and b GATT 1947).
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1983: p. 238). This ties in with the official EC position expressed in a GATT 
Council meeting that the GATT dispute settlement procedure should not be 
expected to help resolve conflicts in which vital national interests were at stake 
(GATT, 1988: p. 14). The same view is expressed by the EC negotiator in the 
Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement at the beginning of the Uruguay 
Round. He stated that “[I]t [i.e. the GATT dispute settlement system] remains a 
delicate instrument between sovereign contracting parties, especially when 
fundamental interests are at stake” (GATT, 1987: p. 1). This shows that, as far as 
the EC was concerned, the consensus rule in GATT was sacrosanct.
Other tactics the EC employed to weaken the GATT dispute settlement process 
were more technical, but no less important. The EC pressed, for example, for 
panels to be made up of five rather than the traditional three members. Having 
larger panels means longer time frames since it takes more time to find panel 
members, for them to meet and deliberate, and issue a conclusive final report. 
Furthermore, the EC strongly argued against the proposal for admitting non­
government persons to sit on a panel, a measure that was intended to speed up 
the panel proceedings and make the panels more independent. The EC also 
proposed that panels should be required to discuss their reports with the parties to 
the disputes before finalising its findings. This proposal ran into strong 
opposition and the EC was forced to abandon it, but “the fact that it was brought 
forward, when combined with the other Community positions noted, led many to 
believe that the EC did not in fact want to strengthen international dispute- 
management systems and would, in general, prefer to handle its disputes 
bilaterally” (Patterson, 1983: p. 239). As if to illustrate this, in 1982 the EC 
emphatically rejected a US proposal for consensus minus two for the adoption of 
panel reports and countered with the demand that the GATT practice of decision­
making by consensus be officially recognised.
For some, this European foot-dragging might seem a bit strange. After all, had 
these countries not delegated jurisdiction to the European Court of Justice when
6 This paragraph and the next draw strongly on Patterson, 1983, pp. 237-241
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it comes to fundamental economic issues? Given their experience, one could
expect them to be great proponents of a rule-oriented approach in trade issues.
Several other elements go some way to explaining this EC reluctance to accept a
more judicial approach to dispute settlement. First of all, the Commission, just
like each of the individual Member States, was used to dealing with other
( ^
countries on a bilateral basis, which fits better into a power-oriented approach. 
Second, it could also be argued that the Commission was experienced in 
international negotiations because of its role of external representative of the EC. 
This expertise in negotiation connects more closely to the diplomatic, power- 
oriented approach of negotiation and consultation than to the arbitration 
mechanism of a strongly legalistic method (the GATT-division of the Legal 
Service, for example, was not established until after the first changes were made 
to the dispute settlement system). Third, as was mentioned earlier, the field of 
external relations is quite contentious, with the Member States often being 
reluctant to cede power to the EC. Fourth, decisions were usually taken 
unanimously. Even when a qualified majority was required, the Luxembourg 
compromise was always hanging over the heads of the Ministers and the 
Commission like the sword of Damocles. Combined with the uncertainty over 
the exact scope of Community’s external competences, it would take a very 
strong Commission to ‘drift’ from the Member States’ preferences in such a 
delicate matter. After all, the inherent danger was that if  the Commission went 
too far and confronted the Member States, they might well decide to rein in the 
Commission. Furthermore, there were some other facilitating factors for sticking 
to a power-oriented approach. For example, the lack of direct effect of GATT- 
law in the EC legal order meant that there was no overview or control by 
individuals (fire-alarm oversight, see chapter two) on the actions of the 
Commission and Council. Also, there was no European ‘Section 301’ that could
7
Although it could just as well be argued that the Commission should have an intuitive 
preference for mles-based systems. After all, the power-based approach is founded upon the basis 
of the more traditional diplomatic interaction between states, which puts the Commission in a 
somewhat unfavourable situation since the EC is a strange entity in inter-state relations. In such 
settings, Member States are thus advantaged in that for them as well as for third countries, it will 
be easier and more natural to interact on a bilateral basis in such a context.
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force the EC to initiate a dispute. Even the New Trade Policy Instrument of 1984 
had only very limited effects because of the rather high hurdles of admissibility 
(seeHilf, 1990: p. 67).
While all the factors mentioned previously did play an important role, the single 
most important reason for this European intransigence over introducing stronger 
dispute settlement provisions was probably the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). This distortive system of (often GATT-inconsistent) import 
barriers and export subsidies provided an obvious and easy target in the 
particularly sensitive sector of trade in agricultural products. It was therefore 
prone to being challenged before the GATT’s dispute settlement system, (a 
glance at the dispute settlement statistics shows that 59% of all formal GATT 
disputes involving the EC (until 1986) involved agricultural products and 
foodstuffs, rising to 65% if only the cases where the EC was defendant are taken 
into account).
On the other hand, the CAP was (and in some cases still is) regarded as a core 
element of the European construction by several key actors. France, for example, 
is notorious for defending the CAP tooth and nail. There are, of course, several 
self-interested reasons for taking this position. France is the biggest net 
beneficiary of the CAP, so any decrease in CAP spending would lead to a net 
decrease in the direct financial benefits of European integration (for France). 
Furthermore, there is a pressing domestic incentive for French politicians to 
defend the CAP because of the strength of the agricultural lobby. Yet there is 
also a more idealistic argument for supporting the CAP. This is based on the fact 
that the CAP was one of the earliest fully-fledged European policies so that some 
still regard it as the core of what the EU is about.
The same two strands of argument also explain why the CAP was so important to 
the Commission. The CAP was (and still is) easily the single biggest item of the 
EU-budget. Furthermore, it was also the most important policy area in terms of 
the sheer scope and extent of the Commission’s powers, transferring “welfare
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state functions ( .. .) to the European level” (Rieger, 2000: p. 179). This is 
reflected in the fact that the Treaty o f Rome had given the Commission extensive 
powers when it came to agriculture. In short, the fact that the GATT-consistency 
o f a policy, which was perceived by key actors (Member States and Commission 
alike) to be o f central importance, was debatable at best did not exactly give the 
Commission nor the Council an incentive to agree to closing some o f the 
loopholes in the GATT dispute settlement system and making it more binding.
In the 1980s the situation started to change. This period saw a huge increase in 
GATT panels involving the EC (see graph 1). Interestingly, the EC also became 
much more active in the GATT dispute settlement system as a complainant (see 
graph 2). In the 1970s, the EC was complainant in only 3 o f the 14 panels 
(21.4%) it was involved in. In the 1980s, this was the case for 25 o f the 67 panels 
(37.3%). This increased EC involvement in the GATT dispute settlement system 
was reflected in the EC’s policies in that it led to a more ambiguous approach to 
the issue o f  strengthening the system.
GATT panels involving the EC
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Graph 1: GATT panels involving the EC
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Graph 2 : GATT panels initiated by the EC
On the one hand, the EC’s agricultural policies as well as its preferential trade 
agreements were still fertile ground for third countries to initiate disputes against 
the EC (see for example Murphy, 1990; 1990a; Petersmann, 1996; Paemen and 
Bensch, 1995). As mentioned earlier, these attacks and the resulting pressures on 
the domestic EC policies (which are themselves often very delicate 
compromises, especially when it comes to agriculture) influenced the EC to stick 
to its anti-legal stance. After all, it did have to block some high profile cases (like 
the first hormones case) and the adoption o f some damning panel reports (for 
example in the EC/US dispute over pasta subsidies or in the EC/US dispute over 
preferential tariffs for Mediterranean citrus products). This goes a long way in 
explaining the EC’s position that the consensus rule should be maintained since 
the dispute settlement system could not and should not deal with disputes where 
vital interests are at stake.
Additionally, the EC was not exactly on the best o f terms with the GATT 
secretariat, or at least its legal department. The EC had long blocked the 
establishment o f a Legal Office in the GATT secretariat. Only in 1983 did the 
EC give in, after assurances that the director o f the Legal Secretariat would be a
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trade diplomat (Petersmann, 1996: p. 268). Despite this compromise, the mistrust 
and discontent between the EC and this legal branch of GATT persisted. 
According to Paemen and Bensch, the EC “had regularly criticised the intrinsic 
legal quality of the reports, which it felt to be too inclined to the views of the 
legal department of the GATT secretariat, a somewhat politicised body, only too 
happy to offer its services to panellists” (Paemen and Bensch, 1995: p. 161).
On the other hand, as is indicated by the sharp increase in EC initiated panels, the 
EC ‘discovered’ the dispute settlement system as a more efficient -  or effective -  
way to solve trade disputes. With the increased use of the judicial approach to 
dispute settlement came the realisation that the traditional ways of dealing with 
these disputes, namely negotiation and consultation, could be quite tedious and 
inefficient. A good example is the dispute over Japan’s discriminatory liquor 
taxes. For seven years, the EC had tried to settle this dispute through a series of 
bilateral negotiations, but to no avail. When the Japanese government finally 
tried to amend the liquor tax legislation, its proposals were rejected by the Diet 
where the liquor lobbies were still very powerful. In 1986, the EC then asked the 
GATT contracting parties to establish a panel, which the GATT Council did on 4 
February 1987 (Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 1988: p. 84). The 
panel that was established ruled in favour of the EC and the panel report was 
adopted on 10 November 1987. By 1989, the Japanese had complied with the 
findings of the panel. This provided the EC with a particularly strong example of 
the advantages of the GATT system, illustrating the benefits of strengthening the 
GATT dispute settlement system. After all, what proved to be too contentious to 
be done in seven years of bilateral negotiations was achieved in just over one 
year and a half by making use of the dispute settlement system.
The fact that previous attempts by the EC to establish a GATT panel were 
frustrated by the Japanese (for example at the GATT Council meeting of 5 and 6 
November 1987, see Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 1988: p. 83) 
would only have brought the point home that the system of decision-making by 
consensus also played against the EC. But there were other reasons for the EC to
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support a strengthening of the dispute settlement system. An important element 
was the desire to curtail or prevent the threat and use of unilateral trade sanctions 
by the US (as allowed for under Section 301 of the -  amended -  Trade Act of
1974). For the EC, this was an important objective in the Uruguay Round 
negotiations (see Paemen and Bensch, 1995). Another experienced practitioner 
noted in this respect that “[T]he European Community negotiators were 
particularly fixated on this objective (...)’ (Stoler, 2004: p. 103). The increased 
threat of American unilateralism has to be understood in the context of the early 
1980s. At this time, the US experienced one of the worst recessions in its recent 
history, saw the dollar appreciate strongly (nearly 30% between 1980 and 1984; 
source: Sapir, 2002) and oversaw a sharp deterioration in its foreign trade 
balance (to a deficit of 3% in 1984 and 1985; source: Sapir, 2002). At the same 
time, the full effects of the Common Agricultural Policy kicked in. Since 1979, 
the EC became a net exporter of temperate foodstuffs, which were heavily 
subsidised in order to be competitive enough to be sold on the world market. As 
a consequence of this situation, US exports to the EC diminished, while EC 
exports to the US -  including for agricultural products -  soared (see Ostry, 
2006). Predictably, this led to cries of outrage in the US over this unfair 
competition of subsidised European products. And given that there was no strong 
dispute settlement system in place which the US could use to address these 
concerns, threats and the likelihood of unilateral action under Section 301 
became much more likely. This, in turn, as witnessed by the earlier quotes of 
several practitioners, was a strong incentive for the EC to push for a 
strengthening of the rules governing dispute settlement on international trade 
issues. In short, as some insiders have put it: “[T]he European Community was 
tom between its desire to reinforce the binding nature of GATT procedures on 
the one hand, and (...) political considerations [against enforcing the system] on 
the other” (Paemen and Bensch, 1995: p. 161).
Apart from the realisation, with the increased number of offensive cases initiated 
by the EC, that the consensus system could be rather frustrating, there was also 
the development within the EC that the relative importance of the CAP
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decreased. Although the CAP was still hugely important and easily the biggest 
EU policy (and certainly not only in purely monetary terms), the rationale behind 
this policy as well as the policy itself were increasingly being questioned by new 
policy developments. Probably the biggest set-back for the CAP was the launch 
of the Single Market programme. After all, the Single European Act led to an 
increase in the number of policy areas in which the EC was attributed 
competences, but also in the depth and scope of the many of the EC’s existing 
competences in ‘old’ policy areas (like competition, for example).
The fundamental tension between the benefits of having a binding dispute 
settlement system for offensive purposes and the usefulness of having blocking 
possibilities for defensive uses is clearly reflected in the outcome of the Montreal 
‘mid-term’ review of the Uruguay Round in 1988. At this ministerial meeting, 
the parties (including the EC) made an attempt to make the dispute settlement 
system more effective by accepting stricter procedural rules for dispute 
settlement, making it harder for any party to block the establishment of a panel. 
However, ‘harder’ does not mean ‘impossible’ and as the EC-US dispute over 
hormone treated beef shows, the consensus rule was still very relevant when 
fundamental interests were at stake. This dispute erupted at the end of 1988 and 
continued into the next year (and, for that matter, was still not entirely resolved at
A
the time of writing). Interestingly, both the EC and the US used blocking 
techniques to defend their interests. The EC blocked the establishment of a panel 
requested by the US to examine the GATT-consistency of EC import restrictions 
on hormone-treated beef, and the US blocked the establishment of a panel 
requested by the EC to examine the GATT-consistency of unilateral American 
sanctions imposed in retaliation for the import restrictions. In general, however, 
while blocking the establishment of a panel became politically much more
8 The WTO Appellate Body ruled that the EC had not complied with WTO law because its 
import ban of hormone-treated beef was not based on a solid risk assessment. Consequently, the 
EC ordered more studies to be carried out into the risks of using hormones. At the time of 
writing, these studies had just been finalised and the EC claims that they provide sufficient 
evidence to justify the European import ban (and, thus, that the American and Canadian sanctions 
in place in retaliation for the EC’s non-compliance with the Appellate Body’s ruling are illegal). 
The WTO hearings are ongoing.
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difficult as a result of the mid-term review agreement (see Jackson, 2000), no 
steps were taken to limit the possibilities to block the adoption of a panel report. 
The mid-term review thus resulted in a tentative move to a stronger 
judicialisation of the dispute settlement system, but it still left open plenty of 
diplomatic loopholes.
At the beginning of the Uruguay Round, the EC position still was to “reaffirm its 
readiness in the search for more effective procedural formulae in the area of 
dispute settlement based on consensus” (Bourgeois, 1995a: p. 83). In closed-door 
negotiations on the reform of the GATT dispute settlement system in mid-April 
1987, the Commission representative was reported to have been defending the 
view “that GATT did not provide for judicial rules and sovereign states could not 
be forced to accept decisions which they regard to be in breach of their balance 
of rights and obligations” (Raghavan, 1987: p. 1). The major change occurred 
later in the Uruguay Round, when the new dispute settlement understanding was 
agreed (Paemen and Bensch date this around 1990, see Paemen and Bensch, 
1995). Within the EC, the Commission had become the most dynamic advocate 
for introducing a more formal and legalised approach to dispute settlement. A 
Financial Times-article, written at around the time of the decisive negotiations on 
the dispute settlement system in the Uruguay Round, clearly spelt out this 
proactive role of the Commission. It reads: “European Community foreign 
ministers will today consider new Commission ideas for dealing with trade 
disputes that would strengthen the authority of the Geneva-based General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Gatt) and could put it in conflict with national 
interests” (Dickson, 1990: p. 2). One of the more controversial ideas that was 
floated by the Commission was the creation of “some new form of legally 
binding appeals procedure” {ibid.), which later became the Appellate Body. Also, 
an important active participant in the Uruguay Round negotiations has confirmed 
the central role of the Commission in this process of “moving the Brussels 
community off the ‘diplomatic model’ and onto the ‘judicial model’ of dispute
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settlement” (Stoler, 2004: p. 102).9 According to Stoler, certain parts of the 
Commission played a prime role in influencing the EC position and in moving 
the negotiations forward in the direction of a stronger dispute settlement system 
(id).
The new approach to solving trade disputes offers no possibilities any more for 
individual countries to block the process, so having agreed to this can rightly be 
seen as a major turning point in the EC’s external policy. It was indicated in the 
previous paragraph that the EC was actually playing a constructive role in the 
negotiations over the reform of the dispute settlement system, which is an even 
bigger U-turn from previous policy. It was also pointed out that within the EC 
the Commission was a major driving force in this process, pushing through some 
fairly far-reaching proposals (certainly when compared to earlier statements and 
actions). But the EC position has evolved even further. In a discussion paper in 
the context of the general review of the dispute settlement system, the EC argued 
for the establishment of “a standing Panel Body” (Commission, 1998a). These 
permanent panellists would form chambers of three (as opposed to the EC’s 
earlier insistence on panels of five). Furthermore, the panellists should be experts 
and act independently (again, as opposed to the EC’s earlier insistence on 
staffing the panels with diplomats). This position is further explained and 
defended in subsequent communications (WTO, 2002b; Commission, 2003).
The previous paragraphs again draw attention to the use of the term ‘the 
Commission’ in this thesis. It has already been pointed out that this in no way 
implies that the Commission is regarded as a unitary actor, something that 
becomes particularly clear in the context of the evolution of the Commission’s 
position concerning the fine-tuning of the world trade regime’s dispute 
settlement system. Initially, agricultural and diplomatic interests were 
predominant, leading the EC to resist any stricter form of dispute settlement. 
Gradually, other issue areas gained prominence on the European level as well,
9 Andrew L. Stoler was principal US negotiator for the Agreement Establishing the WTO during 
the Uruguay Round.
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resulting in a more nuanced (or contradictory) approach. This is summarised 
aptly by a former deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the 
WTO -  and the principal negotiator for a wide range of WTO agreements -  who 
notes that
“[FJormer Commission negotiators indicate that the development of 
European Community objectives in the negotiations [on dispute settlement] 
was mostly a progressive and incremental process where certain sectors of 
DG-I (Trade) and the Legal Service slowly overcame resistance of other 
sectors of DG-I and DG-VI (Agriculture)” (Stoler, 2004: p. 102)
The final U-tum in the EC’s negotiating position thus had its roots in the shifting 
balance of power within the Commission. Initially the coalition between DG 
Agriculture, representing agricultural interests, and large parts of DG External 
Relations, representing the diplomatic face of the Community, was strong 
enough to impose its preferences on the Commission and put its stamp on the 
EC’s position. Gradually, other issue areas gained ground, changing and 
reshaping power politics within the Commission. It was already mentioned 
earlier that the emergence of new policy areas where the EC gained competences 
and the ‘deepening’ of the EC’s competences in some existing areas started to 
mitigate the dominance of agricultural interests within the Commission (when it 
comes to external trade). It also became increasingly clear that there was a shift 
between the parts of DG-I working on international trade and other parts working 
other issues. Given the nature of the EC’s external competences, these other issue 
areas tended to be less technocratic and thus more prone to being governed by a 
traditional, diplomatic approach. This tension, and the emergence of trade 
interests as an important power in intra-Commission politics, came to the surface 
in the Uruguay Round negotiations on dispute settlement and were later 
formalised in the split of DG-I and the creation of a separate DG for international 
trade issues.
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With the use of the term ‘the Commission’, these games of bureaucratic and 
power politics are implied without making them explicit if they do not directly 
add anything to our understanding of the issue at stake. The main reasons for this 
are conceptual as well as analytical. The conceptual argument is that it is hard to 
operationalise a multi-faceted three level game where not only domestic politics 
within the Member States have to be taken into account, but also inter- 
institutional relations within the EC as well as intra-institutional politics within 
each of the EC institutions. Analytically, going into detail about the bargaining 
game that goes on within the Commission would (often unnecessarily) blur the 
picture of the Commission-Council/Member States bargaining game. 
Furthermore, the question about the limits of the analysis would certainly be an 
issue. After all, the intra-Commission bargaining game starts at the unit-level 
(although some say they start even earlier, at the personal level) and works its 
way up from there, sometimes going through all the hierarchical stages up to the 
college of Commissioners. In order to avoid such analytical frizziness, the final 
Commission output is taken as the point of departure. This is interpreted as 
showing the preference of ‘the Commission’, knowing full well that this is not 
the work of a unitary actor and that this outcome is itself the result of an intense 
bargaining game being played within the Commission.
CONCLUSION
This chapter further explored the impact of the institutional framework of 
international organisations on the Commission’s competences in the area of 
trade. It did so by exploring if there is any realisation within the Commission that 
there are possibilities for strengthening its position when there are strong 
international institutions. If that is the case, the expectation would be to see firm 
Commission support for such strong international institutions. This can take two 
forms. Firstly, it could be translated in the policy preferences (and actions) of the 
Commission in that it might favour a strengthening of the institutional 
framework. This was explored in the first section of the chapter, which looked at
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the Commission’s position on how, in its opinion, disputes should be settled in 
the international trade regime. The Commission’s position at first was a firm 
anti-legal stance, but now it is one of the biggest supporters of strengthening the 
system even more and making it more judicial. A second way in which the 
Commission’s liking for strong institutions could be exposed is to examine 
whether the Commission will try to include new issues into the existing, strong, 
institutional framework. This is particularly relevant for issues that do not fall 
under the exclusive competence of the EC because the scope for disagreement 
and conflict with the member states is greatest for those issues. This will be 
explored in the next chapter.
Finally, it is also worth drawing attention to the methodological difficulties in 
trying to separate the international and the domestic (i.e. EU) level. These levels 
cannot be seen independently from each other since there is a very clear 
interaction effect going on. On the one hand, the international level is important 
in that it can be a useful tool for the Commission to influence and change the 
internal balance of power. In this sense, the international system is thus clearly 
impacting on the domestic level. On the other hand, the EC is one of the main 
players at the international level, which means that the domestic level (intra-EU 
politics) can heavily influence what happens at the international level. At first 
sight, this might seem to be reason for optimism for the Commission since it 
could mean that the Commission is able to shape the international context that it 
can then ‘exploit’ to gain competences. However, it also means that the position 
of the Member States is strengthened since they could influence the 
Commission’s behaviour by setting stricter limits and reducing the set of 
possible/acceptable outcomes (for example concerning the negotiating mandate, 
or the actual outcome of negotiations). The strength and extent of this interaction 
between the domestic and international level and the consequences for the 
balance of power between the Commission and the Member States only 
reinforces the claim of this thesis that the international institutional context 
should be taken into account more seriously when addressing Commission- 
Member States relations in external relations.
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5
DYNAMIC INSTITUTIONALISATION AND
TRADE:
THE ISSUE OF INVESTMENT IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
While the previous chapter analysed the Commission’s role in the negotiations 
concerning the dispute settlement system in the trade regime and its subsequent 
evolution, this chapter explores a specific case study to illustrate the 
Commission’s preference for dealing with and bringing new issues within the 
strong WTO framework. A lot has been written about the so-called ‘Singapore 
Issues’ in the past couple of years (see for example Evenett, 2003; Cosby, 2003; 
Bercero and Amarasinha, 2001, Anderson and Holmes, 2002). At the Singapore 
Ministerial Conference in December 1996, the first such meeting, the ministers 
of the WTO member states decided, among other things, that the link between 
trade on the one hand and, on the other hand, investment, competition policy, 
transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation respectively 
should be studied more closely (see WTO, 1996a). To this aim, three working 
groups were established to examine how these issues can influence trade, and,
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hence, how they could or should be integrated in the legal framework of the 
WTO.1
Among the Singapore Issues, investment is arguably the most vehemently 
contested topic. It certainly is among the most hotly debated ones, which is one 
of the main reasons it is singled out here as a case study (rather than, for 
example, competition policy or government procurement). The issue of 
investment had already been dealt with in the Uruguay Round negotiations, but 
the results were fairly limited. The provisions of the agreement on trade-related 
investment measures (TRIMS) are of a rather general nature, basically 
reaffirming the pre-existing GATT-rules (see Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995: p. 
203; Buurman and Schott, 1994: p. 112). The GATS agreement, for example, 
often contains more detailed provisions on investment than the TRIMS 
agreement (Kentin, 2002). The next paragraphs analyse how the issue of 
investment has been dealt with in the international trade regime and, more 
importantly, how the Commission has approached this. It will become clear that 
the Commission has always been a fervent proponent of the inclusion of 
investment in the WTO. This seems strange at first sight for a number of reasons, 
such as, for example, the fact that the economic case to be made for this is not 
always compelling or that there is no strong, coherent lobbying effort focusing 
on the inclusion of investment in the WTO framework.
If the Commission’s increased leeway within the strong institutional setting of 
the WTO is taken into account, this dogged insistence on dealing with 
investment issues within the World Trade Organisation can be understood more 
readily. This not only refers to the Commission’s stronger position in the WTO 
when it comes to trade negotiations (compared to, for example, its position in the 
OECD; see later), but also to the increased scope for gaining competences over 
trade policy within the EC. Investment was one of the issues the Commission
1 One working group examines the relationship between trade and investment, another the 
interaction between trade and competition policy, and a third one studies transparency in 
government procurement.
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wanted to see covered by art. 133 in 1990, but which the Member States refused 
to transfer. According to the institutional logic put forward in this thesis, bringing 
investment issues within the WTO framework and its strong dispute settlement 
system could pave the way for pushing these issues under the umbrella of the 
CCP, in the same manner as with the TRIPS-issues discussed earlier. The 
insistence of the Commission on including investment into the WTO could thus 
point to awareness within the Commission that it is empowered under the strong 
institutional framework of the WTO.
This chapter is composed of two major sections. The first section gives an 
overview of the recent history of the negotiating efforts to integrate the issue of 
investment within the international trading system. The discussion is not 
confined to the setting of the WTO, but also includes the failed negotiations on a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment in the context of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. Particular attention is paid to the role 
and the position of the Commission in these negotiations. The second section 
then tests several alternative explanations for explaining the Commission’s 
behaviour. Again, an approach that incorporates the institutional strength of the 
external framework and the impact this has on the Commission’s preferences, 
will offer the most convincing interpretation for explaining the Commission’s 
efforts to integrate the issue of investment within the international trading 
system.
5.1. Investment during and after the Uruguay Round: an elusive issue
After the limited success of the TRIMS negotiations and the sharp divergences in 
views between (most) developed and (most) developing countries on what 
investment rules should look like, a dual-track approach was adopted. On the one 
hand, the issue was kept alive (although some would rather say on life support) 
within the WTO framework. As mentioned before, the issue of investment was 
discussed, together with three other ones, at the Singapore Ministerial
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Conference in 1996. The result was the establishment of a working group to 
“examine the relationship between trade and investment” (WTO, 1996a). On the 
other hand, negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) were 
initiated within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), an organisation that consists mainly of developed, Western countries.2
This dual track approach gives rise to some interesting questions. If more highly 
institutionalised settings open up possibilities for the Commission to pursue its 
interest and preferences more successfully, as is claimed in this thesis, and if 
there is some awareness of this within the Commission, then the Commission 
should have a preference for dealing with investment in the framework of the 
WTO rather than in the OECD. This is the claim that is examined in this chapter. 
In general, this points to the importance of the external institutional framework 
as well as of the position of the Commission within this framework as 
influencing factors when issues of mixed competences are on the table. 
Regarding the latter, it should be noted that the Commission’s position as 
negotiator on behalf of the Member States, together with the principle of the 
Single Undertaking in the WTO (nothing is agreed upon until everything is 
agreed upon) have an impact on the Commission’s scope for influencing the final 
agreement. That does not mean that the preferences of the Member States are not 
taken into account. On the contrary, Member State preferences will still 
determine the ‘win-set’ within which any agreement should fall if  it is to be 
ratified (see Putnam, 1988; Moravcsik, 1993; Milner, 1997). Package deals, 
however, increase the Commission’s win-set because they are supposed to 
contain benefits for everyone in order to increase the cost of non-ratification for 
every individual participant.
This has two important implications. First, the above would lead one to expect 
the EC to favour broad trade negotiation rounds. Apart from the external
2 Although its membership also includes some emerging economies or newly industrialised 
countries. Mexico, South Korea and Turkey, for example, are also members of the OECD.
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pressures for broad rounds, namely that agreement between the 148 WTO 
member states should be easier to obtain when there is more scope for bargaining 
and trade-offs, there are also some internal pressures for the EC to favour broad 
rounds. Firstly, since the EC consists of 25 Member States, the chances of them 
agreeing on the need to launch a WTO round and the content of such a round, 
increase when enough issues are included so that the list reflects issues of 
particular concern for every Member State. Secondly, and no less important 
given the Commission’s role as catalyst in trade policy, the Commission has an 
incentive to start broad rounds because that increases the win-set within which it 
can negotiate successfully. It is therefore not surprising to find that the EC has 
indeed consistently favoured broad trade negotiation rounds (this was the case 
for the Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay rounds in GATT, but also for the 
Ministerial Meetings in the WTO: Singapore, Geneva, Seattle, Doha, Cancun and 
Hong Kong).3
Second, the dynamics of the strong dispute settlement system in the WTO that 
have been explored in chapter three add to the relative strength of the 
Commission’s position in the ‘implementation phase’. Again, this is of particular 
relevance when issues of mixed competence are at stake since Commission 
action with regards to these issues will further strengthen the Commission’s 
position to lay a claim on these competences. Because of its stronger position in 
the negotiating phase as well as in the implementation phase, the expectation is 
that the Commission would prefer issues of mixed competence to be dealt with 
within a strong framework (for trade-related issues: the WTO) rather than in an 
organisation with a weaker institutional framework.4
3 Note that there are also other factors that help to explain this EC preference for broad 
negotiation rounds. Avoiding being isolated in a round that would focus on attacking the 
Common Agricultural Policy with few or no possibilities to trade this off against other 
concessions, for example, would be an important factor as well.
4 Since the WTO’s dispute settlement system is one of the most highly legalised ones and the EC 
is a fully-fledged member of the WTO (which is not the case in many other organisations), this 
means that the WTO should be the Commission’s favourite forum for trade-related issues. After 
all, one would be very hard-pressed to find an organisation where the Commission is in a stronger 
position.
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Applied to the case of investment, the expectation is thus that the Commission 
has a clear preference for dealing with this issue within the WTO rather than the 
OECD. After all, the institutional position of the Commission undoubtedly is 
much stronger in the WTO than it is in the OECD. The Commission’s strong role 
as the representative of the EC and its Member States in the WTO has already 
been discussed in some depth earlier. Within this organisation, the Commission 
speaks on behalf of the Member States. A good example confirming this was the 
decision of the GATT Council to disregard the misgivings of the French 
representative in the oilseeds case (see chapter four). Within the OECD the 
situation is quite different. The EC is not a full member of the OECD but instead, 
it only has observer status. The Commission, therefore, does not speak on behalf 
of the Member States in the OECD. Indeed, it does not even operate at the same 
level as the Member States (that are all full members of the organisation).
The relative weakness of the Commission’s position in the OECD becomes clear 
from the Local Cost Standard-saga. Within the OECD, an Understanding on a 
Local Cost Standard had been negotiated. The Commission argued that this fell 
within the scope of the EC’s exclusive competence because of the link with the 
Common Commercial Policy. Given that elements of export aid are inextricably 
linked to the Common Commercial Policy, the EC clearly had exclusive 
competence over this issue. The Member States, however, were not very keen on 
signing this as a Community agreement, since that would undermine the 
privileged position of the Member States within the OECD. As a result, the 
Commission had to resort to the Court of Justice and ask for an opinion, in line 
with art. 228(1) of the EC Treaty (now art. 300(6) TEC). The Court ruled that 
“[T]he Community has exclusive power to participate in the Understanding on a 
Local Cost Standard referred to in the request for an opinion” (Court of Justice,
1975). In other words, the Understanding on a Local Cost Standard had to be 
concluded as a Community agreement (Opinion 1/75, see Court of Justice, 1975). 
Nonetheless, the fact that the Commission had to resort to judicial action in order 
to be acknowledged as the relevant actor in an issue area where it possessed 
exclusive competence in the first place is a good illustration of its weak position
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within the OECD. Such a context is hardly very promising as a platform for 
drifting from Member States’ preferences or gaining competences in situations 
where the division of competences is disputed.
As has been indicated in the previous chapters, the WTO’s strong dispute 
settlement provisions can play to the advantage of the Commission in its ‘battle’ 
for competences with the Member States. Because of its leading role in the 
dispute settlement system, the Commission will find it easier to lay a Community 
claim on what are originally mixed competences, thereby changing the de facto 
balance of power in the field and hence pave the way for de jure  acquiring these 
competences at a later stage (see the analysis of the TRIPS-case in chapter three). 
If this institutional interpretation is correct, then the expectation should be to see 
the Commission wanting to deal with the issue of investment within the WTO 
framework rather than in the context of the OECD. The remainder of this section 
describes the position and role of the Commission in the negotiations on 
investment in the context of the WTO and the OECD.
5.1.1. Negotiating investment in the Uruguay Round: a strained history
“The TRIMS negotiations were to be among the most frustrating and least 
productive of the Uruguay Round. Given that most developing countries had not 
wanted to negotiate on trade-related investment measures (...), this outcome was 
almost inevitable” (Croome, 1995: p. 138). This quote, from a privileged 
participant in the Uruguay Round, makes it crystal-clear that investment was one 
of those issues in the Uruguay Round that were characterised by a clear North- 
South divide.5 The vast majority of developing countries (led by India and 
Brazil) was not particularly interested in discussions on investment (one of the
5 John Croome was a senior official in the GATT secretariat. One of the positions he held was 
that o f Director of the Trade and Finance Division. His book Reshaping the World Trading 
System is the official WTO history of the Uruguay Round negotiations. Besides having 
participated in the negotiations, he was given full access to all Uruguay Round documents.
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‘new’ issues dealt with), and saw these talks mainly as negotiating chips in a 
package deal so as to obtain more concessions in other areas. The US (supported 
by Japan) was the single biggest advocate of a wide-ranging, encompassing and 
thorough approach to dealing with TRIMS in the international trading system. 
The US proposed to ban the most trade-distorting TRIMS outright, and put in 
place a framework for controlling all other TRIMS (see Stewart, 1993a; Evans 
and Walsh, 1994). The EC was also a great proponent of including investment 
into the GATT framework, but it did not favour the hard-line approach like the 
US. The key EC submission in the TRIMS negotiations therefore put forward a 
list of 13 TRIMS, only eight of which were considered to be directly related to 
trade (GATT, 1988). The EC therefore only supported the inclusion within the 
GATT framework of these eight TRIMS, as opposed to the US’ list of 14. Even 
this more mitigated proposal ran into strong opposition, and by 1989 -  after the 
mid-term meeting -  “the results on TRIMs were brief, reflecting little progress 
beyond the mandate and negotiating plan” (Stewart, 1993a: p. 2091).
In short, the TRIMS negotiations were among the most difficult ones in the 
Uruguay Round. This was mainly due to the sharp divergence in views between, 
on the one hand, some developing countries and, on the other hand, most 
developed countries, in particular the US and Japan. As a consequence, the end- 
results of the TRIMS negotiations were very modest. The provisions of the 
TRIMS agreement are characterised by their general nature. There are some 
other investment-related provisions scattered over the other sections of the WTO 
agreement, the most important ones being in the GATS agreement. All in all, for 
(most of) the developed countries these investment rules did not go nearly far 
enough. On the other hand, many developing countries were not very eager to 
discuss a broader definition of investment or non-trade related investment 
measures (see Croome, 1995). The modest outcomes of the investment 
negotiations can thus be attributed to resistance from developing countries to a 
comprehensive investment agreement in the WTO. In 1995, after the Uruguay 
Round had ended, the key developed countries therefore sought another forum to 
come to an investment agreement. And what organisation is better suited for that
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than the OECD, a club consisting mostly of developed countries? For this reason, 
it has been argued that the true importance of the TRIMS agreement lies not so 
much in its provisions, but rather in the fact that it “allows continuing discussion 
of investment issues that affect trade, and in the longer run it opens the door to 
full-fledged negotiations both on investment questions and, in the guise of 
competition policy, restrictive business practices” (Croome, 1995: p. 310). 
Referring to the -  then -  pending OECD negotiations, Croome continues by 
saying that “[AJlready, it seems likely that such negotiations will take place” 
(ibid.).
5.1.2. From Paris to Singapore: investment in the OECD and the WTO
After the failure to reach a broad agreement on investment in the WTO, 
negotiations were continued in the OECD. This was convenient since, as noted 
earlier, the strongest opposition to a comprehensive investment treaty came from 
developing countries, who are as good as absent from the OECD.6 Several 
officials within the Commission, however, pointed out that the European 
Commission’s attitude to negotiations in the OECD has never been more than 
lukewarm (interviews with Stefan Amarasinha and Richard Carden). Trade 
Commissioner Brittan, for example, while recognising that “the WTO is not 
ready yet to negotiate [a multilateral investment agreement]” (Commission, 
1995) nevertheless saw the ongoing OECD negotiations mainly as a tool for 
preparing the ground for a WTO agreement on investment. Indeed, after the 
OECD negotiations have finished, he argued, “the WTO will be well placed to 
consider a complementary negotiating mandate to free investment flows 
worldwide” (Ibid.). “That is”, he continues, “why the Commission is proposing 
why the WTO is involved, starting now, in discussion of investment issues”
6 Some developing countries (China, Chile, Argentina and Brazil, among others) were accredited 
as observers to the negotiations. However, this is a somewhat misleading term since in fact they 
were not allowed to follow proceedings and negotiations directly. Instead, they were kept briefed 
on what was happening in the negotiations (post factum) but they had no direct say in or sway 
over them (interview with Stefan Amarasinha).
157
{ibid.). As mentioned earlier, this would seem to be understandable, given the 
Commission’s stronger negotiating position in the WTO compared to that in the 
OECD. The weakness of the Commission’s position as negotiator in the OECD 
is confirmed by the actions of the Member States during the MAI negotiations. 
One official that is now working on investment issues in the Commission, but 
who at the time of the MAI negotiations was representing the Danish 
government, recalled how Member States all pursued their own, often diverging, 
interests. According to him, the Member States acted largely independently, even 
regarding issues that probably fell under the EC’s exclusive competence and thus 
should have been the preserve of the Commission (interview with Stefan 
Amarasinha). When asked, this was confirmed by another Commission official 
who worked for the Swiss government at the time of the OECD-negotiations 
(interview with Christophe Kiener). In this light, the Commission’s persistence in 
trying to get investment on the WTO agenda, even though negotiations were 
being simultaneously conducted in the OECD, or -  later -  after the OECD 
negotiations had been abandoned, seems a logical thing to do. While this 
certainly was a rational strategy for the Commission to pursue in 1995, the 
desirability of such an approach becomes questionable after that, certainly from 
1998 onwards, when the OECD negotiations collapsed.
The negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the OECD 
got underway in April 1995 immediately after the end of the Uruguay Round. 
Almost exactly three years later, in April 1998, they were suspended because of 
the withdrawal of France from the negotiations. The background for the collapse 
of the negotiations, however, was not the resistance of the ‘usual suspects’ 
(labour groups, or developing countries). Instead, “it was a diverse collection of 
self-styled ‘civil society’ non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially 
environmental groups, that mobilized opposition to the negotiations in a number 
of important countries” (Walter, 2001: p. 3). They took their cue from a leaked 
draft of the MAI in 1997 to get organised and start mobilising public opinion by 
pointing out the potential adverse effects of the MAI on environmental and social 
standards and on democratic values (see for example Friends of the Earth, 2001).
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Because of the growing grassroots opposition against the MAI in several 
developed countries, the political climate had changed quite drastically by 1998. 
This is reflected in a report that was ordered by the French government on the 
MAI negotiations. The report is highly critical of the substance of the 
negotiations as well as of the secretive atmosphere in which they were being 
conducted (Lalumiere, Landau and Glimet, 1998). The conclusions of this 
‘Lalumiere’-report ultimately led to the French withdrawal from the negotiations 
and it can thus be seen as the coup de grace for the MAI.
One can be forgiven for thinking that this would be the end of a multilateral 
investment agreement. After all, with suspicious (and quite activist) publics at 
home, and less than enthusiastic negotiating partners abroad, the general political 
context was not exactly advantageous for pursuing this track any further. This 
insight led the US negotiators to abandon their insistence on a multilateral 
investment agreement, given that a broad treaty did not seem achievable (see 
Walter, 2001a). The EC and Japan, however, insisted on dealing with investment 
within the WTO. At the Singapore Ministerial Conference, the EC had already 
succeeded in convincing the other WTO members not to disagree with the 
establishment of a working group on the relationship between trade and 
investment. Instead of rethinking the usefulness or the feasibility of a multilateral 
investment agreement (as the US did), the EC and Japan pushed even harder to 
get investment on the WTO agenda after the failure of the MAI negotiations. 
Investment was explicitly included in the negotiating mandate of the European 
Commission for the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999 (Commission, 1999). 
Because of the confusion and chaos created by “the battle of Seattle”, however, 
discussion on this issue was rather limited and never really took off (WTO, 
1999e; f; g).
That changed in Doha in 2001. At this meeting, after a lot of haggling, the EC 
managed to get a provision inserted in the ministerial declaration, stating that the 
WTO members “agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of 
the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit
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consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations” (WTO, 2001: paragraph 
20). Almost immediately there arose discussion about the interpretation of this 
sentence. Did it say that negotiations should start anyway and the members only 
have to agree on the modalities (as the EU claimed)? Or did it mean that the start 
of negotiations is conditional upon a consensual decision (as the developing 
countries claimed)? Eventually, the chairman of the Ministerial -  Youssef 
Hussain Kamal -  clarified that the mandate should be understood so as to mean 
that “a decision would indeed need to be taken by explicit consensus, before 
negotiations (...) could proceed” (WTO, 2001a).
In fact, the story of the genesis of this chairman’s ruling gives a good idea of the 
contentiousness of including investment onto the WTO agenda. After nocturnal 
negotiations between the representatives of all the major trade actors, an 
agreement on including investment in the new negotiation round was reached. 
When the Director-General of the WTO did the tour of the table during the 
plenary meeting the next day to establish whether there was consensus, India 
suddenly voiced objections against the investment provisions, while the other 
major actors believed these provisions to have been agreed the night before. 
Since another objection would be the end of the investment provisions, people 
from the WTO secretariat took advantage of the tumult that followed India’s 
statement to provide the chairman with a list of countries that should be given the 
floor and another list with (anti-investment) countries that absolutely should not 
be allowed to speak. In the meantime, the Director-General, the US Trade 
Representative and the EC Trade Commissioner disappeared to a back room with 
the Indian ambassador. While a considerable amount of arm-twisting went on in 
that back room, the ‘investment-friendly’ countries that were given the floor 
were discreetly encouraged to speak as long as they possibly could, rather than 
keeping to their 30-second slot to state their acceptance of or objections to the 
conclusions of the negotiations. The Canadian trade minister, Pierre Pettigrew,
7 This is the story how it was told to me by Christophe Kiener, now working on investment issues 
for DG Trade, but at the time of the Doha Ministerial a member of the Swiss delegation and a 
participant in the Ministerial.
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apparently was a particularly gifted improviser, entertaining the delegates for 
half an hour rather than 30 seconds, to the ever-mounting frustration of the 
Malaysian delegation in particular, that was eager to get the floor so that it could 
kill off the issue of investment once and for all. The chair managed to prevent 
any country that was opposed to the inclusion of investment from taking the floor 
and when the representatives of the EC, US and India returned he gave the floor 
back to the Indian representative. The Indian representative subsequently 
declared that India had changed its mind and did not object to the text at hand on 
the condition that the chairman would read out a clarification, which is now the 
‘chairman’s ruling’. This shows very clearly how contentious the issue of 
investment still was at the time of the Doha Ministerial (15 years after the 
Uruguay Round negotiations on TRIMS started) and that a good deal of arm- 
twisting by developed countries, not least the EC, was needed to get even a 
diluted version of investment on the WTO agenda.
Before the Cancun Ministerial Conference, the EC again stressed the importance 
it attached to the issue of investment and the Singapore Issues in general. The 
day before the Cancun Ministerial kicked off, Commissioner Lamy proclaimed 
that “[W]e should not gut the Doha Round: we need the Singapore issues” 
(Lamy, 2003: p. 19). Even though the stakes were quite high in Cancun, the 
Commission kept insisting on including all the Singapore Issues in the 
negotiations. Only at the very last minute did Lamy propose to drop two or 
possibly three of the Singapore Issues. Yet even this apparently was not 
acceptable to the G90 group of developing countries, so that the chairman 
decided to call the negotiations to an end. It is therefore not surprising that the 
EC in general, and Lamy in particular, was widely blamed for the failure of the 
Cancun Ministerial (Elliott, Denny and Munk, 2003; Jonquieres, 2003). This also 
led to frictions between the Commission and the Member States. The most 
pronounced illustration of this is a paper of the UK’s Department of Trade and 
Industry, written -  and leaked -  in the aftermath of the Cancun failure, that was 
highly critical of the way Commissioner Lamy had dealt with the negotiations 
(Elliott, 2003; Denny, 2003; Jonquieres, 2003a).
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The Member States were not the only ones who were critical of the 
Commission’s behaviour. Also the European business leaders urged the 
Commission to focus again on the bigger picture. The European Round Table of 
Industrialists, for example, urged the EU to go back to ‘substance’, implying that 
the Singapore Issues would best be dropped (Jonquieres, 2003b). The 
International Chamber of Commerce was even more explicit when it asked the 
Commission to deal with each of the Singapore Issues “on their own merit and at 
their own pace” (International Chamber of Commerce, 2003), leaving no doubt 
that some issues should best be put on ice. And even UNICE, one of the 
staunchest supporters in the EU of a WTO investment agreement, stated that 
“[T]o achieve the European business trade and investment objectives set out 
above, UNICE supports a pragmatic approach (...)” (UNICE, 2003a, original 
emphasis). Furthermore, many national parliaments as well as the European 
Parliament (that had always been wary of dealing with investment in the WTO) 
remained critical. All this on top of the ‘traditional’ opposition from various 
development, environmental and anti-globalisation NGO’s and the continued 
contentiousness of the issue of investment internationally. The EC looked 
increasingly isolated when even Robert Zoellick, the US Trade Representative, 
openly and “firmly supported the developing countries in saying that investment 
and competition talks should be dropped” (Alden and Barber, 2004).
The Commission’s reaction was somewhat surprising. The logical expectation 
would be that all this pressure would force the Commission into re-thinking its 
approach to the Singapore Issues. Instead, almost the exact opposite happened. 
After the failed Ministerial, the Commission at first engaged in some soul- 
searching. But this period of reflection did not result in the acceptance that, in the 
current climate, the WTO was not the appropriate forum to deal with investment 
or competition policy as the opponents of the Singapore Issues had hoped. 
Giving evidence before the International Development Committee of the House 
of Commons, Commissioner Lamy talked about his last minute offer at Cancun 
to drop two of the Singapore issues and he boldly declared: “I have withdrawn
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the offer”. He then continued to say that “there was not much on the table other 
than what we had put on the table, and that was through Doha, between Doha 
and Cancun and through Cancun. The table crumbled; there is no table and there 
is nothing on the table” (House of Commons, 2003c: questions 45 and 46). This 
confirms what is unambiguously stated in an internal DG Trade position paper of 
25 September 2003, namely that “[Although the Commission indicated its 
willingness to reduce the agenda at Cancun, this offer was not accepted and 
therefore does not constitute any formal or informal commitment on behalf of the 
EU” (Carl, 2003a: p. 13).
At the end of November 2003, the Commission’s position had moved a little bit. 
In a communication to the Council, the European Parliament and ECOSOC, the 
Commission acknowledged the difficulties in reaching consensus on the 
Singapore Issues in the WTO. Instead, it proposed that the Community agree 
with unbundling the issues and that it “should explore the potential for 
negotiating some, or even all four Singapore Issues, outside the Single 
Undertaking” (Commission, 2003e: p. 11). This position, however, proved a 
recipe for uncertainty and confusion. A Third World Network article described 
the situation as follows:
“According to trade diplomats, at an informal meeting of a few ambassadors 
convened on 4 December morning (...) the EC apparently indicated that it 
would like the four Singapore issues to be retained in the WTO, if necessary 
through plurilateral negotiations for some of the issues. Some diplomats said 
they considered this to be a shift from what the EC had said only the 
previous morning [when] the EC ambassador had said that the EC was 
willing to drop one or more issues "from the Doha Development Agenda"” 
(Khor, 2003)
This position is confirmed on numerous other occasions: the EC is not willing to 
leave any of the Singapore Issues completely out of the WTO, but it is willing to 
unbundle the issues and treat the most contentious ones outside the Single
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Undertaking (see for example WTO, 2004a; Lamy, 2004). This new strategy did 
not succeed in solving the EC’s problems concerning the Singapore Issues. The 
fact that the EU still wanted to deal with these issues within the WTO, even 
though only on a plurilateral basis if a multilateral approach did not prove to be 
possible, was still quite discomforting to many (mainly developing) WTO 
members that were opposed to the inclusion of most of these issues in whatever 
form. The Commission, on the other hand, kept pushing as many of these issues 
as possible into the Single Undertaking, a cause of friction not only with many 
developing countries, but also with the US. At the end of February 2004, for 
example, Zoellick (the US Trade Representative at the time) and Lamy clashed 
over the position of the Singapore Issues in the Doha Round negotiations (see 
Inside US Trade, 2004). Note also that the Commission’s proposal for dealing 
with some or all of these issues on a plurilateral basis indicated a fundamental 
shift from the Commission’s earlier position that the single framework was one 
of the main achievements of the WTO (compared to the GATT a la carte). 
During the Uruguay Round, the Commission had been one of the most fervent 
supporters for creating a single framework, which gives an idea about the 
strength of the Commission’s preference for getting investment into the WTO, 
even if  it means departing from the single framework. Compare, for example, the 
Commission’s idea of unbundling the Singapore Issues with the fact that as late 
as 2 April 2003, the Director General of DG Trade told the WTO Trade 
Negotiating Committee that “[W]e should be guided by a few basic principles 
(...) Firstly, the principle of the single undertaking” (Carl, 2003).
From this account, it follows that the Commission’s insistence on including 
investment in the WTO cannot always be understood easily. After all, there were 
numerous internal and external pressures against incorporating this issue within 
the multilateral trade regime. Externally, most developing countries were very 
much opposed to including the Singapore Issues in the negotiations from the 
beginning, but later even the US found the Commission’s insistence on including 
the Singapore Issues unhelpful. Internally, there were critical sounds coming 
from several parliaments, including the European Parliament, but also directly
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from some of the Member States (especially after the failed Cancun meeting). 
The next section explores several explanations that might shed light on the 
Commission’s behaviour.
5.2. Explaining the Commission’s behaviour: the struggle for power 
revisited
This section argues that there were substantial costs involved for the Commission 
in pursuing the strategy that was outlined in the previous section. This is 
particularly true after the breakdown of the MAI negotiations and during as well 
as after the Cancun meeting. At this stage, it will be argued, the desire for a 
stronger negotiating position alone cannot fully account for the Commission’s 
persistence any longer. If only the argument of a stronger negotiating position is 
taken into account, pursuing its case in the WTO would initially seem to be a 
rational strategy for the Commission. In the later stages, however, this argument 
is undermined by the degree of opposition by key developing countries to an 
investment agreement, and becomes weaker with every failure to integrate 
investment into the multilateral trading system (MAI, Seattle, Cancun). After all, 
the decision to incorporate an investment agreement in the WTO would have to 
be taken by consensus and hence strong opposition by developing countries 
makes a successful outcome unlikely. Given the chances of failure, then, 
pursuing its case in the WTO regardless is not necessarily a very rational (nor a 
very efficient) strategy for the Commission to pursue. After all, what good is a 
strong negotiating position in negotiations that are bound to fail anyway? Instead, 
attention will be drawn to the broader issue of competences in the EU. In the 
WTO, the Commission not only has a stronger negotiating position, but it is also 
better placed to tilt the balance of power in its favour after the negotiations have 
finished (see chapter three). Furthermore, the uncertainty with regard to the 
feasibility of dealing with investment in the WTO points to increased political 
costs for the Commission in nonetheless undertaking such talks.
165
The question that comes to mind then is why the Commission did it anyway. 
Four possible explanations are discussed (and rejected) before an alternative, 
institutionalist interpretation is proposed (the second research hypothesis, see 
chapter two). The first approach looks at the dynamics of the negotiations. In this 
explanation, the Commission only held on to the Singapore Issues because they 
served as negotiating coinage in the wider context of broad trade negotiating 
rounds. The second explanation focuses on the intrinsic value of the 
Commission’s position (is there an unambiguous technocratic case to be made 
for including investment in the WTO?). The third one looks at the preferences 
and positions of the EC Member States (was the Commission driven by the 
preferences of the Member States?). Fourthly, the lobbying efforts are examined 
in more detail to investigate whether the Commission’s actions were driven by 
industry preferences (was there capture of the Commission by certain specific 
interests?). The fifth and final approach then suggests that the Commission is 
pursuing its own policy preferences. Given that the institutional structure of the 
international regime can influence the Commission’s scope for having its 
preferences reflected in the outcome, its choice for the WTO-forum and its 
insistence on incorporating investment into this framework can be more readily 
understood.
5.2.1. Is there a place for investment in the international trade regime? Part 1: 
the problematic politics o f WTO investment negotiations
First of all, the overview of the history of the TRIMS negotiations in the 
Uruguay Round in the previous section showed that investment was a highly 
contentious topic, and that there was a serious conflict between the preferences 
of most developed and most developing countries. The Uruguay Round was the 
largest round of trade negotiations ever undertaken, so few -  if  any -  other 
contexts would offer better conditions for making trade-offs between issues and 
hence for concluding a multilateral investment agreement. Investment turned out 
to be such a sensitive issue, though, that it proved impossible to negotiate a broad
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treaty even within the context of the Uruguay Round. The sensitivity of this topic 
became clear again after the Singapore Ministerial in 1996 where the EC was 
accused of bullying countries opposing the inclusion of the so-called Singapore 
issues (mainly developing countries) and forcing these four topics, including 
investment, on the agenda. One could ask the question why the EU would expect 
to succeed after 1995 if a broad agreement could not even be reached within the 
context of the Uruguay Round.
After the collapse of the MAI negotiations in 1998 this question becomes even 
more pressing. What is the use of discussing investment in the WTO, where there 
are developing countries’ interests to be taken into account when the relatively 
like-minded, developed countries that largely make up the OECD membership 
cannot even negotiate an investment agreement among themselves? After all, the 
OECD countries are supposed to have broadly similar interests and policy 
environments, especially when compared to the differences between developed 
and developing countries. In other words, success was never guaranteed. On the 
contrary, investment was always going to remain a contentious issue and 
negotiations on this within the WTO were always going to be extremely difficult. 
This is confirmed by a Federal Trust Report, compiled by an impressive group of 
experts, which states that “[I]n particular investment seemed to us the most 
controversial, with the least pressing case for multilateral rules now” (The 
Federal Trust, 2003: p. 22). The extent of the controversy becomes clear from a 
look at the September 5 (2003) edition of International Trade Daily, where a 
senior US official is quoted as saying that “the Singapore Issues remain "very 
controversial"” and that “the EU [sic] position is "not widely shared" among 
WTO countries” (Yerkey, 2003). There is also strong pressure from within the 
US corporate sector to oppose the EC’s position. The same article mentions a 
letter from USTrade -  a lobby group representing almost 350 US companies and 
trade associations -  to President Bush, arguing for the unbundling of the 
Singapore Issues and making very clear that investment is the least interesting of 
these issues (ibid.). And also from within Congress there was considerable 
pressure. Another article in the same issue quotes a letter to Zoellick from two
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(Democratic) Senators in which “[T]hey said that the issue of investment, in 
particular, is "not ripe [for negotiations] in the WTO at this time."” (Yerkey, 
2003a). From this, it becomes clear that even the US, once one of the major
o  f
supporters of a multilateral investment agreement, did not see how investment 
could successfully be included in the WTO framework.
Some would argue that the Commission’s demand for the Singapore Issues in 
general, and investment (for which there was little hope to a successful 
conclusion) in particular was nothing more than gathering negotiating coinage 
that could be used in the traditionally tough negotiations over agricultural 
liberalisation. The strength of this argument, even though it may very well hold a 
grain of truth, is undermined by the sheer resources spent by the Commission on 
the Singapore Issues. First of all the Commission pushed hard at the Singapore 
Ministerial to introduce the four Singapore Issues onto the WTO agenda in the 
first place (and to institutionalise them through the establishment of working 
groups). This cost the EC political and negotiating capital rather than giving it a 
negotiating edge because it led to accusations of the EC bullying the other WTO 
members -  and in particular the developing countries -  into accepting these 
issues (Day, 2003; Jawara, 2003; Althaus, 2003). On top of that, the 
institutionalisation of the Singapore Issues required a mobilisation of resources 
by the Commission. After all, the EC was the main demandeur for these issues, 
had pressed hard to get them onto the agenda in Singapore (to the dismay of 
many NGOs) and hence had to take up a leadership role. That means submitting 
position papers, interpretations, etc. to the working groups. For example, all 
communications from the European Community and its Member States made to 
the WTO Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment 
have been issued by the Permanent Delegation of the European Commission, 
even though investment is still largely a mixed competence. This takes up 
valuable and scarce resources in terms of time and manpower. The EC had to
8 The US started pushing for the incorporation of investment into the -  then -  GATT as early as 
1981 (Graham and Krugman, 1990: p. 150).
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take on this leadership role since the US was very much aware of the limited 
chances of success for investment negotiations in the WTO. Alan Larson, the 
assistant US secretary of state for economic and business affairs at the time of the 
OECD negotiations, stated that “[W]e chose not to press the issue of WTO 
investment negotiations (...) [because] we were aware that many important 
developing countries were not interested at this stage in embarking on global 
investment negotiations” (Larson, 1997). This US realism with regards to the 
chances of success for a WTO investment agreement stands in stark contrast with 
the EC’s optimism and even undermines it. It also raises questions about the 
rationale for the Commission’s insistence on dealing with investment in the 
WTO, given the poor chances of a successful outcome.
Furthermore, these issues then still had to be incorporated in a negotiating round, 
something which the EC had to spend yet more effort and political capital on in 
Doha. But even then the EC did not have the negotiating chips yet because 
serious disagreement arose on the interpretation of the hard-fought Doha 
declaration. The EC understood the Doha declaration to mean that negotiations 
on the Singapore Issues would begin automatically, and that only the modalities 
on how to proceed should be addressed in Cancun. A ruling by the chair of the 
Doha Ministerial, however, gave the text a different interpretation (see earlier). 
This effectively brought the EC back to where it came from, namely no closer to 
a WTO agreement on investment. On top of this, since consensus is still required 
to start negotiations on the Singapore Issues, it is very questionable whether the 
negotiating coinage gained (not very much, if  any) was worth the (substantial) 
effort and the high price paid for it. Therefore, it looks highly unlikely that the 
major driving force behind the Commission’s insistence on investment is the 
creation of negotiating leverage. After all, according to a spokesperson for the 
US Trade Representative, the EC had “isolated themselves from the rest of the 
planet” (Bridges, 2003a: p. 2), which is usually not a very convincing strategy to 
extract concessions from your negotiating partners. This is again confirmed by 
the way the Commission dealt with these issues after Cancun (see earlier) and its
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insistence on keeping these issues within the WTO, on a plurilateral basis if 
necessary.
Explaining the Commission’s insistence on including investment in terms of 
finding negotiating coinage that could be used in the agricultural negotiations is 
also rejected by officials from DG Trade. In my interview with Stefan 
Amarasinha, for example, he referred to the joint letter of Commissioners Lamy 
and Fischler of 9 May 2004 to disprove this argument. In this letter, the 
Commissioners suggested eliminating “all forms of [agricultural] export support” 
(Lamy and Fischler, 2004: p. 1) while at the same time also dropping at least two 
and maybe even three of the Singapore Issues, leaving “only trade facilitation, 
and perhaps transparency in government procurement, inside the DDA [Doha 
Development Agenda]” (ibid.). The proposal of these two elements combined 
and outside the heat of the negotiations showed, according to the DG Trade 
official, that the Commission’s pursuit of the Singapore Issues was not primarily 
intended to be traded of against concessions in the field of agriculture.
5.2.2. Is there a place fo r  investment in the international trade regime? Part 2: 
the economic case
Another explanation for the Commission’s behaviour might be that there just was 
an unambiguous, clear-cut economic case to be made for dealing with investment 
within the WTO. Even though most people involved acknowledge that -  
regulated -  FDI can be beneficial, that does not mean that the case for a 
multilateral approach to investment has been made. Two prominent observers 
conclude in a World Bank working paper that “(...) we are pessimistic about the 
need for -  and the feasibility of -  negotiating a multilateral agreement on 
investment” (Hoekman and Saggi, 1999: p. 24; for a stronger critique, see Chang 
and Green, 2003). According to UNCTAD, “the effects of FDI on development 
often depend on the initial conditions prevailing in the recipient countries, on the 
investment strategies of TNCs and on host government policies” (UNCTAD,
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1999a: p. 3) so it is not clear why a multilateral approach would yield the best 
results. While acknowledging that the legal framework has to be taken into 
account, it is nonetheless economic factors that are still the most important ones 
in determining FDI flows (see UNCTAD, 1999b), and this has led some to attack 
the Commission’s claim (or assumption) that a multilateral investment agreement 
would significantly affect FDI inflow in developing countries (see Ferrarini, 
2003). Furthermore, it is not always clear whether negotiating a multilateral 
agreement would be worth the trouble since there is already a vast network of 
bilateral investment agreements in place. It was estimated that in 2003, there 
were more than 2100 bilateral investment agreements in existence (Cosby et al, 
2003: p. 16). In this light, one can hardly claim that a multilateral approach 
would remedy the absence of rules governing international investment. Instead, 
one of the arguments put forward by proponents of a multilateral approach to 
investment is that this would be more efficient than the hotchpotch of bilateral 
agreements that are in place now. The problem is that it is not clear how these 
two levels would interact or if a multilateral agreement would indeed replace -  
rather than coexist with -  the network of bilateral treaties.
In this respect, an UNCTAD paper notes that “[T]he existence of a network of 
BITs [Bilateral Investment Treaties] containing similar provisions by and 
between the negotiating parties does not necessarily indicate the readiness to 
proceed to another level of international commitments (...)” (UNCTAD 1999). 
In the WTO working group on trade and investment, India has repeatedly -  and 
explicitly -  made clear that it shares this view. At one point it stated that “the 
argument that multilateral rules were more efficient because they would obviate 
the need for concluding a large number of bilateral treaties was without merit” 
(WTO, 1999: p. 11). Three years later, the Indian representative went one step 
further, questioning the usefulness of a multilateral approach to investment for 
developing countries by saying that “(...) it had heard no convincing argument 
that a multilateral framework on investment would achieve this objective [i.e. 
maximising the positive while minimising the negative effects of FDI]” (WTO, 
2002b: p. 37)
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On a different level, several elements in the way the EC presents the case for a 
multilateral approach for investment give further rise to suspicions of a hidden, 
politicised agenda behind this drive to have investment included. Ferrarini 
criticises the Commission because “[RJather than building its case on sound 
conceptual grounds and compelling empirical evidence, the arguments are 
seemingly based on conjectures. Attempts to provide definitions or explanations 
of key concepts are often inaccurate, or overly simplistic” (Ferrarini, 2003, p. 
20). In its submission to the WTO working group on the relationship between 
trade and investment, for example, the Commission puts a lot of stress on the 
importance of transparency. To back up this claim, it cites a survey that it 
commissioned, showing that “lack of transparency on local legislation and rules 
was considered the most frequent hindrance to investment by 71 percent of the 
companies” (WTO, 2002a: p. 2).
It conveniently ignores that the same report also finds that “[TJhere is a very 
clear correlation between the size of the enterprise and the number and diversity 
of investment barriers encountered” where “[T]he smaller enterprises in the 
sample tended not to know whether or not they had encountered investment 
barriers” (TN SOFRES Consulting, 2000: p. 14). The vast majority of European 
enterprises are small companies (45% of European companies have a turnover 
smaller than €0.2 billion; ibid.: p. 4). Furthermore, only 10 percent of enterprises 
have a ‘working knowledge’ of GATS, about the same percentage as those that 
have a working knowledge of bilateral investment treaties. For TRIMS, that 
figure drops to around 5 percent (ibid. : p.28). More specifically, the report states 
that “[I]t is furthermore observed that medium-sized enterprises (turnover under 
one billion euros) know far less about the existing agreements than the large 
enterprises” (ibid.: p. 28). This can hardly be read as strong demand by the 
stakeholders for integrating investment in the multilateral trading system. If the 
companies do not even have a better working knowledge of the current, limited, 
multilateral rules than of the supposedly confusing network of bilateral 
agreements, that does not look like a strong basis for demanding a more 
comprehensive multilateral framework. Or, to put it in Ferrarini’s words,
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“[HJowever one may interpret these results, arguably they do not appear to make 
a particularly strong case for the proposed multilateral disciplines on 
transparency in investment” (Ferrarini, 2003: p. 21). This is supported by the 
attitude of the business community itself. In the first meeting of the Investment 
Network (an initiative of the Commission, bringing together stakeholders in the 
investment debate), the argument that investment decisions depend on the 
international regulatory framework was discussed. On this topic, the minutes of 
the meeting state that “[M]ost business correspondents considered that the 
presence or absence of multilateral or bilateral commitments did not constitute a 
key criterion in the investment decision-making process” (Commission, 1998).
5.2.3. Back to the roots: what about lobby groups?
A strong lobbying effort could be another possible explanation as to why the 
Commission was so eager to deal with investment in the WTO. Looking at the 
preferences and the level of activity of pressure groups is particularly relevant 
since it has been noted that in EU trade policy-making
“[T]he Commission needs to consult interest groups in order to reduce 
“slack” with the principal (Member States). In other words, the Commission 
has to keep interest groups fully informed of what it is negotiating at the 
WTO to prevent them from trying to block the multilateral negotiations in 
the Council of Ministers. Therefore, the Commission’s ability to represent 
the EU in multilateral negotiations and to keep the Member States united 
behind its negotiating position largely depends on keeping interest groups 
satisfied with the concessions that it is giving and receiving in the WTO”
(Van den Hoven, 2002: p. 23)
In other words, interest groups can be very powerful actors that can play a hugely 
important role in determining the negotiating agenda if  they can exert enough 
pressure. Also, there is an inherent danger of ‘capture’ of DG Trade by certain 
(business) interest groups (on capture and special interest groups, see Foster,
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1997).9 Hence, a strong and coherent lobbying campaign to get the Singapore 
Issues incorporated within the framework of the WTO could still have been the 
driving force behind the Commission’s actions. From the next paragraphs, 
however, it will become clear that this was not the case and that pressure from 
interest groups cannot explain the Commission’s dogged pursuit of a WTO 
investment agreement.
First of all, there was no coherence within the wider lobbying community. There 
will always be groups that oppose any given policy, so in this sense ‘coherence’ 
does not refer to the position of all groups involved. Rather, it is about the 
relative strength and the effectiveness of the groups involved: do they have 
access to policy-makers? Are they being listened to? Are they in a position to 
effectively influence them? The strongest opposition to a multilateral investment 
agreement when it was being negotiated in the OECD came from an ad hoc 
coalition of environmental NGOs, development NGOs, and -  later -  various anti­
globalisation organisations (Walter, 2001). 1997 can be seen as a turning point 
for the anti-MAI movement. In this year, a draft of the proposed MAI was leaked 
and this was exploited by the organisations fighting against the MAI to raise 
awareness with the general public about these rather secretive negotiations. By 
skilfully playing -  and mobilising -  the media and by drawing attention to the 
allegedly harmful environmental and social consequences of such an investment 
agreement, these groups galvanised public opinion across the world, most 
crucially in their own -  developed -  countries. This put huge pressure on the 
governments and acted as a counterbalance to the industry lobby groups. This 
strategy eventually paid off in that it was an important element contributing to 
the failure of the MAI negotiations.
9 The Commission has been trying hard to reduce that risk by, for example, stimulating and 
supporting the creation of lobby groups for more diffuse (‘weaker’) interests like consumers. 
These influences can then counterbalance the business pressure groups that have a much stronger 
incentive to get organised since the number of people in the groups is limited and the benefits for 
each member are substantial (see for example Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997: p. 232).
174
When the investment focus then moved to the WTO, these organisations -  most 
of which had never been very appreciative of the WTO anyway -  were 
emboldened by their success in scuppering the MAI. Their opposition against 
dealing with investment in the WTO was substantial, as becomes clear from the 
position papers and other output of organisations such as Oxfam, Actionaid, 
Cafod, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Christian Aid, Attac and Corporate 
Europe Observatory, to name but a few. Given the success of the “anti­
multilateral investment” movement in bringing down the MAI negotiations, and 
given the high-profile impact this had, it will be clear that the ‘corporate lobby’ 
did not have carte blanche and that there were sufficiently important and 
sufficiently vocal opponents of a WTO investment agreement and that they were 
numerous enough to credibly counterbalance the corporate lobby groups. Hence, 
the argument that the Commission insisted on WTO investment negotiations 
because it was pushed by a uniform lobbying effort (i.e. the opponents were not 
vocal/powerful enough to make themselves heard) does not hold.
Nonetheless, there is still the possibility that DG Trade was in fact ‘captured’ by 
the business lobby and their interests. In that case, the effectiveness of non­
business interest groups opposing a WTO investment agreement would of course 
be greatly reduced. Yet that still leaves the problem of the political fall-out 
caused by the increased public awareness surrounding this topic. It would be 
very difficult for a government to push through such an investment agreement if 
it is widely perceived to be detrimental to the environment, or if  people think it 
will only protect multinational companies at the expense of poor Africans, to 
take two of the examples used by the anti-MAI campaign. It would take even 
more pressure from the business lobby to overcome this resistance at a political 
level. In other words, support for bringing investment into the WTO would have 
to be very strong and almost universal across the business community.
Some European lobby groups are indeed among the most fervent supporters of 
dealing with investment in the WTO (see for example UNICE, 2001; 2003; 
2003a; European Services Forum, 1999; 2003; or Foreign Trade Association,
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2003). Other important business interest groups, however, have given only tepid 
support to the cause of a WTO investment agreement. The section on trade and 
investment in Eurocommerce’s position paper for Cancun, for example, is 
surprisingly short and tellingly bland (see Eurocommerce, 2003). For 
Eurochambres, “it is paramount that all countries are given the opportunity to 
assess what the possible implications of an agreement on investment would be, 
before they commit to a fixed framework” (Eurochambres, 2003: p. 4). This can 
hardly be read as a ringing endorsement for the Commission’s insistence on 
including investment in the WTO framework. The issue of investment is also 
noticeably absent from the priorities list of the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists (ERT), arguably the most influential European business lobby 
group. In 2000 an ERT-study on investment remarked that “[I]t is important to 
note that all the measures of liberalisation identified by our survey have occurred 
despite the failures in Paris with the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MAI) 
and in Seattle with the omission of investment on the agenda” (European 
Roundtable of Industrialists, 2000: p. 9). In short, not all -  or even all major -  
business groups were actively lobbying for the opening of investment 
negotiations in the WTO. Rather, the attitude of some of the most important 
organisations (ERT, Eurocommerce) is one of passive support. While they do not 
oppose the goal of dealing with investment in the WTO, it is certainly not a 
priority for them. That there was considerable disagreement within the business 
lobby community is something that was readily acknowledged by Adriaan Van 
Den Hoven of UNICE. When interviewed, he pointed to diverging interests 
within the business community, most notably between importers and exporters, 
to explain why some business organisations gave only lukewarm support to the 
case of a WTO investment agreement. Whatever the reason, the lack of 
enthusiasm within important lobby groups for prioritising investment on the 
WTO agenda, also means that when this issue becomes a deal-breaker for the 
negotiations as a whole, this passive support of these less enthusiastic advocates 
of investment should disappear since the wider interests of these organisations 
are threatened if  the negotiations collapse altogether and the result is no further 
liberalisation.
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In this respect, Cancun is a good case study in that the success of the negotiations 
was threatened by -  among others -  the EC’s insistence on the Singapore Issues. 
After the failure of the Cancun Ministerial, the dividing lines in the business 
community become more visible. In a publication by the Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC), for example, the major OECD 
business organisations call for their trade ministers to focus on non-agricultural 
tariff reductions and reduction of non-tariff barriers, more efforts on services, 
and trade facilitation (the least contentious of the Singapore Issues). More 
specifically, the statement says that “[0]n the Singapore issues, we urge our 
governments to find the flexibility to move each of these issues forward on its 
own merit and at its own pace although we wish to see Trade Facilitation 
included in the single undertaking” (Business and Industry Advisory Committee 
to the OECD, 2004: p. 1). Interestingly, there is a footnote attached to this 
sentence in the statement in which MEDEF10 adds that “[T]his shall not be 
understood as excluding that investment is negotiated within the timeline of the 
DDA [Doha Development Agenda]” {ibid.). This points to clear and rather 
substantial differences in opinion within the OECD business community. In fact, 
after Cancun most interest groups re-adjusted their positions on investment in the 
light of the events. UNICE, for example, drastically toned down the rhetoric, 
even though this organisation was one of the most fervent proponents of a WTO 
investment treaty. Where in May of 2003 this organisation “strongly supports 
launching negotiations on a multilateral framework on investment” and considers 
this “to be one of the four priority issues at the WTO” (UNICE, 2003: p. 2), after 
Cancun they call for a “pragmatic” approach and the resumption of the 
negotiations “on the basis of a balanced agenda” (UNICE, 2003a: p. 5).
In practice, the Commission’s actions do not immediately follow this move away 
from insisting on the inclusion of investment in the DDA. For example, it was
10 Mouvement des entreprises de France, the organisation bringing together 85 industry 
federations of France.
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discussed earlier that, for several months after Cancun, Lamy insisted that the 
offer that was on the table in Cancun (i.e. dropping of two or even three of the 
Singapore Issues) did not bind the Commission’s position in any way since it 
was not accepted (see earlier). For months after the failed Ministerial, this was 
the Commission’s official position, despite the changes in position by industry 
lobby groups and to the dismay of many Member States (see next section). Even 
a year after the Cancun debacle, the Commission was holding on to dealing with 
the Singapore Issues within the WTO, albeit plurilaterally if necessary. This 
indicates that the explanation that the Commission’s insistence on a WTO 
investment agreement is driven first and foremost by a concerted lobbying effort 
is not tenable. Furthermore, the possibility of ‘capture’ of DG Trade by certain 
interests was rejected by people from the business lobby community (interview 
with Adrian Van den Hoven). One of the main reasons that Dr Van den Hoven 
indicated for this was that there are simply too many interest groups involved, so 
that it becomes practically impossible for any one group to influence the 
Commission without due checks and balances by other interest groups. Equally, 
DG Trade did not give privileged access to any interest group. After all, the 
group that DG Trade would be most likely to collaborate with or give special 
access would be UNICE, since this is an important lobby group and their position 
was closest to the Commission’s. Yet Adrian Van den Hoven, the UNICE 
official responsible for external trade and WTO matters, formally denies that this 
was the case. According to him, UNICE’s views on including investment into the 
WTO were important to the Commission, but no more than usual, i.e. not more 
than the importance of UNICE within the business lobby community would 
allow for. He added that there certainly was no special relationship between 
UNICE and the Commission or any sort of extraordinary collaboration between 
them on the issue of investment (interview Adriaan Van Den Hoven). Therefore, 
the activity of lobby groups cannot account for the Commission’s proactive 
approach either.
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5.2.4. Cohesion policy: where are the Member States on investment?
On the DG Trade website one can read that “[T]he European Community and its 
Member States support a gradual and progressive work programme for the 
Working Group on Trade and Investment” (Commission, 1997). If one did not 
know that the phrase ‘The European Community and its Member States’ has to 
be used for legal reasons (investment is a mixed competence), one would 
immediately want to correct this sentence into ‘the EC and some of its Member 
States’. In spite of the arguments and uncertainties raised in the previous 
subsections, the Commission’s push for a WTO investment treaty could still be 
explained if the Member States were united in their desire to deal with this issue. 
This section will show that this was not the case. There was considerable 
disagreement among (and indeed within) the Member States as to the 
appropriateness of an encompassing WTO investment agreement.
First of all, there were already clear tensions between the EC Member States in 
the context of the MAI negotiations. Countries such as the Netherlands and 
Germany (before the SPD won the elections in 1998) were fervent supporters of 
an encompassing investment agreement (for the position of the Netherlands, see 
for example the comments of the Dutch Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 
Ms van Dok-van Weelen, to the Dutch parliament; van Dok-van Weelen, 1995). 
Other Member States, most notably France, but also Belgium were more hesitant 
in their support, insisting for example on an exemption for culture (see Friends of 
the Earth, 1998: p. 40). Sometimes, these tensions became highly visible. One 
example of this is when the chairman of the negotiations, the Dutchman Mr. 
Engering, stepped down in 1998, Germany nominated a German candidate, Mr. 
Schumeros to take up this position. France, instead of supporting this candidate 
from another EC country, “blocked his nomination throughout the summer and 
fall” (Vallianatos, 1998a). Elsewhere, Vallianatos had already drawn attention to 
the varying level of support for finishing the MAI negotiations, where “France 
reportedly favoured ending MAI negotiations altogether. [And] Germany and 
some of the smaller EU countries still favoured completion” (Vallianatos, 1998).
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In the end, the MAI collapsed “following a decision by France to cease 
participating in the negotiations” (Hoekman and Saggi, 1999: p. 19). 
Paradoxically, this led to the situation where the most recalcitrant Member State 
became an ally for the Commission to deal with investment in the WTO. After 
all, the chances of success for reaching agreement in the WTO are lower than in 
the OECD (which France did not really mind). Furthermore, France would still 
be able to influence the events indirectly from behind the scenes (in the Council 
of Ministers and the 133-committee). And if the Commission would against all 
odds succeed in negotiating an investment agreement after all, the Commission 
(rather than the French government) would take most of the political flak (see 
Blake, 1999, in particular on p. 30).
After the collapse of the negotiations in the OECD, it looked as if  the Member 
States had no choice but to follow the Commission’s preference and deal with 
investment in the WTO. Even before the failure of the Cancun Ministerial, 
however, there were already some signs of dissent between the EU Member 
States. A report from ActionAid notes that “deep divisions have become apparent 
at all levels across the EU body politic during preparations for Cancun, making 
the European Commission look increasingly isolated in its aggressive stance to 
launch negotiations (...) in the WTO” (Eagleton, 2003: p.l). There have always 
been critical voices against the prioritisation of the Singapore Issues from within 
various parliaments. In the European Parliament, for example, the Greens and the 
Party of European Socialists have been particularly vocal in expressing their 
doubts on the usefulness and desirability of initiating negotiations on investment 
in the framework of the Doha Round (see for example PES Group, 2003; Greens 
EFA Group, 2003). Also some national parliaments have made themselves heard 
in this respect. Most notably, the German and UK parliaments have both called 
for the Commission to drop the Singapore Issues in general and investment in 
particular (see for example Bundestag, 2003; House of Commons, 2003).
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Even though parliaments in general -  and the European Parliament in particular -  
can try to influence trade policy indirectly, they usually have very little power in 
the actual decision-making process. In that respect it is interesting to see that 
some dissenting voices have also come from within the governments of some 
Member States, even before Cancun. In late July 2003 (one and a half months 
before the Cancun meeting), for example, the German Minister for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, expressed her 
sympathy for the concerns of the developing countries with regards to the launch 
of investment negotiations in the WTO. She goes further than just expressing 
sympathy, stating that “I would certainly understand if the launch of negotiations 
on any further topics [than implementation of the development agenda] were to 
be postponed” and that “[T]he other question is whether now is the right time to 
begin negotiations on a WTO investment agreement” (Wieczorek-Zeul, 2003). 
This is two weeks after the Italian Minister of Productive Activities told 
journalists he felt that it would not be appropriate to expand the list of issues on 
the agenda (see Marzano, 2003). Also in France the weak support that existed for 
an investment agreement in the WTO was already waning. Advisors to F rancis 
Loos, the French Trade Minister, reportedly played down the importance of the 
Singapore Issues, claiming they were “less of a priority now and may not be 
launched at Cancun” (Eagleton, 2003: p. 3).
In this light, it will hardly be surprising that there was also disagreement between 
the EC Member States. A press release from Actionaid, for example, claims that 
“[0]n the contentious issue of investment, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Ireland have said they do not consider negotiations to be a priority for 
Cancun” (Actionaid, 2003: p. 1). There are also indications that the Spanish 
government “did not seem to be strongly committed to it” (House of Commons, 
2003a). The strongest, or at least the best documented, break with the 
Commission’s position, however, comes from the UK. The UK’s Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry, Patricia Hewitt, repeatedly claimed in the run-up to 
Cancun that the Singapore Issues were no longer a priority for the UK in these 
negotiations. This was explicitly confirmed by Baroness Amos, the Secretary of
181
State for International Development, in an oral answer to a question before the 
House of Commons International Development Committee where she stated that 
“I cannot answer the question about who is driving it [i.e. the pursuit of the 
Singapore Issues in the WTO] -  it is certainly not us. Patricia Hewitt has said 
publicly that it is not a priority for us” (House of Commons, 2003c).
This rift became even more apparent after the failure of Cancun for which many 
blame Lamy’s insistence on the inclusion of the Singapore Issues (see earlier). 
Gordon Brown, for example hinted at a shift in the UK’s position, namely 
dropping investment and competition (the most controversial of the Singapore 
Issues) altogether. In a press conference after the IMF Committee Meeting in 
Dubai on 21 September 2003, he said that “we believe that these problems [i.e. 
competition and investment in the Doha Round] can be overcome, and all of the 
countries, at present, around the table believed that these obstacles could be 
removedp’ (Brown, 2003: p. 5; emphasis added). In an article in The Independent 
that same day, Brown is a little bit more specific, writing that “(...) we must 
focus on agriculture and not be distracted by the Singapore Issues” (Brown, 
2003a). This seems to confirm Patricia Hewitt’s comments in the House of 
Commons four days earlier when she declared that “WTO agreements on 
investment and competition are off the EU’s agenda” (House of Commons, 
2003b). This was also reported in The Guardian where it was written that 
“Britain favours abandoning the issues completely” (Osborn, 2003).11 While the 
Danish parliament and government had both been staunch defenders of the 
Singapore Issues, by early November the failure of Cancun had convinced the 
Danish foreign minister that the Singapore issues “should not be pursued if  this 
leads to a blockage of the Doha-Round negotiations” (Moller, 2003).
11 This was also confirmed by another source. In a meeting between with UK minister’s political 
advisors and some senior trade, development and agriculture officials on 1 December 2003, 
representatives of NGOs were reportedly “told that the UK would press for investment and 
competition to be dropped from the EU mandate” (NGO email, 2003).
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From this overview, it has become clear that there was no uniform, constant or 
unconditional support by the Member States for the inclusion of the Singapore 
Issues in the new WTO round. The rift became even more pronounced after the 
failure of the 5th WTO Ministerial Meeting. The insistence of Pascal Lamy and 
DG Trade that the last-minute offer at Cancun of dropping competition and 
investment was invalidated by the lack of agreement (see Carl, 2003) was 
diametrically opposed to the preferences of some important Member States. It 
would therefore be hard to argue that the EC’s position on the handling of the 
Singapore Issues was driven by a demand from the Member States. The next 
section proposes an alternative explanation.
5.2.5. An institutional explanation: how well does the second hypothesis fit?
If there is no clear-cut economic case to be made for a multilateral investment 
agreement, if  the political costs outweigh any negotiating coinage that might be 
gained, and if the investment rules the Commission so vigorously pursued were 
in fact “a low priority for many EU governments and businesses” (de Jonquieres, 
2003), then the question what drove the Commission in its actions still remains 
unanswered. Exactly why the Commission was willing to go so far as to almost 
endanger the Doha negotiation round as a whole in order to try (but ultimately 
fail) to get investment (and competition, the other very contentious Singapore 
Issue) incorporated within the WTO remains clouded in mystery. Consistent with 
the general argument made in this thesis, and building on the findings of chapter 
three that the institutional structure of an international organisation can impact on 
the Commission’s room for manoeuvre, this section argues that taking into 
account the (external) institutional framework can help to explain the 
Commission’s preferences and behaviour. This is not to say that the other 
elements that have been discussed have become superfluous or uninfluential. 
They still have a role to play, of course, since they help delineating the 
boundaries of the Commission’s ‘win-set’. In that sense, they influence rather 
than determine the Commission’s position. They are less informative about the
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rationale behind the Commission following or choosing a given path in the first 
place.
Here, it is argued that there is awareness within the Commission of its success in 
the strong setting of the WTO. Issues of mixed competence are thus best dealt 
with in this forum if the Commission wants to keep its edge over the Member 
States and wants to remain or become the main player on these issues. 
Paradoxically, this means that the forum that gave rise to the legal morass of 
‘mixed’ and ‘shared’ competences in the first place is also the most effective 
forum available to the Commission to pave the way for turning more of these 
issues into exclusive competences, falling under art. 133 TEC. In this particular 
case study, the inclusion of investment in the WTO framework would make it 
easier for the Commission to gradually push this issue under the cover of the 
CCP. What, then, makes the Commission think that the WTO is the best forum to 
pursue the case for investment?
First of all, the fact that the Commission had been dealing with multilateral trade 
issues since the 1960s provided it with invaluable experience and expertise, also 
in dealing with GATT trade disputes. The EC quickly replaced the individual 
Member States as the most important player in the dispute settlement system, as 
defendant as well as complainant.12 This is unambiguously reflected in the 
GATT dispute settlement statistics. Whereas there have only been 20 (formal) 
GATT disputes involving an individual Member State, there have been 104 
disputes involving the EC. Or, in other words, in almost 84% of the GATT 
disputes involving the EC or the Member States, it was the EC rather than a 
Member State that was defendant or complainant.13 If the playing field is levelled 
and only the disputes from 1963 onwards are taken into account, the share of the
12 Keep in mind that GATT mainly dealt with issues falling under the EC’s exclusive 
competence.
13 Note that only ‘formal’ GATT disputes are taken into account here, i.e. disputes that have been 
formally discussed in the GATT framework. The calculations are based upon data collected by 
Eric Reinhardt (Reinhardt, 1996), available from:
http://userwww.service.emorv.edU/~erein/data/#GATTl
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disputes in which Member States are involved falls further to only 6%.14 
Furthermore, with the only exception of a complaint initiated by the Netherlands 
against the US in 1991, the last GATT dispute in which a Member State was 
involved directly was in 1973.15 The Commission thus has the advantage of an 
extensive learning period where it was the main defender of the EC’s interests in 
GATT.
Then there is also the learning effect from the Commission’s experience with the 
WTO dispute settlement system. The creation of the WTO and the coming into 
force of its new dispute settlement system immediately had a very significant 
impact on the EC. For example, two of the most contentious cases involving the 
EC, the infamous Bananas and Hormones cases, were both launched in the early 
days of the new system (the Bananas case in October 1995 and the Hormones 
case in January 1996). Given the sensitivity and importance of these cases, the 
Commission immediately got a taste of the possibilities of this new judicial 
system and the strong position it enjoys in dispute settlement over the Member 
States. This is likely to have raised awareness of the benefits for the 
Commission’s institutional position that derive from its central position in this 
strongly legal and institutional approach to settling international trade disputes. 
The claim that there is awareness within the Commission of its stronger position 
in the WTO was also confirmed in interviews with officials in DG Trade and the 
Commission’s Legal Service. During these interviews it became clear that most 
officials interviewed, and this holds for junior and senior officials alike, regarded 
this as rather self-evident, which suggests that this awareness has already been 
firmly institutionalised within the organisation (interviews with Alan Rosas, 
Stefan Amarasinha, Richard Carden, Christophe Kiener, Robin Ratchford, Soren 
Schonberg and Lothar Ehring). While being very diplomatic in stressing the
14 1963 is a symbolic date for the Common Commercial Policy for two reasons: the establishment 
of a customs union (and thus also a common commercial policy) was speeded up, and this year 
also saw the -  unofficial -  opening of the Kennedy Round in which the EC represented its 
Member States for the first time.
15 And even the complaint filed by the Netherlands was filed simultaneously with an identical 
complaint by the EC.
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interaction between the Commission and the Council/Member States, when 
explicitly asked all these officials nonetheless answered that they were aware of 
the stronger position of the Commission vis-a-vis the Member States in the WTO 
context.
Taking into account the influence of the institutional framework on the 
Commission’s preference formation would help to explain its behaviour with 
regards to investment more fully. One aspect of the Commission’s position that 
was particularly baffling for many actors (observers and people involved alike) 
was its insistence on the bundling of the Singapore Issues. The founding director 
of the Evian Group put it as follows:
“what I cannot understand -  and no one has been able to explain -  is why 
these Singapore issues had to be bundled. The issue remains shrouded in 
mystery. Through your columns, perhaps we can invite Mr Lamy to inform 
us (the public) of exactly which organisations, on what dates and on what 
occasions, asked that the EU insist on having the four Singapore issues 
bundled” (Lehmann, 2003).
It was pointed out earlier that this view was also shared by important actors 
within the governments of the Member States. By taking into account the 
external institutional framework as well as the Commission’s preferences and by 
placing the issue in the context of the ongoing (though often implicit) power 
struggle between the Commission and the Member States, it is easier to 
understand the Commission’s insistence on the bundling of the Singapore Issues.
In this explanation, the key element is the Commission’s desire to gain 
competences, in this case concerning international investment measures. Relying 
on judicial activism by the Court of Justice to obtain these competences is tricky 
and no guarantee for success, as was witnessed by Opinion 1/94. Lobbying for a 
treaty change is time consuming, takes up a lot of political capital (you are likely 
to have to ‘pay’ for it by making concessions in other fields) and is rather static.
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For example, in the draft constitution, foreign direct investment (FDI) would 
have been brought under the remit of the Common Commercial Policy (Article 
III-217, paragraph 1). But FDI flows are affected by the regulatory framework of 
the host country, and are hence intrinsically related to a whole range of 
liberalisation issues (the OECD mentions for example the movement of key 
personnel, privatisation, states enterprises, etc., see OECD, 1996: p. 13). These 
issues do not clearly fall within the CCP and the Commission would therefore 
still have a hard time convincing the Member States it should be responsible for 
these issues. Most likely, these competence fights would sooner or later end up 
again before the European Court of Justice to be clarified.
Therefore, it is much more attractive for the Commission to try and ‘smuggle’ 
these issues into the WTO. Here, the institutional framework of the WTO, 
combined with the strong role of the Commission in this forum, creates a 
favourable atmosphere for the Commission to de facto gain these competences in 
the day-to-day workings of the organisation and within its dispute settlement 
system (where the stakes are usually quite high). Given the contentiousness of 
the topic of investment, the only way the Commission could hope to integrate 
this issue within the WTO was by bundling it and presenting the Singapore 
Issues as a package. Of course, this is no guarantee for success and it was never 
certain that the Singapore Issues would be accepted as a package and included in 
the Single Undertaking. But here the Commission’s post-Cancun strategy is quite 
enlightening since the Commission kept stressing that the Singapore Issues that 
are dropped from the Single Undertaking (definitely investment and 
competition), should still be dealt with within the WTO framework, albeit in 
plurilateral negotiations rather than in the Single Undertaking. The result for the 
Commission, however, would be the same: investment would be dealt with 
within the WTO and investment disputes would most likely be resolved by 
making use of the dispute settlement system. This would also explain why the 
Commission suddenly is demandeur for a plurilateral approach, compared to the 
Uruguay Round where the Commission was one of the biggest supporters of the 
Single Undertaking and the ‘multilateralisation’ of the GATT a la carte (see
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Preeg, 1995: pp. 114-125). This support for the principle of the Single 
Undertaking did not whither after the Uruguay Round. In a Communication on 
the EU approach to the Millennium Round, the Commission states that “[T]he 
results of a Round should be adopted in their entirety and apply to all WTO 
members. (...) The Community should therefore continue to argue in favour of 
launching and concluding the negotiations as a single undertaking” 
(Commission, 1999b: p. 6). Even as late as April 2003, Peter Carl (Director- 
General of DG Trade) told the WTO Trade Negotiating Committee that “[W]e 
should be guided by a few basic principles (...). Firstly, the principle of the 
single undertaking” (Commission, 2003a: p. 1). The Commission’s sudden 
preference for plurilateral agreements is therefore highly significant and is a 
good indication of the importance it attached to integrating some of the 
Singapore Issues, most notably investment, into the WTO framework.
CONCLUSION
This chapter explored the Commission’s role in dealing with the issue of 
investment in the trade regime. From this discussion, it has become clear that the 
Commission was very keen to bring investment into the (strong) WTO 
framework, even though both the necessity and the desirability of these efforts 
have often been questioned. One of the major driving forces behind these efforts, 
it was argued, is the Commission’s desire to expand its competences vis-a-vis the 
Member States, a goal that is more likely to be achieved in the strong 
institutional setting of the WTO. This is itself a good indication that there is 
some awareness within the Commission that it is in a favourable position in the 
strong institutional context of the WTO (the second hypothesis that was put 
forward in chapter two). The next chapter expands the scope of the thesis by 
focussing on international environmental agreements. The same fundamental 
question will be addressed in this chapter as well: does the Commission actively 
employ strategies in order to strengthen the institutional context in which the 
action takes place in order to gain influence? Therefore, the stress will be again
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on the two main strategies that could be used to this aim. These are strengthening 
the institutional frameworks of agreements and/or trying to incorporate these 
issues within existing strong frameworks.
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6
INSTITUTIONALISATION AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters were focussed on making the case that the institutional 
framework of international regimes can influence the balance of power between 
the Commission and the Member States. This was done by first showing that the 
Commission enjoys a stronger position in the WTO than it did in GATT, and by 
linking this change to the strengthened institutional framework. Then, attention 
was paid to the role of the Commission in bringing about this strong framework 
in the first place, and to its attempts at extending the number of issues falling 
under the scope of the strong institutional set-up of the WTO. The question that 
arises now is whether this dynamic is restricted to the trade regime, or whether 
there are indications that the institutional explanation is also relevant in other 
settings. This chapter therefore studies the role of the Commission in the 
evolution of international environmental regimes. The central question is whether 
the Commission actively tries to profile itself on the international 
(environmental) stage as well, in line with the findings of the previous chapters. 
With this aim in mind, some of the Commission’s preferences and actions on the 
international environmental stage are analysed. The main question is whether
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there is any evidence of attempts by the Commission to strengthen its position by 
institutionalising international environmental agreements or its position within 
these agreements. This can take the form of exerting pressure to strengthen the 
institutional framework of an existing regime, but -  due to the relatively weak 
starting position of the Commission in international environmental affairs -  this 
can also mean lobbying to become party to an agreement.
6.1. General background: the environment as a case study
Reasons for looking at environmental issues when studying international policy 
competences are not very difficult to find. Issues such as water management 
policies, or water and air pollution can have broader regional and transboundary 
repercussions, as was clearly pointed out as early as 1938 and again in 1941 in 
the famous Trail Smelter Arbitration cases (see United Nations Reports of 
International Arbitral Awards, 1941). The same is true for other well-publicised 
issues, such as climate change or ozone layer depletion. These problems cannot 
be tackled on a country-by-country basis but require a co-ordinated joint effort. 
For this reason, many environmental policies, like trade, are of an inherently 
multilateral nature. The success and effectiveness of these environmental 
agreements depends on their implementation by all parties, whereas the cost of 
this implementation is restricted to the individual countries. This is the setting for 
a classic collective action problem. In order to overcome this collective action 
problem and to avoid free-riding, the agreement can be institutionalised so that a 
one-shot game is transformed into an iterated game, changing the pay-off matrix 
and giving countries an incentive to comply. In short, environmental policies 
often have transboundary effects, inviting international cooperation. This raises 
the likelihood of collective action problems and free-riding, and in order to avoid 
this, the response to an environmental problem can be institutionalised by 
concluding international agreements or by creating an international organisation. 
This need for international cooperation and the propensity to produce
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international organisations makes the environment a good study object for 
external policy competences.
The fact that trade and environmental issues both invite international cooperation 
does not mean there are no substantial differences between these two areas. Quite 
the contrary is true. A substantially different logic is at work in both domains, 
which leads to a fundamentally different approach to dispute settlement in 
environmental and trade organisations (recall that, since the approach to dispute 
settlement can be highly legalistic, it is an important element in the description of 
‘institutionalisation’ in this thesis). For example, there will be less (if any) 
bilateral dispute settlement regarding environmental disputes because these 
problems, unlike trade disputes, are often not restricted to two countries but tend 
to be regional or sometimes even global in their dimensions. Furthermore, this 
transboundary character of environmental problems means that it is difficult to 
pin these problems down to a single source (as opposed to, for example, country 
X’s specific anti-dumping duties that are impacting on country Y’s industry). 
Therefore, the aggressive or conflictual litigation approach that exists in the trade 
regime seems to be unsuitable for enforcing compliance with environmental 
standards (see also WTO, 2001c). As a consequence, the dispute settlement 
provisions in environmental organisations usually differ from that in the WTO 
(and regional trade agreements) in that they tend to be rather vague and focussed 
on diplomatic solutions. Instead of relying on confrontational dispute settlement, 
multilateral environmental agreements (ME As) mostly contain ‘soft’ 
enforcement provisions with more stress on compliance monitoring and ‘name 
and shame’-mechanisms (Esty, 2002; Sands, 1993). Or, as one of the 
organisations involved has put it, “[T]he focus of MEAs is on procedures and 
mechanisms to assist Parties to remain in compliance and to avoid disputes, not 
on the use of provisions for the settlement of disputes” (WTO, 2001c: p. 2).
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This is reflected in the fact that no dispute settlement provision has ever been 
invoked in an environmental agreement (WTO, 2001c: p. 2; Brack, 2001: p. 11).1 
This raises a measurement problem since it means that the role of the 
Commission in the initiation of and response to environmental disputes cannot be 
analysed in the same way as it was in the case of trade. Even concentrating on 
the non-compliance proceedings does not seem to offer a way out since the focus 
of MEAs’ non-compliance procedures is not so much on policing adherence to 
the treaty, with the possibility to invoke sanctions in order to enforce compliance, 
but is rather aimed at offering the parties incentives to comply (Victor, 1996). 
Usually, there is an elaborate procedure that has to be followed (parties are 
named and shamed, summoned to explain themselves before committees, etc.) 
before the option of introducing ‘hard’ sanctions or similar measures, if the treaty 
in question provides such an option in the first place, might finally be 
contemplated.
All in all, it therefore appears that ‘hard’ dispute settlement systems are not really 
suitable for MEAs and that non-compliance procedures in MEAs are more 
geared towards developing countries or transition economies since the primary 
concern of such procedures and mechanisms is to facilitate compliance (Yoshida, 
2001). Hence, neither mechanism seems to create a ‘favourable’ condition for the 
EC to end up entangled in a dispute or non-compliance proceeding and there is 
thus not much scope either for the Commission to profile itself through its 
(extensive) use of the litigation system. For these reasons, another approach is 
needed than that in the trade chapters, where participation in and use of the 
dispute settlement system by the EC were more straightforward to observe. 
Instead, this chapter will turn its focus on the aspect of ‘dynamic 
institutionalisation’, by looking at the attempts of the Commission to establish 
itself as an international actor in environmental issues and at its role in the 
establishment and functioning of the institutional frameworks for the MEAs,
1 With the exception of the EC-Chilean ‘Swordfish’ dispute if the United Nations Conference of 
the Law of the Sea is regarded as an environmental agreement. This case will be discussed in 
more detail later.
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particularly the dispute settlement and/or non-compliance mechanisms. In other 
words, this chapter focuses on testing the second hypothesis rather than the first 
one (see chapter two).
Another important difference between trade and environment relates to the 
divergent nature of the EC’s external competences in both areas. Whereas 
external trade relations were clearly mentioned in the Treaty of Rome as falling 
under the exclusive competence of the EC (at least where trade in goods is 
concerned), the environment did not feature at all in that Treaty. It was not until 
the 1970s that EC started to develop competences in the field of the environment, 
thanks to the spill-over effects from the single market and judicial activism by 
the Court of Justice through its ERTA-ruling and the related doctrine of implied 
powers (Sbragia and Hildebrand, 1998; Sbragia, 1998). The next paragraphs give 
an overview of the emergence of the environment as an issue area, both on the 
international stage and within the EC.
The environment featured high on the political agenda in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Increased public concern about the state of the planet, and growing 
environmental awareness in general led to the 1972 UN Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm (UNCHE) (see for example Tenner, 2000). 
This global environmental agenda-setting exercise was repeated in 1992 in Rio, 
where the UN Conference on Environment and Development took place. This 
also had an institutional component in that both of these high-profile events 
resulted in the adoption of important MEAs: the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) in the case of the Stockholm conference, 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, among others, in Rio. Moreover, there are 
strong indications that the Stockholm conference gave the opening shot for the 
fairly recent boom in MEAs, since about 75% of the MEAs concluded between 
1951 and 2000 were adopted after the 1972 conference (Tenner, 2000: p. 133). It 
therefore seems fair to conclude that this conference played a pivotal role in 
introducing international environmental issues on the political agenda and in
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making them salient. Even more importantly, perhaps, activists were able to keep 
the momentum by constantly reaffirming the important role of the environment 
in international political affairs, as is witnessed by the huge increase in MEAs 
since 1972.
These international developments also had repercussions for the EC. The EC’s 
founding treaty, the Treaty of Rome, did not mention environmental protection -  
or the ‘environment’, for that matter -  once (Haigh, 1992; Commission, 2002a; 
Grant, Matthews and Newell, 2000). Hence, there was no explicit legal basis for 
an environmental policy at the Community level. Nonetheless, the 1972 
Stockholm conference and the growing environmental awareness that preceded 
and accompanied it, created considerable pressure for the EC to move into 
environmental policymaking (Haigh, 1992; Jordan, 1999). Only a couple of 
months after UNCHE, the Paris summit of the heads of state and government 
called upon the Commission to draft a programme of action for an EC 
environmental policy. The environmental action programme of 1973 (covering 
the period 1973-1976) was thus the first of these programmes and also the first 
explicit reference to environmental policy on the Community level, even though 
a strict legal basis was still lacking. It was not until the entry into force of the 
Single European Act (SEA) in 1987 that this legal basis was provided. The SEA 
added an environmental chapter to the Treaty by introducing Articles 13 Or-13 0s, 
which specifically dealt with environmental protection. In Maastricht and 
Amsterdam, these provisions were further refined and entrenched in the Treaty.
But where does this leave the EC on the international environmental scene? With 
regards to trade issues or fisheries policies, the Treaty of Rome explicitly stated 
that the Community possessed exclusive competence to conduct the external
2 Although this does not mean that there was no EC legislation relating to the environment at all. 
The first EC environmental (or better: environment-related) directive dates from 1967 and deals 
with standards for classifying, packaging and labelling dangerous substances. Early 
environmental legislation was intrinsically related to (intra-EC) trade facilitation, and the 
Commission “proved creative in the use of Article 100 [...] and Article 235” (Grant, Matthews 
and Newell, 2000: p. 9; see also Golub, 1999).
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aspects of these policies. Regarding the environment -  and despite the emergence 
of this issue area as an internal EC competence -  the extent and nature of the 
external dimension of this new Community competence was not nearly as clear- 
cut. The European Court of Justice has played a major role in the emergence of 
the EC as an international actor on environmental issues. Or, as one analyst has 
put it: “[T]he extent to which the Community has been able to claim a place on 
the international plane over the years is mainly a consequence of the substantial 
body of case-law developed by the Court” (Nollkaemper, 1987: p. 61). One 
ruling by the Court particularly stands out in this respect, and that is the ERTA 
case (Court of Justice, 1971; for comments and analyses see Sbragia, 1998; 
Macrory and Hession, 1996; Nollkaemper, 1987). Building on the principle Hn 
foro interno, in foro externo\ the Court developed its doctrine of implied powers 
in this ruling. It ruled that if the Community had been given the competences to 
act internally, it implicitly had been given the competence to act externally as 
well. After all, if the Community did not have powers over the external 
dimensions of its internal competences, the Member States might take actions in 
the external forum that could undermine the Community’s internal competences.
The result of all this is that “since 1972 discussions on the desirability of a 
transfer of powers have increasingly been provoked by the appearance of the 
Community on the international plane” (Nollkaemper, 1987: p. 55; emphasis 
added). However, there is also another front on which the Commission is fighting 
a battle when it comes to external environmental affairs.3 There are some 
preconditions that have to be fulfilled if  the Commission is to drift from the 
Member States and if it is to be able to use the institutional provisions of the 
MEA to extend its influence and power, should the opportunity arise. Two of 
these conditions are that the EC should first of all be a party to the MEA and also 
that it be in a reasonably strong position within the functioning of that MEA. The
3 While the Commission is certainly not the exclusive spokesperson of the EC in international 
environmental negotiations (the Council Presidency can also, and regularly does, speak for the 
EU, see Golub 1999), it does represent the EC in the institutional structures of international 
environmental organisations.
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first condition is closely related to the issue of third party recognition of the EC. 
It has already been pointed out that the EC faced -  and to a certain extent is still 
facing -  some problems concerning third country recognition when it comes to 
international trade. In international environmental affairs, however, the problem 
is much more serious. For example, US and Soviet Union opposition prevented 
the EC from becoming a party to the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species. And also in the more recent case of the Montreal Protocol, 
there was fierce resistance against the EC joining the Protocol (see later). From 
the point of view of the Commission, there is an important link between the 
vagueness of the division of external competences in environmental matters on 
the one hand, and the problem the Commission faces concerning third country- 
recognition of the EC as an international environmental actor on the other. This 
is because the absence of a clearly delineated core set of exclusive community 
competences on international environmental issues (in other words, the absence 
of an environmental equivalent of art. 133) means that getting international 
recognition becomes much more important for the Commission. After all, it will 
have to rely on and need this third country-endorsement to strengthen its 
international position and hence to have the possibility to use this strong 
international position as a platform to gain more influence and power internally 
as well. In the absence of a strong dispute settlement system that raises the costs 
of non-compliance and thereby gives the Member States an incentive to rely on 
the Commission, the element of third-country recognition of the EC becomes 
even more important in the environmental field.
Strengthening its position internationally also means paving the way for a 
stronger position for the Commission domestically (i.e. vis-a-vis the Member 
States). By becoming a party to many (or at least the most important) MEAs and 
by fulfilling the role of EC spokesperson within these organisations, the 
Commission has an opportunity to strengthen its external representation function. 
This will in turn lead to increased acceptance by third parties of the Commission 
as an international environmental actor, thereby making it easier for the 
Commission to become more assertive in the area of international environmental
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affairs. This process, in which external recognition empowers the Commission 
internally as well, can be strengthened by creating stronger institutional 
frameworks in MEAs. This would empower the Commission as external EC 
spokesperson within the EC, profile the EC as a coherent external actor and make 
future acceptance of the EC as an actor in international environmental affairs 
more likely.
After all, having to depend on obtaining international recognition over and over 
again for every new MEA is not only a cumbersome, but also dangerous strategy, 
as was illustrated by the reluctance of the US to accept the EC as a party to 
CITES, the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol. In the last two 
instances, the EC prevailed and became a party, but not after having had to put 
the success of the negotiations in the balance first. This strategy worked in these 
cases, but it would probably be doomed to fail in negotiations for which the EC 
would be the demandeur and where at the same time the US -  while willing to 
negotiate -  would only be only lukewarm about reaching an agreement. Some 
mechanism to provide more certainty to the Commission regarding its 
international status would therefore be useful. The institutionalisation of MEAs 
is such a strategy since a stronger Commission position in existing agreements 
would increase its credibility as an international actor and make its participation 
in future agreements more likely (the precedent effect). Above all, a strong 
Commission position also has the potential to discredit one of the most important 
arguments against acceptance of the EC in MEAs, namely that the EC cannot 
deliver or effectively function as a coherent actor.
While international recognition certainly is a necessary condition in order for the 
Commission to be able to use the external context to affect the internal balance of 
power in the EC, it is not a sufficient one. If the Commission has more scope for 
playing the first fiddle over mixed competences -  and thus gaining influence and 
power -  in contexts of judicial, bilateral dispute settlement, then international 
environmental regimes are hardly an ideal setting. After all, it has already been 
indicated earlier that dispute settlement provisions in MEAs have never yet been
198
invoked (Victor, 1996) and that non-compliance procedures are more co­
operative in nature (than litigation). One strategy for the Commission would be 
to try and lure these issues into a framework that does have a high degree of 
institutionalisation. This is the question about the Commission’s role in 
incorporating environmental issues within the framework of the WTO.
In conclusion, there are three elements that could point to a drive by the 
Commission to use the external institutional framework as a tool to gain 
influence in environmental issues: a strong push for external recognition in 
international environmental affairs, efforts to strengthen the institutional 
framework of MEAs, and attempts to push environmental issues into the WTO. 
The remainder of the chapter explores whether and to what extent these factors 
are present in the Commission’s actions. The next section will tackle the first two 
issues by looking at the Commission’s actions in the framework of the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. It has to be noted that the 
Commission openly expressed its intention of using the Montreal Protocol and 
the Vienna Convention negotiations for gaining international recognition (see 
later). As a result, the implications of international recognition of the EC for 
Commission-Member States relations have already been discussed in this context 
by other scholars. The next section places these findings within the broader 
theoretical framework that has been developed in this thesis, before going into 
specifics and discussing the role of the Commission in the creation of the non- 
compliance mechanism of the Montreal Protocol. The last section then deals with 
the Commission’s position regarding the link between trade and environmental 
matters and the extent to which the WTO should be involved in trade- 
environment issues.
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6.2. The Commission in the Montreal Protocol: international recognition 
and stronger institutions
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is a protocol 
of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and is “generally 
regarded as one of the most, if not the most, successful environmental 
conventions in existence” (Brack, 2003: p. 209). Unusually for a multilateral 
environmental agreement, it is highly effective and this is not in the least because 
it has “one of the most effective non-compliance mechanisms of any MEA” 
(ibid.: p. 216). This is a clear break from the traditional weak approaches to 
international environmental cooperation and thus forms the best possible setting 
in international environmental politics for studying the role of the Commission.
6.2,1. Dispute settlement and non-compliance in the Montreal Protocol
Dispute settlement in the Montreal Protocol is governed by the provisions laid 
down in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention. This article states that states 
should first try to resolve their disputes through negotiation (paragraph 1). If no 
agreement can be reached, they may turn to a third party for mediation or for 
good offices (paragraph 2). If a settlement still proves elusive after these steps, 
parties to the dispute can -  with mutual consent -  request the submission of the 
dispute to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration (paragraph 3).4 If 
one of the parties objects to such arbitration, a conciliatory commission is 
established whose recommendations the parties shall consider ‘in good faith’ 
(paragraph 5). Although this dispute settlement system could be highly legalistic 
(if the parties agree to be bound by an arbitration panel or if they decide to refer 
their dispute to the International Court of Justice), there is still a lack of ‘hard’ 
sanctions. No mention is made of compensation in case of a breach of the
4 Note that only states can be party before the International Court of Justice. The European 
Community is not a state and therefore the Commission would only be able to rely on arbitration 
tribunals.
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agreement, and there are no additional incentives to comply with the arbitration 
panel’s ruling. In any case it is impossible to judge the effectiveness of this 
formal dispute settlement mechanism since -  to date -  it has never yet been 
invoked. Whenever reference is made to the Montreal Protocol’s strong and 
effective dispute resolution system, it is therefore not article 11 of the Vienna 
Convention that is referred to, but rather the non-compliance mechanism 
incorporated in the Montreal Protocol itself.
The non-compliance provisions of the Montreal Protocol can be found in article 
8. However, this article only states, in the most general terms, that “[T]he Parties, 
at their first meeting, shall consider and approve procedures and institutional 
mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol 
and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance”. Thus, the details of 
the procedure for dealing with instances of non-compliance were to be worked 
out after the Protocol came into force. To this aim, an ad hoc Working Group of 
Legal Experts was established. Interestingly, the procedure this group proposed 
was accepted only on an interim basis since some Parties thought a stricter 
approach was needed (Victor, 1996: p. 4), until the final -  only slightly revised -  
procedure was adopted at the Fourth Meeting of the Parties in Copenhagen in 
November 1992 (UNEP, 1992: p. 13).
The central institution in Montreal’s non-compliance mechanism is the 
Implementation Committee. This committee, which consists of two members of 
each of the five geographical regions of the United Nations, normally meets 
twice a year. It considers submissions, information and observations on issues of 
implementation of the Montreal Protocol. In principle, there are three ways for an 
issue to end up before the Implementation Committee. The Committee can be 
alerted to instances of non-compliance by the non-complying Party itself, by the 
Secretariat, or by a third Party. In reality, however, third Party action seldom 
occurs. Victor notes that “[Virtually all issues related to data reporting have 
arrived on the Committee’s agenda at the initiative of the Committee or the 
Secretariat” and “all the issues related to compliance with the Protocol’s
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obligations to phase out ODS [Ozone Depleting Substances] have been put on 
the Implementation Committee’s agenda by the affected Parties themselves” 
(Victor, 1996: p. 16). Thus, the ‘oversight’ that is crucial for an effective 
compliance procedure is the responsibility not only of the Parties to the 
agreement, but also of the Secretariat, which is supposed to be technocratic and 
impartial -  or at the very least less politicised than the Meeting of the Parties 
(MoP). Following conventional institutional theory, this (partial) delegation to 
more independent agencies should enhance the credibility of the policy, in this 
case the non-compliance procedure (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977 for an early 
account of this problem). Furthermore, it is important to note that the Committee 
not only deals with specific instances of non-compliance, but that it also serves 
as a standing body, something which has also substantially increased the standing 
and effectiveness of the Committee (Victor, 1996).
The Implementation Committee cannot take decisions autonomously, but it 
reports to the Meeting of the Parties and it proposes recommendations to deal 
with instances of non-compliance. The indicative list of measures that might be 
taken by the MoP includes:
A. Appropriate assistance (...)
B. Issuing cautions.
C. Suspension, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law 
concerning the suspension of the operation of a treaty, of specific rights 
and privileges under the Protocol, whether or not subject to time limits, 
including those concerned with industrial rationalization, production, 
consumption, trade, transfer of technology, financial mechanism and 
institutional arrangements.
(Ozone Secretariat, 2000: p. 297)
This last option, the threat of restrictions on trade in products covered by the 
Montreal Protocol, undoubtedly is the strongest incentive and the biggest ‘stick’ 
to induce compliance (see also Brack, 2003; and in particular Brack, 1996).
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Another important element that strengthens the non-compliance procedure and 
gives it credibility is the rule that “[N]o Party, whether or not a member of the 
Implementation Committee, involved in a matter under consideration by the 
Implementation Committee, shall take part in the elaboration and adoption of 
recommendations on that matter to be included in the report of the Committee” 
(Ozone Secretariat, 2000: p. 296). Recall that the ability of the parties to the 
dispute to block the dispute from being investigated or ruled upon was one of the 
major weaknesses in the early GATT dispute settlement system. The Montreal 
Protocol clearly scores better in this respect.
In conclusion it can be stated that, even though the dispute settlement system 
incorporated in the Vienna Convention has never yet been used, the Montreal 
Protocol does have a relatively strong non-compliance mechanism. The 
important role of the Secretariat and the Implementation Committee in the non- 
compliance procedure, as well as the exclusion of parties involved in 
investigations from the Committee’s decision-making process, prevents the 
procedure from becoming overly politicised. The fact that alleged instances of 
non-compliance can be brought to the attention of the Implementation 
Committee by the Secretariat, the Party involved or a third Party adds to the 
credibility of the non-compliance mechanism. And the possibility of the use of 
trade sanctions gives countries an incentive to comply with the Montreal 
Protocol, which is key to creating an effective agreement.
6.2.2. The role o f the Commission in the making o f Montreal’s non-compliance 
mechanism
In search o f  international recognition
The main challenge for the Commission at the start of the Montreal Protocol 
negotiations was at the same time its primary objective: obtaining international
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recognition. This was important for two reasons. First of all it would give the 
Commission a stronger platform to act, given that there is no environmental 
equivalent of art. 133 (see earlier), which means that international recognition of 
the EC is of utmost importance when it comes to international environmental 
issues. Secondly, Commission participation in the functioning of an MEA would 
put it in a stronger position vis-a-vis the Member States. After all, in 
environmental negotiations it is still often the Presidency that speaks for the 
Community. Within the functioning of an agreement to which the EC is a party, 
on the other hand, it is the Commission that represents the EC. Becoming a party 
to the agreement was thus of double importance to the Commission at the start of 
the Montreal negotiations since, firstly, it would send a clear signal that it is a 
full international partner when it comes to environmental issues and, secondly, it 
would strengthen its position vis-a-vis the Member States.
Obtaining international recognition was not just on the Commission’s hidden 
agenda, it was made fairly explicit early onwards that this was what the 
negotiations were all about according to the Commission. This was not only the 
case for the Montreal Protocol negotiations, but had also been so for the 
bargaining leading to the conclusion of the Vienna Convention. A 
communication from the Commission to the Council on the negotiations for a 
global framework convention for the protection of the ozone layer states that 
“[T]he Commission did not wish to accept any clause which would make 
participation by the Community subject to prior participation by one Member 
State (...) or by a majority of Member States (...)” (Commission, 1985: p. 1). 
The Commission’s (stated) goal was thus to gain influence and competences by 
obtaining EC participation in the international agreements. If the EC could 
become a party to the Vienna Convention, the Commission could then ‘transfer’ 
this issue to the internal level by claiming the right to propose legislation to 
implement the Vienna convention, thereby increasing its internal competence 
over environmental issues (see Jachtenfuchs, 1990). The same reasoning was 
central to the Commission’s approach to the Montreal Protocol negotiations. 
Sbragia and Hildebrand, for example, note that “[T]he Commission viewed the
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Montreal Protocol as an opportunity to increase the Community’s international 
standing, and thereby its own institutional prestige and influence” (Sbragia and 
Hildebrand, 1998: p. 225). It is hard to underestimate the salience of the issue of 
EC participation to the Commission in both of these international negotiations 
(Vienna and Montreal). It is certainly not exaggerated to state that “the Vienna 
Convention was about “institution-building” in Brussels as much as it was about 
CFCs” (ibid.: p. 223). While facing strong international (especially American) 
resistance to EC participation in both negotiations, in the case of the Montreal 
Protocol, the Commission pushed this issue of EC participation and recognition 
so far that it nearly endangered the successful conclusion of the negotiations as a 
whole. In the end, only a New-Zealand brokered compromise after a “nerve- 
raking midnight standoff over this issue” (Benedick, 1991: p. 96) saved the 
Montreal Protocol. This episode illustrates very clearly the importance the 
Commission attached to being taken seriously on the international stage and 
becoming an international environmental actor.
The Commission and the creation o f Montreal's non-compliance mechanism
Finally, we should take a closer look at the role of the Commission in the 
negotiations of the actual provisions of the non-compliance procedure of the 
Montreal Protocol. Whereas MEAs have usually been characterised by a soft or 
diplomatic approach (in other words, they were power-based systems), one of the 
most interesting and intriguing aspects of the Montreal Protocol is exactly its 
move towards a more rules-based system. Though still a far cry from the WTO’s 
judicial approach, the Montreal Protocol’s non-compliance procedure 
nonetheless does have several characteristics of a rules-based system. In the next 
paragraphs, it will be shown that the Commission was a pivotal actor in pushing 
for the incorporation of these strong institutional elements and thus in making the 
Montreal Protocol much more rules-based than the average MEA.
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In order to work out a non-compliance mechanism for the Montreal Protocol, an 
ad hoc Working Group of Legal Experts was established. The Commission took 
a very proactive approach in this working group and argued forcefully for a 
strong institutional mechanism tackling non-compliance. Indeed, Victor notes 
that the European Commission was one of only a few participants in the 
negotiations on the non-compliance system that “led the way” (Victor, 1996: p. 
5). The most important document that sheds light on the Commission’s position 
and influence in the creation of the non-compliance system is the EC’s proposal 
of 8 April 1991, suggesting several changes and additions to the draft non- 
compliance procedure that was on the table (UNEP, 1991). All of these 
suggestions were designed to make this procedure stronger and give it teeth. 
They fall broadly within three categories: introducing time limits, strengthening 
the role of independent actors (i.e. the Implementation Committee and the 
Secretariat) and preventing conflicts of interests.
Firstly, the EC proposal is the first to advocate strict time limits in the procedure. 
While the wording that the Implementation Committee (IC) “consider the matter 
as soon as practicable” (UNEP, 1991: p. 2) is unchanged, the timeframe for the 
submission of information to the Implementation Committee by the Secretariat is 
fixed at three months and two weeks, unless the Secretariat decides differently. 
Equally, the EC proposed that when the Secretariat requests information from a 
Party, that this information should be provided within three months. Otherwise 
the Secretariat “shall forthwith refer the matter to the Implementation Committee 
for examination” (ibid.). Nonetheless, even with these stricter time limits, the 
whole process could still be an empty threat since the requirement that the IC 
consider the matter as soon as ‘practicable’ could render the exercise futile, for 
example in the case where it would only meet, say, once every two years. In 
order to avoid this scenario, the EC also proposed to introduce a more specific 
calendar for the IC meetings. The first draft only recommended that “[T]he 
Committee shall meet as necessary to perform its functions” (UNEP, 1991: p.3). 
The EC draft is more precise by adding that “unless it decides otherwise the 
Committee shall meet twice a year” (ibid.). This puts the minimum number of
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meetings of the IC to two a year, thus avoiding that investigations regarding 
complaints about non-compliance get stalled because of a large gap between, and 
an overcrowded agenda of, IC meetings.
Second, but closely related to the issue of imposing time frames, the EC proposal 
seeks to strengthen the role and position of the IC and the Secretariat. The 
Secretariat, for example, may request further information from parties on specific 
matters when it “is aware of possible irregularities with regard to the compliance 
of a Party with its obligations under the Protocol” (UNEP, 1991: p. 2). The IC, 
under the EC proposal, can “address requests for information to Parties, 
organisations or individuals as appropriate” (UNEP, 1991: p. 3) as well as “send, 
with the consent of the Party in question, one or more of its Members to the 
territory of the Party concerned for further clarification of the relevant facts” 
(ibid.). The strict time frames in combination with broad information gathering 
capacities for the secretariat can play in the hands of the Commission and 
strengthen its position vis-a-vis the Member States in the functioning of the non- 
compliance system. The reason is that this very much fits into the Commission’s 
profile as technical body of the EC. Given that the strict time frame greatly 
increases the pressure to deliver the requested non-compliance information, 
Member States will be more likely to (have to) rely on the Commission’s 
expertise and experience should they ever be asked to explain themselves before 
the Implementation Committee (in the same way the strict time frame of the 
WTO dispute settlement system favours Commission action).5 The possibility of 
ultimately facing trade sanctions in cases of continued non-compliance should 
make Commission action even more likely, not least because trade sanctions 
involving only one Member States would be a distortion of the Single Market. It 
should be noted, however, that this scenario is hypothetical since neither the EC 
nor a Member State has ever been in that position and it is highly unlikely that a
5 Except, of course, when it concerns requests to clarify or provide purely national data, which 
only the government of the Member State can provide. This was the case when Italy was 
repeatedly called before the IC.
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scenario in which any of these actors would be found in non-compliance with the 
Montreal Protocol and end up facing trade sanctions would materialise.
Finally, the EC proposal also tried to prevent conflicts of interest by proposing 
that a member of the IC that is itself involved in a case of non-compliance be 
replaced. This bears a striking resemblance to the changes that were made to the 
GATT dispute settlement system. Recall that under GATT rules parties to a 
dispute also had a veto over the creation of a panel or the adoption of panel 
reports on that dispute. This was a major source of frustration and blockage in 
the GATT dispute settlement system and was subsequently dealt with during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations.6 It is therefore quite interesting to see that the EC 
proposal is very explicit in its desire to close this loophole for rendering 
Montreal’s non-compliance procedure ineffective.
In short, the Commission has pushed hard for getting this relatively highly 
institutionalised, rules-based non-compliance in place. Furthermore, there are 
several striking similarities between elements introduced by the Commission in 
the Montreal’s non-compliance mechanism and some of the changes in the 
dispute settlement system with the transition from GATT to WTO. This is in line 
with the findings of the previous chapters, that the Commission favours strongly 
institutionalised international settings to operate in since they offer more scope 
for the Commission to gain influence and power.
Another element that contributed to a stronger role for the Commission is the 
degree of technicality involved in the implementation of the provisions of the 
Montreal Protocol. To begin with, “[T]he European Community’s main 
instrument to implement the Montreal Protocol is through a Community 
Regulation that is directly applicable in all Member States” (Commission, 2003g: 
p. 1), which gives the Commission a much firmer grasp on the implementation
6 The first inroads to remedying the weaknesses of the GATT dispute settlement system in the 
Uruguay Round were made in 1988 at the mid-term review in Montreal.
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process than in the case where a Directive would have been issued. But Peter 
Horrocks, the head of delegation of the European Community, adds in a speech 
at the 12th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol that “the new 
Regulation introduces a range of measures concerning all ozone depleting 
substances that go beyond the Protocol (...)” (ibid). The effect of this on the 
inter-institutional relations within the EC is hinted at by the Commission in an 
outline of its policy and objectives regarding the protection of the ozone layer, 
when it is stated that “[T]he Commission is a major driving force in the Montreal 
Protocol process since the commitments under this Protocol are mainly 
implemented at the Community level” (Commission, 2003f: p. 1). When 
interviewed, Peter Horrocks went even a bit further by claiming that the 
Commission is “generally more active than the Member States in trying to 
achieve a high level environmental ambition” (interview with Peter Horrocks). 
Regarding the effect of the technicality of the issue matter on the position of the 
Commission within the Montreal Protocol, Mr Horrocks is very clear. In a 
response (by email) to this question, he answers that “[i]t is true that the 
increased technicality of the subject matter gives the Commission (DG ENV), 
which is more knowledgeable than most MS [Member States], an edge in 
guiding the implementation of the Regulation and in leading negotiations within 
the Montreal Protocol’ (interview Peter Horrocks).
While the Montreal Protocol is of course but one case study, it is all the more 
interesting to note that its widely acclaimed ‘strong’ non-compliance mechanism 
seems to have set a trend. In the early 1990s, for example, non-compliance 
mechanisms were also adopted by two of the protocols to the Convention on 
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), the Sulphur Protocol and 
the Protocol dealing with emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds, whose 
provisions were almost identical to those of the compliance system of the 
Montreal Protocol (Szell, 1997). Later, it also served as a source of inspiration 
for the non-compliance mechanism of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FCCC), including the (in)famous Kyoto Protocol. The non- 
compliance mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol even goes beyond the provisions
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of the Montreal Protocol and seeks to give the Kyoto agreement sharper teeth 
still (see for example Oberthur, 2001; UNFCCC, 2000). For example, Kyoto’s 
equivalent of Montreal’s Implementation Committee is a Compliance Committee 
consisting of a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch. Sanctions for 
producing more emissions than allowed can include having to cut an extra 30% 
of the surplus emissions, and a country being barred from the emissions trading 
scheme. This puts the Commission in a very strong position within the 
functioning of the agreement (compared to its position in other ME As).
Here as well, the issue of climate change in general and the role of the 
Commission in dealing with it in particular can be seen in the context of the 
process of European integration. Jachtenfuchs and Huber have pointed out earlier 
that the Commission very quickly approached climate change “as a question 
involving the future of the Community” (Jachtenfuchs and Huber, 1993: p. 43). 
This was not only the line of thinking of Carlo Ripa di Meana, the flamboyant 
Commissioner for the Environment (European Parliament, 1991). The idea of 
framing the climate change issue, and the European response to it, in terms of the 
European integration process also lived in the Forward Studies Unit of Jacques 
Delors (Jachtenfuchs and Huber, 1993). There was thus an impressive political 
machinery at work for turning the politics of climate change in favour of the 
position of the Commission, both within the EU and on the international scene. 
Commissioner Ripa di Meana, for example, referred to the Commission’s 
strategy to combat CO2 emissions as a proposal which “will contribute towards 
European integration and the credibility of the European Community at 
international level (European Parliament, 1991: p. 47). In the words of some 
analysts, the Kyoto Protocol “would also serve the cause of EU political 
integration by establishing new competences for the European Commission” 
(Boehmer-Christiaensen and Kellow, 2002: p. 178). Other analysts have put it 
even more explicitly, pointing out that “[T]he politics of climate change are 
inextricably linked to the institution-building process which has characterised the 
process of European integration since 1957, and the exercise of global leadership
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forms one component of such institution building” (Sbragia and Damro, 1999: p. 
66).
6.3. Environment and trade: back to the WTO
The previous chapter explored some of the consequences of the impact of the 
external institutional framework: if  the Commission is indeed empowered in such 
settings, trying to get issues that are mixed competences included into this strong 
framework would be a perfectly rational strategy. This was illustrated by 
working out in some detail the Commission’s position regarding the 
incorporation in the international trading system of the issue of investment. It 
also has repercussions for the expectations concerning the Commission’s actions 
in international environmental matters since these issues usually fall in the 
category of mixed competences. As one scholar has put it, “nearly every single 
case in the field of environmental policy has been one of mixed competence” 
(Golub, 1999: p. 454). Hence, the expectation in the environmental domain 
would be to see the Commission trying to deal with these issues in a strong 
institutional framework. While the Commission’s negotiating efforts in favour of 
strong non-compliance mechanisms (see previous section) certainly fit into this 
picture, this still leaves us with the problem that environmental agreements have 
a fundamentally different approach to resolving disputes. Or, more precisely, that 
the disputes that emerge within the framework of MEAs are of an inherently 
different nature, compared to trade disputes, and that they invite soft rather than 
hard enforcement mechanisms.
This means that the Commission’s efforts to strengthen the institutional 
frameworks of MEAs in recent years will not be sufficient to fully exploit the 
advantage offered by a rules-based approach. That is not to say that these efforts 
are not useful, on the contrary, but they should be seen in the context of 
strengthening the Commission’s credibility as an international environmental 
actor vis-a-vis third states rather than directly in the context of Commission-
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Member States relations. It has been pointed out before that these two elements 
are, of course, intrinsically related. But in terms of the struggle over 
competences, third party recognition -  as in the case of trade -  is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition. The question then is what forum the Commission 
could use if it wanted to gain influence and power regarding international 
environmental issues. This section will take up this question by looking at the 
Commission’s efforts to include environmental issues into the WTO. The 
successful inclusion of these issues would lead to the Commission being in a 
much stronger position vis-a-vis the Member States.
In the international trade regime, the discussion about the relationship between 
trade issues and environmental ones has rekindled over the past couple of years. 
This has been a particularly hot topic since the creation of the WTO, and 
especially after some high profile environment-related trade disputes had been 
brought before the WTO’s dispute settlement system. Here, the Shrimp-Turtle 
case certainly comes to mind (WTO, 1998), or the Tuna-Dolphin cases, although 
these were initiated during the Uruguay Round and thus still under the GATT 
framework (GATT, 1991; 1994). As early as 1971, a Group on Environmental 
Measures and International Trade had been set up in the framework of the 
GATT. Yet this group was not convened until 1991 when, in the midst of the 
Uruguay Round, the EFTA countries asked for a meeting (WTO, 2004: p. 4). In 
this, they were strongly supported by Canada and the EC. The result was that the 
issue of the relationship between trade and environment found its way onto the 
agenda of the Uruguay Round negotiations. As a consequence of this, the 
creation of the WTO also saw the establishment of a committee to study the 
relationship between trade and environment in wider sense (WTO, 2004: p. 5). 
The mandate of this newly established committee was to identify the relationship 
between trade measures and environmental ones and to make recommendations 
for changes in the multilateral trading system (WTO, 2004).
It is important to note, in the light of this thesis, that the EC took a leading role in 
the efforts to include environment on the agenda of the Uruguay Round and,
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later, in institutionalising it within the framework of the WTO. Back in 1990, a 
(critical) observer of the Uruguay Round negotiations noted that “[0]nly the 
European Community has been trying to float the idea of a decision or 
declaration by the GATT Contracting Parties [szc] to deal with issues of 
environment, health and consumer protection in trade and GATT’s work (...)” 
(Raghavan, 1990c). When the EFTA countries then formally asked the director- 
general to convene the GATT Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Trade in 1991, the EC was among the most fervent supporters of 
this initiative in order to push environment higher on the Uruguay Round agenda.
This is also confirmed from within the Commission, where the head of unit of 
the unit responsible for issues of ‘trade and environment’ in DG Trade confirmed 
that it was the Commission that was the driving force behind the efforts to put 
the relationship between trade and environment on the WTO agenda (interview 
with Robin Ratchford). According to the same official, there was not really a lot 
of pressure from any of the Member States to insist on dealing with environment 
in a WTO context. He continued by explaining that, as could be expected, the 
environmental leaders (Nordic countries, Germany, the Netherlands) were more 
proactive in the EC Working Groups in discussing the relationship between trade 
and environment, but that even they were not pushing for incorporating these 
issues into the framework of the WTO. Therefore, Mr Ratchford described this 
Commission ploy of having the EFTA countries speak out and convening the 
GATT Group on Environmental Measures and Trade to revive the trade- 
environment debate in the context of the Uruguay Round negotiations as “a 
clever negotiating tactic”. After all, if this proposal had come from the EC 
directly, it would have generated a lot of ‘automatic’ resistance in some comers 
and, as was discussed earlier, the EC was already defending more than enough 
contentious issues in these negotiations. In order to lose as little negotiating 
capital as possible and to increase the chances of success, it therefore made sense 
for the Commission to have another country put this topic on the table and 
support it rather than bring it up itself.
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Also after the Uruguay Round, the EC continued to push for discussions on the 
relationship between trade and environment within the framework of the newly 
established Committee on Trade and Environment as well as within the context 
of new rounds of multilateral trade negotiations.7 This is particularly pronounced 
in the context of the most recent round of multilateral trade negotiations, the 
Doha (Development) round. In these negotiations the EC, in the Commission’s 
own words, “is among the most active supporters of a positive “environment” 
and “sustainable development” agenda in WTO” (Commission, 2001: p.l). 
Indeed, in the same Memorandum, the Commission boldly proclaims that “[W]e 
have been studying all these issues since 1995 in the WTO. That is enough study. 
The time has come for action, which in the WTO requires a mandate to negotiate 
in order to reach conclusions” {ibid.). One of the key issues in this respect, and 
one the EC had also been pressing for in the context of the (failed) WTO 
Ministerial in Seattle, is that of the relation between the WTO and MEAs. The 
EC was the main demandeur for this issue in the Doha negotiations. Some press 
comments did not leave much doubt about where this left the EC, claiming that 
“[0]n the environment, the EU [sfc.] has isolated itself from other WTO 
members” (Mizumoto, 2001). Nonetheless, at the eleventh hour, the EC did 
manage to have certain aspects of the trade-environment debate included in the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration, thereby committing the WTO to negotiations on, 
among other things, the relation between WTO rules and trade provisions in 
MEAs. Again, an important Commission official stressed that it was the 
Commission that took the lead in keeping this issue on the WTO agenda and 
getting it included into the Doha negotiation round (interview with Robin 
Ratchford).
Tellingly, and somewhat predictably, the Commission’s achievement in Doha of 
having succeeded in committing the WTO to start negotiations on certain aspects
7 In fact, the GATT Working Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade was 
first transformed into an Ad Hoc Committee on Trade and Environment. It was not until the 
Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996 that the Committee on Trade and Environment became a 
permanent body of the WTO (Lang, 1997).
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of the trade-environment issue was not everywhere well received. The summary 
of a workshop of the Heinrich Boll Foundation on the trade-environment nexus 
that took place one month after the Doha summit highlights some of these 
complaints. Unsurprisingly, representatives of the business community at this 
workshop express their dissatisfaction with the inclusion of environmental 
concerns. And also developing countries, a majority of which had opposed the 
inclusion of environment as a negotiating topic onto the WTO agenda, were not 
very happy, being left with “a feeling of frustration and suspicion” (Schalatek, 
2001: p. 3). More interesting, though, is the lukewarm reaction of other actors. 
The paper states that “[E]ven from NGO side, though, there was some criticism 
that the EU had done a disservice to the issue of trade and environment (...)” 
(ibid.). The absence of grassroots pressure, combined with the relative inertia of 
the Member States regarding the issue of trade and environment, again 
strengthen the interpretation that the Commission pushed this issue on the agenda 
in order to strengthen its position on environmental issues by incorporating these 
in the strong WTO framework.
In its submissions on the issue of trade and environment in the Doha Round, the 
Commission is careful to avoid creating the impression that the EC puts trade 
interests above environmental concerns by favouring the WTO as the ultimate 
forum (“Multilateral environmental policy should be made within multilateral 
environmental fora and not in the WTO”; Commission, 2002: p. 6). But the 
desire to apply the WTO and its dispute settlement system to (trade-related) 
environmental issues becomes nonetheless apparent in claims that “WTO rules 
should not be interpreted in clinical isolation of complementary bodies of 
international law, including MEAs” (ibid.). This is a clear attempt to bring 
environmental issues and considerations into the WTO’s dispute settlement 
system ‘through the back door’. And once this dispute settlement system 
becomes a forum for dealing with environmentally charged disputes in which the 
EC or its Member States are involved, the Commission (and not the Member 
States) will be defending the Community as well as the Member States’ interests. 
This would strengthen the Commission’s position and standing as an
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international environmental actor greatly, creating the potential for a virtuous 
circle (from the point of view of the Commission) in which this enhanced status 
leads to more credibility and power in other environmental organisations and 
negotiations. After the account of the trade-environment debate in the previous 
paragraphs, this institutional explanation gains credibility. After all, several other 
possible explanations were ruled out. There was no clear and strong pressure 
from (some of) the Member States, nor was there a demand by third parties. On 
the contrary, most of the developing countries (whom the Doha Round was 
seemingly aimed at, hence the name ‘Doha Development Agenda’) actively 
opposed the inclusion of an environmental agenda in the WTO. Furthermore, the 
Commission’s achievements could not even please NGOs since the trade- 
environment issue that was of most importance to them, the precautionary 
principle, did not make it into the Doha Ministerial Declaration. In this light, the 
Commission’s desire to push environmental issues more clearly within the WTO 
framework offers a credible explanation for why the Commission was willing to 
raise the stakes substantially (the environmental paragraph was reintroduced 
during the last night of the negotiations, raising the stakes by risking complete 
failure of the ministerial meeting).
Before turning to a concrete example to give additional support to our argument, 
it is worth recalling that the dynamics of intra-Commission politics are left 
implicit in this analysis. The starting point is instead revealed Commission 
preference (and strategy), leaving the underlying power relations unspoken. In 
the case of the relationship between trade and environment and the role of the 
WTO in trade-related environmental issues, for example, it is DG Trade that has 
firmly taken the leading role. When asked how she felt about this evolution, the 
European Commissioner for the Environment was not very enthusiastic about 
linking trade issues to environmental ones or incorporating environmental 
concerns into the WTO. The reason was that she feared the primacy of trade over 
environment, reflecting the internal balance of power within the Commission 
(interview with Margaret Wallstrom). Strangely enough, at the same time she 
also showed to be a big proponent of applying economic approaches and trade
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mechanisms to the issue area of the environment when it comes to internal 
policies. Externally, however, the primacy of trade and the importance of the 
WTO apparently is still too overpowering.
As an illustration, a discussion of the Chilean swordfish case is informative and 
will shed some light on the EC’s actions in international disputes with an 
environmental component (see International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
2000, WTO, 2000c). This dispute between the EC and Chile arose when Chile 
prohibited Community fishing vessels to unload swordfish in Chilean ports on 
the grounds of protecting the conservation and sustainable exploitation of 
swordfish in the south-eastern Pacific Ocean. It fell both under the jurisdiction of 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the dispute settlement 
body of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the WTO, 
thereby providing an excellent example of the interaction between the WTO and 
MEAs and the legal uncertainty this can create. Whereas Chile initiated 
proceedings before ITLOS, the European Commission brought this issue to the 
attention of the WTO’s dispute settlement body. Eventually, a mutually agreed 
solution was found and the disputes in both fora were suspended. The interesting 
point here, however, is the choice of dispute settlement forum. Under article 5 of 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the EC and its Member 
States have to make a declaration of competences which have been transferred to 
the EC and for which the EC is responsible (see also Simmonds, 1983). This 
requirement, intended to provide third countries with legal security in the early 
days of the EC as an international environmental actor (the UN Convention of 
the Law of the Sea III came into force in 1983), of course makes this 
organisation much less attractive from the point of view of the Commission. This 
list of competences cements the balance of power between the Commission and 
the Member States and prevents the Commission from increasing its influence. In 
the light of the above account of the Commission’s role in the efforts to 
incorporate environmental issues in the WTO, therefore, it would be more 
interesting for the Commission to pursue this dispute within the WTO
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framework, in which the division of competences is more dynamic.8 By initiating 
this dispute involving environmental concerns in the WTO, the Commission 
could thus use its strong position in that organisation to actively start to introduce 
environmental issues as well. This would lead to a strengthening of the EC as an 
international actor, making it a more credible partner. Such a gain in influence by 
the Commission might even result, eventually, in the Commission gaining more 
power and (formal) competence over those issues.
There are also other elements illustrating the eagerness on behalf of the 
Commission to have this issue dealt with within the framework of the WTO. In 
an internal draft press release on this dispute, the Commission claims that ITLOS 
is not the right forum for dealing with this issue since -  still according to the 
Commission -  the transit and importation of fishing products is not regulated by 
UNCLOS. “That”, so the text continues, “is why on this issue we did not have 
any other option than to resort to WTO dispute settlement” (Commission, 2000: 
p. 1). However, the next paragraph then continues by stating that “we will 
actively participate in UNCLOS proceedings” (ibid.). Strangely enough, the 
Commission’s legal defence does not include challenging the competence of 
ITLOS to rule over this dispute (since it was claimed that the subject matter falls 
outside the scope of UNCLOS). Instead, the Commission’s legal argumentation 
focuses on the definition of what constitutes an MEA. In this respect, the 
negotiations should be open to all interested parties, which was not the case with 
the Galapagos Agreement that was invoked by Chile to justify its conservation 
measures. In short, in the light of the argument made in this thesis, the 
Commission’s choice for the WTO as the forum for dispute settlement in the 
Chile swordfish case is more deliberate and informative than it would appear at 
first sight.
8 Even if it is argued that the substance of the dispute falls under the common fisheries policy, 
and is thus an exclusive Community competence, and that it is not a conservation issue (as Chile 
claimed), the argument that the Commission prefers the WTO because of the better opportunities 
for increasing its influence would still hold. After all, there would be spill-over effects from the 
link of the trade component of this dispute with the environmental component and this would 
reflect on the Commission (acting on behalf of the EC).
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has broadened the scope of the empirical grounds on which the 
institutional argument of this thesis rests. In a departure from the approach of the 
previous chapters, this one focused on the issue area o f the environment, rather 
than trade. Immediately it became clear, however, that there are substantial 
differences between these issue areas and that this has certain methodological 
implications. Since the nature of dealing with disputes in environmental regimes 
differs fundamentally from the nature of disagreements (and the way they are 
tackled) in trade settings, the opportunities for the Commission to use the dispute 
settlement or non-compliance systems of environmental regimes is rather limited, 
to say the least. Therefore, this chapter only focussed on the dynamic aspect of 
institutionalisation, namely the Commission’s efforts to strengthen the 
institutional settings in which international environmental issues are being dealt 
with. Through a discussion of the Commission’s role in the drafting of the non- 
compliance regime of the Montreal Protocol, and the Commission’s approach of 
similar provisions in, for example, the Kyoto Protocol it became clear that the 
Commission’s strategy was indeed aimed at strengthening these provisions and -  
only through its participation -  to enhance its own institutional position and 
standing, both internationally as well as within the EC.
But the Commission’s attempts do not stop at strengthening the institutional 
frameworks of environmental regimes. The Commission has been -  and still is -  
one of the strongest advocates of incorporating environmental issues within the 
WTO, the strong institutional setting par excellence. And while it managed to get 
a discussion started within the WTO about the relationship between trade and 
environment, the negotiations on this topic are momentarily stuck -  the WTO’s 
Committee on Trade and Environment being, in fact, inactive. However, the case 
study of the Chilean Swordfish dispute, where the Commission initiated 
proceedings before the WTO rather than following Chile in its choice for ITLOS, 
showed that the Commission’s hand consists of more than negotiation results 
alone. Just like it succeeded in gaining competence over TRIPS issues through its
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role in the WTO’s dispute settlement system, the Commission is also trying to 
use that same system to force environment-related issues on the agenda. The 
focus of this chapter was on the environment in order to provide a counterweight 
to the predominance of trade case studies and to show that the core argument 
made in this thesis does not only hold when it comes to trade issues, but that it 
has a wider appeal. The fact that the argument in this chapter has ended up 
discussing environmental issues within the WTO again does not render the 
attempt to divert attention from the trade regime useless. After all, the reason 
why the role of the Commission within the WTO is discussed in this 
environment-focussed chapter is not because the WTO deals with trade issues 
(that would undermine the effort to show that our argument is not restricted to 
the issues area of trade) but rather that the WTO simply offers the strongest 
institutional framework of any international organisation. This makes it the most 
logical choice of forum for any actor looking for a strong setting.
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7
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A MORE 
COHERENT FRAMEWORK
7.1. Summary and main argument of the thesis
The role of the EC in the international system has always been problematic. Non­
recognition of the EC -  and the Commission as its representative -  by third 
parties, lack of clarity regarding the division of competences between the EC and 
its Member States, turf wars over whether a particular external Community 
competence is exclusive or n o t .... These are but a few examples of the daunting 
problems that arise when it comes to the Community’s external relations. From 
this, it becomes clear that the Commission’s role of executing the EC’s external 
policy and representing the EC on the international stage is not always easy. 
Against this background, it is particularly interesting to note the central position 
the Commission occupies within the World Trade Organisation. While this may 
seem not more than logical under the provisions of the Common Commercial 
Policy, which gives the EC exclusive competence over trade in goods, there is 
more to it than that. Firstly, the Commission’s role in the world trade regime had 
not always been so central. For example, under the WTO’s predecessor, the 
GATT, it was not unheard of for Member State representatives to take the floor 
during GATT meetings, and sometimes even publicly challenge the
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Commission’s competences, as became clear from the example -  given earlier -  
of the French representative challenging the Commission representative’s 
position within GATT (see chapter four; GATT, 1988a; Petersmann, 1996). 
Within the WTO, the Commission is firmly in charge of the conduct of the EC’s 
trade policy. Secondly, under the impulse of the Commission the scope of the 
definition of art. 133 (the Common Commercial Policy) has gradually been 
broadened to include elements of other trade issues such as trade-related aspects 
of intellectual property rights or trade in services.
The central research puzzle derives from this last observation: how come the 
Commission managed to play a central role regarding the ‘new’ trade issues 
(trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights and trade in services) within 
the WTO, even extending the scope of the EC’s exclusive competences over 
these issues, when most Member States were adamantly opposed to transferring 
these competences to the Common Commercial Policy? In the lead-up to and the 
aftermath of the Maastricht summit, the climate in which the Commission had to 
operate had deteriorated decidedly. The Commission was widely and publicly 
blamed for (at least part of) the ratification difficulties of the Maastricht Treaty in 
France and Denmark, its negotiating credibility came under fire when the 
Member States challenged the result and the Commission’s conduct of the 
agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round (the Blair House agreement) and 
-  to add insult to injury -  the Court of Justice largely sided with the Member 
States and refused to extend the application of art. 133 to all of the ‘new’ trade 
issues, as the Commission had requested. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence 
presented in chapter three shows that the Commission does play a central role in 
the WTO, and in particular in its dispute settlement system. This thesis argues 
that the strength of the institutional framework of the WTO (i.e. its rules-based 
system) strengthens the position of the Commission vis-a-vis the Member States. 
In order to show this, two sets of case studies were examined. First, the role of 
the Commission in offensive and defensive TRIPS disputes in the WTO was 
examined. Second, several disputes that were initiated against individual EC 
Member States concerning tax issues were compared. The earliest of these
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disputes took place under GATT and hardly saw any involvement on the part of 
the Commission. The more recent of these disputes, initiated under WTO rules, 
saw the Commission negotiate with the US on behalf of the Member States 
concerned.
While this offers support to the hypothesis that the Commission is indeed in a 
stronger position in highly institutionalised settings, it does not provide any clues 
as to the policy preferences of the Commission (is there some kind of awareness 
within the Commission of the possibilities that are presented by strong 
institutional frameworks?). There are two courses of action available to the 
Commission to use its advantage, both of which would offer strong indications 
that the Commission does indeed have a preference for highly institutionalised 
settings. The first one is simply to push for the creation of strong institutions in 
international negotiations. The second possible strategy is to push for the 
incorporation of new issues in existing organisations with a strong institutional 
framework.
Chapter four focused on the first option. It shows not only that the Commission 
was a major driving force in turning the WTO into a real organisation (as 
opposed to the GATT, which was merely a provisionally applied treaty), but also 
that there was a dramatic U-turn in the Commission’s thinking about the need for 
and desirability of a binding system for settling trade disputes. The impetus for 
this U-turn was not only the changing domestic policy setting, but also the 
experience gained from the increasingly legal approach to settling trade disputes 
under the late stages of GATT (particularly after the agreement reached on 
dispute settlement at the Montreal mid-term review). Chapter five tackled the 
second strategy by discussing the Commission’s dogged efforts for the 
incorporation of, among other things, the issue of investment into the 
international trade regime. Despite fierce external and internal resistance, the 
Commission nonetheless pushed this issue to the brink, almost endangering the 
whole negotiation round. Several possible explanations are discussed in the last
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section of chapter five, but it is argued that the institutional interpretation is 
better in explaining more of the Commission’s actions in this context.
At this point one might wonder whether the findings also hold for other issue 
areas than trade. This is addressed in chapter six, which studies the 
Commission’s role in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). An 
overview of the evolution of the EC’s competences in the field of environment 
reveals that “since 1972 discussions on the desirability of a transfer of powers 
have increasingly been provoked by the appearance of the Community on the 
international plane” (Nollkaemper, 1987: p. 55). Again, the same two questions 
are posed to establish whether the Commission tries to tilt the balance its way: is 
it actively trying to establish strong institutional frameworks and is it actively 
trying to incorporate issues over which it holds relatively little sway into strongly 
institutionalised settings where it has more influence? The first question is 
answered by looking at the Commission’s role in the negotiations establishing 
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. From 
Commission and negotiation documents, it becomes clear that the Commission 
was indeed a pivotal player in pushing for a strong non-compliance mechanism, 
which makes the Montreal Protocol one of the most highly effective 
environmental agreements in place (see for example Brack, 2003). The second 
question is tackled by pointing out the Commission’s important role in attempts 
to integrate environmental issues and concerns within the context of the World 
Trade Organisation. To this aim, the Commission not only makes use of the 
negotiating table, but it also follows this through with action through more 
practical channels, as was illustrated by the Commission’s choice of dispute 
settlement forum in the Chilean Swordfish case.
In sum, the picture painted of the Commission is that of a dynamic agent that 
succeeds in using strong institutional frameworks, i.e. those with a more rules- 
based approach to the resolution of conflicts, to strengthen its position vis-a-vis 
the Member States. There are several facilitating conditions for this process such 
as the technicality of the issue area, the extent of international recognition of the
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EC as a legitimate player regarding the issue at hand, the competence grounds 
and the division of competences within the EC in the area as well as the presence 
of exclusive competence in a closely related field, and the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the issue area. The Commission proactively exploits the 
presence of these conditions to broaden its competence base, de facto  as well as 
de jure. A key element in this process is the dynamic interaction between the 
domestic (EU) level and the international level. Because the ‘traditional’ 
integration theories have largely focused on the relations between the national 
and the European level, they usually cannot account for the increase in EU 
competences deriving from the Commission’s role and position on the 
international stage.
The literature on the EC’s external relations is of course more concerned about 
including the international level into the analysis. Even here, however, the 
analysis has largely focused on the interaction between the EU and the 
international level in terms of specific policy outcomes. A prime example is the 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy in the 1990s, which would not have 
been possible (at least not at that point in time) without the external pressure 
generated by the Uruguay Round negotiations and, later, by the functioning of 
the WTO and in particular its strong and highly effective dispute settlement 
system (see for example Skogstad, 2001; Patterson, 1997). The theoretical 
contribution of this thesis is to combine these two elements by pointing at the 
structural impact of the international level on the European integration process. 
Not only can the interaction between the international and the European level 
influence specific policy outcomes, it can also impact on the division of 
competences within the EU. For this reason, the existing approaches to the study 
of European integration should be refined so that they can also account for 
competence shifts that originate in the interaction between the EU and the 
international level.
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7.2. To boldly go...? Limitations of the thesis.
This section offers a discussion of several important issues of methodology and 
theory. It also points to the limitations of the research. After all, the old dictum 
that “to choose is to lose” does not only refer to the essence of what the ‘dismal 
science’ is all about, but it also offers sound methodological advice. No matter 
how elaborate a theory, or how sophisticated a methodology, it will be 
impossible to incorporate every angle to look at a problem. Choosing a certain 
angle from which to study a subject entails an opportunity cost, namely not being 
able to use other angles to their fullest extent. This section discusses some of the 
repercussions of having chosen the particular angle that we have in 
this research. It also points out limitations of the research and it offers a defence 
of certain important choices of a methodological nature.
7.2.1. European integration as a zero-sum game between the Commission and 
the Member States
The relation between the European Commission and the Member States of the 
European Union, gathered in the Council of Ministers, has usually been at the 
core of the study of the European integration process. In recent years, there has 
been a gradual extension of the focus in European studies, a move that was long 
overdue, to pay more attention to other EU institutions as well, and to include 
them into the analysis. The most notable examples of this, that have already 
generated a substantial body of literature, are the Court of Justice (see for 
example Shapiro, 1991; Garrett, 1995; Neill, 1995; Chalmers, 2000) and the 
European Parliament (see for example Hix, Raunio and Scully, 2003; Rittberger, 
2003). These institutions too are often categorised as being supranational in 
nature and, hence -  since this aligns their interests -  as allies of the Commission. 
One of the consequences is that the somewhat discordant view of European 
integration as a zero-sum process between, on the one hand, the supranational
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institutions at the European level and, on the other hand, the Member States or 
the Council of Ministers, is maintained and even strengthened further. Inevitably, 
this way o f looking at the European integration process does ignore important 
dynamic factors at work (such as, for example, socialisation pressures) and it 
certainly minimises the role of other institutions and various regional and 
subnational actors. On the other hand, it offers the substantial advantage that it is 
intuitive, parsimonious and relatively easy to operationalise. As an additional 
advantage, this approach has a strong basis in theory and empirical research.
Theoretically, the tension between EC interests and national interests is at the 
core of the most influential approaches to explain the process of European 
integration. Usually, the Commission is portrayed as the chief defender of the EC 
interest and the Member States as defenders of their respective national interests. 
The main difference between intergovemmentalism and neofunctionalism relates 
to which side is more influential in determining policy outcomes, with 
intergovemmentalism stressing the primacy of the Member States and 
neofunctionalists attributing a more autonomous role to the Commission. As was 
discussed in some detail in chapter two, this divergence of interests between the 
Commission and the Member States is also at the core of the principal-agent 
approach, as applied to the European integration process. After all, if  the interests 
of the principal and agent were the same, there would be no reason for the agent 
to drift or to shirk, which would in turn make the establishment of any oversight 
mechanism by the principal superfluous.
Strong arguments for looking at the relationship between the Member States and 
the Commission in discordant terms also have a strong basis in practice, most 
notably in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ or the Court). 
There are a substantial number of cases initiated by the Commission against the 
Council, for example challenging certain Council decisions on competence 
grounds. Furthermore, among these cases are some of the more important rulings 
of the Court of Justice, certainly in the field of the Community’s external 
relations where many of the seminal cases were initiated by the Commission
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against the Council. One notorious example of such a case is the AETR-ruling 
(Case 22/70) (see Court of Justice, 1971). This ruling forms the basis of the 
ECJ’s implied powers doctrine and is thus a crucial building stone in extending 
the scope of the EC’s external (and exclusive!) competences. This case was 
initiated by the Commission against the Council and concerned the negotiation 
and conclusion by the Council of a European Agreement on Road Transport in 
the framework of the UN’s Economic Commission for Europe. The importance 
of the ruling lies in the fact that the Court decided that the EC can have external 
competences that are exclusive not because they are specifically attributed to the 
Community by the Treaty (such as the Common Commercial Policy in art. 133), 
but because they have become exclusive through internal Community action in 
that field. Opinion 1/76 is another erosion of the principle that exclusive 
Community competences can only be attributed to the EC by the Treaty (see 
Court of Justice, 1977). Again, it was the Commission that resorted to the ECJ to 
question the legality, i.e. the consistency with the Treaty, of an act of the 
Council. And there are numerous other such cases: Opinion 1/78, ruling C-25/94, 
Opinion 1/91, Opinion 2/94 and ruling 45/86 being only a few (yet very 
important) examples (see Court of Justice, 1979; 1996a; 1991; 1996b; 1987).
Some readers will undoubtedly point out that this first and foremost shows the 
importance of the role of the ECJ in the European integration process. That may 
be true, and the central position of the ECJ and its importance are certainly not 
put into question in this thesis. What is more important for the sake of the 
argument here, however, is that this record of jurisprudence shows the existence 
of a confrontational pattern in the international relations of the EC, where the 
Commission is often challenging an action of the Council before the Court.1 
Typically, the Commission claims the measure or decision at hand falls under the 
competence of the EC, so that the Commission should have had a much more 
prominent role in the negotiations and a more important input in the outcome.
1 And, by implication, where the Member States have wanted to shield off certain international 
agreements from EC and Commission involvement.
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Hence, within the framework of ‘competence issues’, the history of cases 
brought before the ECJ offers some support for the portrayal of Commission- 
Member State relations in discordant terms. Again, this is not a general statement 
about the nature of how the EU functions. It has been pointed out elsewhere that 
non-discordant mechanisms such as coordination, cooperation and socialisation 
effects, to name but a few (see for example Wallace, 2000; Kerremans, 1996; or, 
for a more general discussion: Haas, 1992), are often more accurate 
representations of inter-institutional relations in the EU or of Commission- 
Member State relations. The question of the division of competences, however, is 
much more delicate since it touches upon the core characteristic of a state: its 
sovereignty.
Another reason why the list of cases mentioned earlier is more informative 
regarding the role of the Commission rather than that of the ECJ is that asking 
the Court for an opinion or judgement is certainly no guarantee for success for 
the Commission. The clearest manifestation of this is probably the Court’s much- 
discussed and infamous Opinion 1/94. Furthermore, Alter and Meunier- 
Aitsahalia (1994) have shown rather convincingly that it is not necessarily the 
Court’s decision as such that impacts on the integration process, but that the 
political use and interpretation of the rulings afterwards is sometimes more 
important. The initiation of proceedings against the Council before the ECJ as 
well as the application of the Court’s rulings are thus highly politicised decisions. 
For this reason, the antagonism between the Commission and the Council (with 
the vast majority of Member States usually supporting the Council in the 
proceedings) in the case law of the European Court of Justice supports a 
discordant interpretation of Commission-Member State relations in the field of 
the EC’s external competences.
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7.2.2. What about ‘commitment’ as a delegation strategy?
Some readers might take issue with the application of the principal-agent theory 
to the study of the European integration process as it is presented in this thesis. In 
particular, the lack of variation within the concept of ‘delegation’ might prove a 
sticking point. This thesis takes a rather radical view of the principal-agent 
approach in that any deviation by the agent from the revealed preferences of the 
principal is considered as ‘shirking’ or ‘drifting’, i.e. an undesirable feature of 
delegation from the principal’s point of view. One could, however, argue that not 
every deviation between the actions, preferences, or even interests of the agent 
on the one hand, and the preferences or interests of the principal on the other 
hand, constitutes undesirable drift by the agent. A prime example of such a 
‘desired’ deviation within the context of the principal-agent approach would be 
the mechanism of commitment. A notorious and well-worn illustration of this 
mechanism in action is the independence of central banks, where the central 
government delegates responsibility for monetary policy to a conservative central 
banker. In this case, it is clear from the onset that the preferences of the principal 
and agent are quite likely to diverge substantially over the course of the 
economic and electoral cycle, yet this is exactly the reason why the decision to 
delegate is taken in the first place. This has been worked out in substantial detail 
by Kydland and Prescott in their seminal 1977 article, where they referred to this 
phenomenon as ‘dynamic inconsistency’ (see Prescott and Kydland, 1977).
This mechanism of commitment might seem to undermine the more discordant 
interpretation of the principal-agent dynamic as it was defended in the previous 
section. After all, the question arises whether the process of European integration 
cannot better be conceived of as an example of commitment rather than the harsh 
power struggle as it was depicted earlier. In this interpretation, the Member 
States would use the EU as a -  not fully controllable -  commitment mechanism 
to lock in certain policies (e.g. free trade or sustainable development).
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While introducing the mechanism of commitment is indeed promising and 
certainly does have its merits, there are two main arguments for sticking with the 
discordant view of European integration. Firstly, it should be conceded that the 
commitment mechanism is rather appealing and convincing, especially when 
applied to the early days of the integration process. Using the technique of 
commitment as a delegation strategy, however, requires further implementation 
measures, otherwise the principal risks giving too much leeway to the agent, 
which would be counterproductive (from the point of view of the principal). The 
independent central banker, for example, will find that the field of action in 
which she can exert her delegated powers is strictly defined. Therefore, this 
technique does not seem very well suited when the field of action is broad and 
not clearly defined. And this is exactly what seems to be the case when it comes 
to European integration. The integration process is not a straightforward, linear 
process of attribution of competences from the Member States (principals) to the 
EC/Commission (agent), certainly not regarding the external relations of the EU. 
A good example of this is the earlier mentioned implied powers doctrine of the 
ECJ (see cases 22/70 AETR and Opinion 1/78; Court of Justice, 1971; 1979). 
Commitment works as long as, and in so far as, the principal can define the limits 
of the delegation. Developments such as the emergence of the implied powers 
doctrine dent the capability of the principal to exert this overall control. 
Suddenly, the principal will find itself on the defensive, with the commitment 
mechanism backfiring because of the unwanted and unforeseen ‘spill-over’ from 
one issue area to the other.
Furthermore, such commitment would need to be executed or implemented in 
order to be put into practice. And this process would arguably still involve the 
antagonistic dynamics that were described earlier. After all, this is the moment 
when the discussions over the nitty-gritty details will come to the surface (what 
is included in the delegation and what not, what about closely related issues in 
other fields, etc.). It will be clear from the current state of the EU as well as from 
the history of European integration that the commitment -  if  such a relatively 
clear-cut and readily identifiable process took place in the first place -  was
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certainly not detailed enough to contain or prevent these discussions over 
competence. And in these circumstances, i.e. where the exact limitations of the 
division of competences are blurred, the discussions on the application and 
implementation of the commitment do take an adversarial form: the principal and 
agent clashing over specific competences.
7.2.3. Equating the Member States with the Council (using the Council as a 
proxy fo r  the revealed preference o f  the Member States)
Throughout this thesis, the Council has been equated with the Member States. 
The rationale for doing so has been discussed in detail in chapter one (pp. 26-29). 
The main argument, in a nutshell, is that the Council’s position represents the 
revealed preferences of a critical mass of Member States, all the more so since a 
study by Matilla and Lane (2001) has shown actual voting in the Council to be a 
relatively rare event, even after the switch from unanimity to qualified majority 
voting in many areas. There are two main disadvantages that derive from 
equating the Council with the Member States, both of which relate to the fact that 
this approach ignores certain dynamics within the Council that actually shape the 
preferences of the Member States.
The first such dynamic is socialisation. This concept was introduced in the early 
stages of the study of European integration to refer to the process whereby “the 
immediate participants in the policy-making process, from interest groups to 
bureaucrats and statesmen, begin to develop new perspectives, loyalties, and 
identifications as a result of their mutual interactions” (Lindberg and Scheingold, 
1970: p. 98). This is of particular relevance here since, according to Kerremans, 
“socialization is the most visible in the case of the councils” (Kerremans, 1996: 
p. 232). So much so to the point that “national affiliations are often thwarted by 
the affiliations with the council” (ibid.). Whether the process actually goes that 
far is debatable, but it is true that these interactions between the Member States’
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representatives are not directly taken into account in this thesis. If one were to 
study the dynamics behind the formation of the preferences of the individual 
countries (or of those of their representatives in the Council), the preferences of 
each Member State or of each representative would have to be examined. Within 
the context of this thesis, this is not feasible in terms of time or resources 
available. Nor would it be desirable to do so in the context of this study since that 
would move away from the core analysis of the thesis and arguably result in an 
idiosyncratic analysis that would lack a sufficiently general explanatory power. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that these socialisation effects are ignored 
altogether. They are, after all, reflected in the output of the Council. These effects 
are thus being taken into account indirectly (i.e. ex post) rather than that the 
dynamics of their genesis are analysed.
The second preference-shaping dynamic that occurs within the Council relates to 
the simultaneous games that are being played at the EU policy-level. There are 
constant interactions between national representatives in the context of different 
Councils. The repeated decision-making on the European level therefore forms 
the context of an iterated game, because of which interdependence between the 
participants is created. Because of the repeated nature of the game, a rational 
decision-maker will not only have to take the consequences of his choices for the 
current game into account, but also the consequences his choices now have for 
parallel and future games. On issues of relatively minor importance, for example, 
it might be worth appeasing the preferences of another actor to whom the issue at 
stake is important in order to build a stock of political capital or goodwill that 
could be used for forming a strategic coalition with regards to issues that are of 
greater importance. Or sometimes, certainly in a system of qualified majority 
voting, it could be worth giving up its resistance to an issue if  the alternative is 
becoming isolated and spending political capital without the chance of 
succeeding in obtaining the preferred policy outcome. This is in line with the 
concept of ‘coaptation’, which is central to Heisler’s and Kvavik’s European 
Polity Model (Heisler and Kvavik, 1974).
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Coaptation and socialisation are in fact very similar processes. In both cases, 
preferences are influenced and can be changed because of exogenous factors 
(social pressure in the case of socialisation, the iterated nature of the decision­
making game in the case of coaptation). This thesis does indeed to a large extent 
lose sight of the multiple trade-offs involved in the complex decision-making 
game that is being played by the national representatives at the EU level. 
However, it is nigh impossible to track all or even most inter-issue bargaining 
processes or to place decisions in the framework of certain package deals which 
they are part of. All the more so because national representatives do not tend to 
publicly announce why they cast their vote the way they did (or even how they 
voted at all, for that matter). The result of trying to map these games (and 
integrate them into the analysis) is therefore bound to be fraught with 
measurement problems and difficulties in gathering the necessary information.
To conclude, while equating the Council with the Member States might be only a 
second best option, the first best option turned out to be not always very 
practical. Using Council output as a proxy for the revealed preferences of the 
Member States has huge advantages in terms of transparency, operationalisation 
and measurement compared to a more detailed analysis of the processes that 
shape these outputs. It has to be bome in mind, however, that this is a pragmatic 
decision in order to create a benchmark to compare Commission influence 
against. This is not meant to ignore and even less so to negate that the situation in 
the EU is more complex and that the Commission in fact faces multiple or 
collective principals. This has an impact on the room for manoeuvre of the agent, 
of how much influence the agent can exert. For this reason, the preferences of 
certain individual Member States have also been taken into account in the 
specific case studies.
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7.2.4. Regarding the Commission as a unitary actor
It cannot be stressed often enough that the frequent use of the term ‘the 
Commission’ should not be misunderstood as to imply that the Commission is 
regarded as a unitary actor in this thesis. Coombes’ early and influential study of 
the Commission already pointed out the heterogeneity of interests that exists 
within this institution (Coombes, 1970). Ever since, scholars have come up with 
different catch phrases in attempts to describe the nature of the Commission in a 
single noun. Whether it is a ‘multi-organization’ (Cram, 1994) or a ‘bourse’ 
(Mazey and Richardson, 1995), all these terms try to catch the “distinctively 
hybrid” character of the institution (Peterson, 2002: p. 71) and the heterogeneity 
it houses. It would therefore be decidedly unwise to be in denial about the 
complexity of the structure of the Commission and the intra-institutional politics 
that ensue from this. In chapter four (particularly pp. 127-129; pp. 132-134), 
some attention is paid to the bureaucratic politics within the Commission in the 
context of the Commission’s position on the creation of a binding dispute 
settlement system in the WTO. And chapter six touches upon the same issue in 
the context of integrating environmental concerns into the trade regime (chapter 
six, p. 199).
On the other hand, it is equally important to keep the analysis sharply focussed. 
Conceptualising and operationalising a theoretical framework that integrates the 
different levels of decision-making (national, European and international) as well 
as dissecting the genesis of the outputs of the national and European levels is 
worth a thesis on its own. Some broad ideas for the establishment of such a 
theoretical framework will be given later, and avenues for further research will 
be indicated. Working this out in detail and providing a full-blown theoretical 
framework for understanding the EU’s external relations (including the 
interaction with the national and international level) lies outside the scope of this 
thesis. Furthermore, going too much into the intra-Commission politics would 
blur the bigger picture on which this thesis is focussing: the relation between the 
Commission and the Member States/Council. The intra-commission politics have
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been referred to in the analysis in places where they are highly relevant, for 
example for gaining a necessary understanding of certain policy changes.
7.2.5. Arch enemies or brothers-in-arms? Conflicting and aligned preferences o f 
the Commission and the Member States
An earlier section defended the decision to interpret the process of European 
integration in discordant terms in this thesis. However, that does not mean that 
the preferences and the interests of the Commission and the Member States are 
always diametrically opposed. These different actors can -  and regularly do -  
have broadly similar preferences. In many cases preferences are more or less 
aligned and the fact that this thesis (as most research) focuses almost exclusively 
on cases where preferences diverge should not be misread as implying that this 
would somehow be the only option. The reason why this thesis has focused 
mostly on cases where the preferences of the Commission and those of the 
Member States diverge is that these instances are often more informative because 
of this variance (which indicates that it is likely that there are influencing factors 
at play that only or more strongly affect one actor). In a more general sense, this 
also holds for the central argument of the thesis. Throughout the previous 
chapters, the focus has been almost exclusively on the external institutional 
setting and on showing that this can have an impact on Commission influence 
and on the European integration process. In the drive to make this argument as 
forcefully as possible, too little attention has been paid to other influencing 
factors. This is a good place to stress that this should not be taken to mean that 
the external institutional framework is the only -  or even the major -  factor 
determining the scope of the Commission's influence and the direction of the 
European integration process. Rather, this is an additional element that has often 
been ignored previously but that can help to explain a degree of the variation in 
the influence of the Commission.
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In this light, it should be noted that the reasons for countries to agree to be bound 
by and to create certain institutional frameworks have been examined to a 
considerable extent in the literature on legalisation (see for example Keohane, 
Moravcsik and Slaughter; Kahler; Goldstein et al\ Abbott et al; Goldstein and 
Martin, 2000). In an influential contribution to the study of legalisation, Abbott 
and Snidal (2000) examine why countries sometimes opt for soft law and in other 
cases for hard law. They distinguish between several dimensions, focusing on 
contracting and transaction cost theory as well as on normative considerations to 
explain why countries agree to make a particular set of institutional arrangements 
'harder' or 'softer'. Goldstein and Martin (2000) add to this that it is not only the 
anticipated consequences of a legal agreement (credible commitments, reduced 
transaction costs, transparency, political strategies, ...), or normative preferences 
for such agreements (the firm believe that law is 'good', usually derived from the 
notion that the rule of law is at the very basis of democratic societies) that make 
actors opt for legalisation. They also stress the impact of the preferences and 
calculations of domestic political actors on the shape of the agreement and the 
degree of legalisation.
From this it becomes clear that, when it comes to the legalisation of an 
international regime, there is much more scope for the preferences of the 
Commission and those of the Member States to be aligned than was mentioned in 
the previous chapters. One of Abbott and Snidal's hypotheses, for example, is 
that “[MJundane issues such as the availability of resources and trained personnel 
can be quite significant: the United States and other advanced industrial nations 
with large legal staffs should be more amenable to legalization than countries 
with few trained specialists” (Abbott and Snidal, 2000: p. 432). Clearly, this 
holds for the Commission as well as for the individual EU Member States. The 
same authors also note that “legalization provides actors with a means to 
instantiate normative values” (id.: p. 422). This also entails that sometimes the 
preferences of the Commission and the Member States are aligned.
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In short, it is very likely that the Commission has a preference for (hard) 
legalisation because it supports the process of legalisation in general, in line with 
the general arguments put forward in the legalisation literature (see earlier). 
Furthermore, as was discussed in the previous paragraph, in these cases the 
preferences of the Commission and the Member States would be similar in that 
they would both be expected to support legalisation, for example, on normative 
grounds. The question then arises if  and how this is compatible with one of the 
arguments developed in this thesis, namely that one of the reasons why the 
Commission supports legalisation is that this process strengthens its position vis- 
a-vis the Member States and increases its influence. In fact, it is perfectly 
possible to acknowledge the findings of the legalisation literature and at the same 
time uphold the argument that the Commission's preference for legalisation is at 
least partly because this increases its influence. The reason is that this thesis has 
mostly focussed on cases where there the preferences of the main actors 
diverged. As explained earlier in this section, such a narrow focus offers 
advantages and disadvantages. One of the advantages is that this setting better 
allows for measuring the potential impact of differences in the external 
institutional framework on Commission-Member State relations. The 
disadvantage is that, often, not enough attention has been paid to the wider 
context. In this case that refers to the fact that there are, of course, also other 
factors that influence and shape the Commission's preference for legalisation (as 
identified in the legalisation literature). These elements, however, should equally 
shape the preferences of the Member States and many of the factors identified in 
the legalisation literature can therefore not account for divergence between the 
Commission's and the Member States' preferences when it comes to legalisation. 
The argument that the Commission sometimes prefers to strengthen an external 
institutional framework because this can increase its influence, also domestically, 
can help to explain these cases where there are diverging preferences. This does 
not ignore or negate the findings of the broader legalisation literature, but 
complements them in a specific application of this literature.
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7.2.6. The (unreliability o f empirical sources
Since a relative increase in or decline of influence and/or competence for the 
Commission almost necessarily entails a corresponding decline or increase in the 
influence of the Member States, this thesis has mostly focussed on the 
Commission and taken this institution as its point of reference. As a 
consequence, the largest group of practitioners interviewed are Commission 
officials. They represent half of all the people interviewed for this thesis. At first 
sight, this could raise a fundamental question regarding the quality of the 
information gathered from these interviews. After all, how could we trust these 
Commission officials not to exaggerate their own role? As an example, we could 
refer to the tendency of international trade negotiators to overestimate their 
importance and their impact on the final deal that is reached (see for example 
Meunier, 2005: p. 46-47). Why could a similar process not be at work here? And 
can we still consider the interview material to be trustworthy if  their content is 
not extensively cross-checked with outside parties?
While extensive cross-checking would indeed have been the ideal solution, this 
has usually not proven feasible for many reasons, not least importantly the fact 
that almost all members of the 133-committee contacted refused the request for 
an interview. There are, nonetheless, at least three reasons to be optimistic about 
the truthfulness and reliability of the interview material. First o f all, for one trade 
case study, the tax disputes discussed in chapter three, there has been a cross­
check, albeit a limited one, only concerning officials from one of the four 
Member States that were involved. Furthermore, one trade official that has been 
interviewed was at the time of the interview temporarily seconded to the 
Commission from the UK civil service. Since this secondment was only for a 
duration of two years, this official had no obvious interest in exaggerating the 
role of the Commission. Any socialisation effect would also be expected to be 
fairly limited given the relatively short period of time spent in the Commission. 
Specifically regarding the case study of the Montreal Protocol in chapter six, an 
official from a Member State -  the UK -  who was very closely involved in the
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creation and functioning of the agreement has been interviewed in order to cross­
check the statements of the Commission official interviewed. In a similar vein, it 
should be noted that one interviewee is in fact an ex-Commission official, but is 
currently working as a judge at the European Court of Justice. This would thus 
give him few incentives to exaggerate the role of the Commission. On the 
contrary, given his supposed loyalty to another institution, and given the 
delicateness of many of the issues at stake and their tendency to eventually end 
up before the ECJ, one would expect him to have a more detached view. The fact 
that none of these checks has contradicted the core statements of the Commission 
officials interviewed, while not being a guarantee that these officials did not 
exaggerate their roles in other cases, should nonetheless raise the expectation that 
there is a good possibility that this was not the case.
Secondly, there is some variation within the Commission officials that have been 
interviewed. Especially regarding the trade case studies, the interviews were not 
limited to DG Trade officials, but were extended to people from the Legal 
Service as well. The latter have no apparent reason to exaggerate the role of the 
former, especially regarding issues that cannot have an impact on the division of 
tasks between them anyway. For example, while the officials from the Legal 
Service are very well informed about the relations between DG Trade and the 
133-committee, they still have no incentive to favour one or the other since it 
does not really impact on them who does the preparatory work. Thirdly, and 
probably most importantly, all interviews have been conducted independently of 
one another, yet all interviews relating to the same topics pointed very clearly in 
the same direction. Although this is certainly no irrefutable evidence that the 
officials interviewed have not exaggerated their role, it would nonetheless seem 
to suggest that it is plausible that the interview results do, to a large extent, 
reflect a balanced and truthful view of the situation. It would be a fruitful avenue 
for further research or for projects on a bigger scale and with more means at their 
disposition than a PhD research project, to extend the analysis more directly to 
the Member States and their representatives, thereby providing a more rigorous 
cross-check. In the absence of that, however, the partial checks and balances
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provided by the measures that were described above will have to fulfil that task 
in this thesis.
7.2.7. The limits o f a multidisciplinary thesis
When it comes to the study of the position of the EC on the international stage, 
and particularly of the position of the EC in the international trading system since 
1995, it is the legal scholars that have generated the vast majority of research 
articles and monographs. For lawyers, the complex relationship between EC law 
and international trade law, and the role of the EC in the GATT/WTO, has 
always been a point of intense discussion (Hilf, Jacobs and Petersmann, 1986). 
Because of the legalistic nature of the new WTO dispute settlement system, 
lawyers were also among the first to investigate its impact on the EC (Bourgeois, 
1995; O’Keeffe and Emiliou, 1996; Cottier, 1998). After the European Court of 
Justice’s infamous Opinion 1/94 on the division of competences between the EC 
and the Member States with regards to the WTO subject matter, this debate only 
intensified. In short, the study of the role of the EC in the WTO is heavily 
dominated by legal scholars. It is only relatively recently that the attention of 
political scientists and international relations scholars studying the EU has turned 
to this issue area. There is an increasing amount of literature on the EC’s role in 
the international trade system in general (Woolcock, 2000), the internal aspects 
of its negotiating position in the WTO (Meunier and Nicolai'dis, 1999), and its 
performance in the settlement of international trade disputes (Young, 2003a), 
often with a focus on its implementation record (Neyer, 2004).
While any discussion of the EC’s international position is bound to be inherently 
multidisciplinary, the focus of this thesis -  in terms of its interpretation of the 
empirical evidence as well as its choice of methodology and theory -  is primarily 
political. The main aspiration of this thesis is to make a contribution to filling the 
hiatus that exists in political science/international relations literature on the 
international position of the EC (a gap that, ironically, is probably most
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pronounced when looking at international trade issues) and to approach this issue 
from the perspective of its contribution to and implications for European 
integration. The analysis needs to have a firm ground in the legal literature and a 
good grasp of the economic sensitivities involved. Ultimately, however, this 
thesis has looked at the topic studied through the telescope of political science, 
and the microscope of the European integration literature. These approaches 
therefore provide the ultimate grounds on which the thesis should be judged.
In conclusion, all methodologies offer benefits and costs. The comments and 
remarks in this section recognise this, and pointed out that the approaches used in 
this thesis also have certain opportunity costs in that they exclude other 
viewpoints from being fully taken into account. However, this section also 
offered a sturdy defence of the approach followed. After all, no methodology is 
perfect and it was argued here that the benefits of the methods chosen outweigh 
their costs.
7.3. Theoretical repercussions: towards a more coherent framework for 
understanding the EC as an international actor
7.3.1. The principal-agent approach as an integration ‘theory’
The application of the principal-agent approach to the study of European 
integration has arguably been one of the more inspiring moments for the 
theoretical development of European Studies since the 1960s. The reason for this 
is that this approach is ideally placed for accommodating the complexity of the 
European actors and, indeed, the complexity of the EU itself. Dealing with this 
unprecedented bout of international integration or cooperation (depending on 
your view of the finality of the EU) has always generated substantial problems 
for any attempt at theorising the dynamics of this process. The sheer vagueness 
of the functions and aims of the European construction, combined with differing
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views on its rationale and end-goal rapidly led to the well-known schism in 
integration theory between intergovemmentalism and neofunctionalism. For 
decades, theories seeking to explain (parts of) the European integration process 
were cast in one of these two moulds. The appeal and importance of the 
principal-agent approach derives from its ability to combine the strong points of 
both intergovemmentalism and neofunctionalism, while avoiding most of their 
pitfalls. This approach can acknowledge the (initial) primacy of the Member 
States without denying the supranational institutions any meaningful independent 
role. Or it can point out how the supranational institutions play a role in shaping 
policy outcomes without implying that sovereignty has become obsolete.
Also on a lower level, it is very appealing to use the principal-agent model as an 
integration ‘theory’ because it is often easier to operationalise than its more 
traditional theoretical counterparts. The role of agent, for example, fits the 
Commission like a glove. It allows for flexibility in interpreting the 
Commission’s actions, in that it acknowledges that these actions are not only the 
result of the Commission’s own preferences, but also of the institutional 
framework and the terms of reference (i.e. the mandate and leeway it was given 
by the principal). Furthermore, and this is important in the light of the findings in 
the literature on the Commission, the principal-agent theory does not necessarily 
focus solely on the final outcome or the revealed preferences of the Commission. 
The decision to do exactly that in this thesis was based on methodological 
grounds, but the principal-agent approach can also be integrated with 
bureaucratic politics-theories of the functioning of the Commission to come to a 
more complete framework for understanding the dynamics of the EU (see 
Pollack, 2003). This not only allows for incorporating intra-Commission politics 
in the more traditional, bureaucratic sense (units competing with each other, 
directorates defending their own turf, directorate-generals fighting each other 
because of conflicting interests, etc.), but it also allows for capturing the 
horizontal divide that runs through the Commission. This refers to the dual 
function of the Commission as a technocratic body and as a political one, as a 
bureaucracy and as an executive. While its technocratic functions might be more
243
intuitively linked to the role of the Commission as agent, the political levels of 
the Commission’s hierarchy are very influential in determining the revealed 
preferences of this institution and they are thus an integral part of the 
conceptualisation of the Commission as an agent. Note that this not only refers to 
the ultimate level of political decision-making, i.e. the College of 
Commissioners, but also to the politicised higher levels of every DG separately.
At the same time, this touches upon a weakness of the principal-agent approach. 
Like most other well-developed theoretical approaches for explaining the 
European integration process, it seems to have an inward-looking bias. On the 
one hand this could be seen as a natural or logical consequence of the unique 
nature of the creation and functioning of the EU. While the broader aims and 
impulses of European cooperation have usually been described in rather general 
terms, placing these events in their historical setting and connecting them to the 
international context (see for example Dinan, 1999, particularly part 1), the 
dynamics of the integration process itself, however, have mostly been explained 
by referring to very specific internal policy developments. Such research projects 
have made an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the evolution of 
the integration process and they have paved the way for the emergence of more 
complete theoretical frameworks, such as the principal-agent approach. On the 
other hand, however, such introvert approaches miss significant aspects of the 
dynamics and development of an increasingly important part of the EU’s 
policies: its external relations and their impact -  through implementation and 
execution of international agreements -  on internal competences. There is thus a 
clear need for making some adjustments to the principal-agent approach to allow 
for the inclusion of this external dimension, certainly in light of the EU’s position 
in an ever increasing globalised policy environment. The result will be a more 
coherent framework for gaining a better understanding of the European 
integration process, also when it comes to external relations and external 
policies.
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7.3.2. Theorising the external dimension
Theoretical approaches to international relations have long struggled with 
conceptualising the relationship between the level of the state and the 
international level. According to one of the most influential neo-realist thinkers, 
the behaviour of states in international settings was influenced, even determined, 
by the structure of the international system (Waltz, 1979). One of the central 
assumptions of this neo-realist ‘billiard ball’-approach (the presumption that 
states are unitary actors) quickly came under fire, mainly from scholars in the 
foreign policy analysis school. They focussed instead on the diversity and the 
structure of the domestic level (see for example Jervis, 1976; Steinbrunner, 1974; 
Brecher, 1972; Brecher, 1975).2 They even went so far in their criticism of the 
neo-realist approach that they ignored the international context altogether and 
explained states’ international relations purely by looking at their domestic 
politics. At the end of the 1970s, Gourevitch tried to bridge the divide by 
‘reversing’ this ‘second image’-school of thought and by stressing the need to 
tackle the domestic and the international system together (Gourevitch, 1978). 
The important contribution of this article was the insight that the domestic and 
the international level are intrinsically connected and should therefore not be 
separated. Nevertheless, even Gourevitch was still looking for a causal relation, 
wanting to explain the actions at one level in terms of what happened at the other 
level.
Putnam reacts against this. In a seminal article, published in the late 1980s, he 
introduced the concept of the ‘two-level game’ to put in place a basic framework 
for understanding the outcome of international negotiations (Putnam, 1988). His 
aim is to come to a ‘general equilibrium’ theory of international negotiations that 
accounts “simultaneously for the interaction of domestic and international 
factors” (Putnam, 1988: p. 430). These ideas were subsequently refined and
2 This was Waltz’s ‘second’ level, between the international system and the individual decision­
maker. This is the reason why this strand of literature is often referred to as the ‘second image’- 
approach.
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elaborated (Evans et al, 1993) and built upon to come to a more general theory of 
international cooperation (Milner, 1997). Specifically for scholars of European 
Studies, however, the timing of the publication of these important theoretical 
insights could hardly have been worse. The Single European Act was signed in 
1986, introducing the ‘Europe 1992’-programme with the aim to establish a 
Single Market by that date. Furthermore, the beginning of the 1990s saw a 
rekindling of the battle between neofunctionalism and intergovemmentalism over 
their claim to be the pre-eminent theoretical framework for approaching and 
understanding European integration (see Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; 
Moravcsik, 1991). The result was that the focus of EU scholars was again mostly 
inward looking, pinned down on the policy dynamics of the Single Market 
project and the question whether the integration process is inherently 
supranational or intergovernmental in nature. In that light, it is interesting to note 
that many of the most influential books and articles about the EC’s and the 
Commission’s role in the Uruguay Round negotiations, the most encompassing 
round of trade negotiations ever conducted, only started to appear from the late- 
1990s onwards (see for example, Vahl, 1997; Meunier and Nicolaidis, 1999; 
Meunier, 2005). At the moment, the international relations of the EC are again an 
important centre of attention in EU studies (see Meunier, 2005; Young, 2002). 
Some reflections on how the findings of this thesis can contribute to the 
formulation of a more coherent and complete integration theory are therefore 
welcome.
There are two major obstacles to developing a theoretical framework for 
interpreting and understanding the EC’s external relations. The first is the lack of 
continuity in those relations. The sheer variation in the EC’s international 
position becomes clear from comparing its role under the provisions of the 
Common Commercial Policy or the Common Fisheries Policy to that under the 
provisions of the EC’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). As recent 
events, such as the discord over the Iraq war in 2003, have yet again confirmed, 
there is often not much ‘common’ to the CFSP. That is not to say that there is no 
movement toward a stronger CFSP. From Maastricht onwards, the EU’s foreign
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policy arm has been continually adjusted and strengthened. This hard-fought 
unity, however, has a tendency to evaporate in the light of concrete challenges 
where specific national interests are at play. Also in other fields, the external 
relations of the Community are shrouded in uncertainty because they have not 
been codified and have developed or are developing in an ad hoc manner. The 
genesis of the EC’s role and competences in international environmental issues 
that was discussed in chapter six is a good example of this. The second big 
obstacle is the complex and sui generis nature of the entity that is the EU. The 
EU is unlike any other player known on the international stage. Wallace’s quote 
of the EC as “more than a regime, less than a state” (Wallace, 1983) might be 
well-worn by now, but it still captures the ambiguity of the EC as an 
international player very well.
Several authors have tried to tackle the latter problem by adjusting Putnam’s two 
level game. The EU’s external relations, so the argument goes, should in fact be 
seen as two overlapping two level games being played. In one, the Member 
States make up the domestic level and the EU is the international one. In the 
other one, the EU becomes the domestic level and the external organisation or 
agreement becomes the international level (see Young, 2002; 2003: p. 55; 
Jolstad, 1997). The result is a three-level game with a domestic level, a 
supranational level, and an international level (see Moyer, 1993; Patterson, 1997; 
Collinson, 1999; Meunier, 2000). This three-level game framework is remarkable 
because it has the potential of developing into an overarching, encompassing 
theoretical framework for understanding European integration. The reason is that 
it not only highlights the interactions between the different levels, but that it can 
also be merged or integrated with other theories in the ‘second image’-mould that 
focus on the internal dynamics of the national and/or supranational level. Many 
theories of and approaches to European integration have concentrated on the 
national and supranational level and their interrelations. Also the traditional 
integration theories can be understood in this way. In such an interpretation, 
intergovemmentalists stress the importance of the national level, 
neofimctionalists point out the central role of the supranational level and new-
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institutionalists (as described in chapter one) pay attention to the interactions 
between these two levels.
7.3.3. The external relations o f the EU and European integration
The main theoretical contribution of this thesis has been to refine one of the most 
successful frameworks for interpreting the European integration process: the 
principal-agent analysis. The starting point was the observation that the 
traditional integration theories, including the principal-agent approach, are too 
inward-looking to be successfully applied to the study of the rise of the EC as an 
international actor. On the other hand, as discussed in the previous section, there 
is an extensive literature that draws on the two-level game framework in order to 
come to a better understanding of how the EC behaves in international settings. 
The chief importance of this strand of literature is the acceptance that the second 
-  or, in the case of the EC’s external relations, the third -  level also has an 
impact on the choices that are made at the domestic level. These two or three 
level game approaches have originally been developed in order to better 
understand the outcomes of international negotiations (Putnam, 1988; Evans et 
al., 1993). The result is that most of these studies, in determining the influencing 
factors on the international level, still very much focus on the dynamics and 
strategic interactions between the negotiators (exploiting and/or influencing each 
other’s win-set, reducing informational advantages, etc.). Also regarding the 
study of the EC’s external relations, all too often the analysis of the third level 
has remained restricted to saying that ‘it mattered’ or else it has tended to focus 
on the interaction between the negotiating parties, on systemic or on issue 
specific elements.
3 Even the much-hyped and fast growing literature on ‘Europeanization’ (see Featherstone and 
Raedelli, 2003), which deals with the impact supranational policy-making and policy-outcomes 
have on the national level, does not really spell out clear conditions, even though some studies are 
moving some way towards a more formal approach (see in particular Jordan and Liefferink, 
2004).
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This thesis has tried to reconcile (important elements of) the two strands of 
literature that were discussed in the previous paragraph by pointing out the 
impact of the external institutional framework on the domestic level. After all, 
institutions matter, and the institutional framework of the international 
organisation can have an important impact on the win-set of the Commission in 
its domestic game with the Member States. In other words, the external 
institutional setting is also an element in determining how much leeway the 
Commission enjoys to drift from the preferences of the principal(s). Two very 
different conclusions can be deduced from this insight. On the one hand, the 
identification of a very specific variable (the external institutional framework) 
helps to operationalise the two/three-level game approach. It should be noted, 
however, that this does certainly not mean that other factors are deemed to be 
irrelevant. In its drive to convince the reader that the external institutional 
framework is an important influencing factor, the thesis has undoubtedly paid too 
little attention to, or maybe even ignored, other more widely used influencing 
variables. A good example can be the more systemic characteristics of the 
workings of multilateral trade negotiations, the dynamics between negotiators, or 
even issue-specific elements. This should not be interpreted as a statement that 
such variables are deemed to be superfluous or irrelevant. The opposite is true. 
The external institutional framework is of course but one of several key 
influencing variables. The stress has been heavily on this particular element, 
however, because it was the task of this thesis to prove the validity and relevance 
of this influencing factor. On the other hand -  and on a different level -  this is a 
contribution to turning the principal-agent approach into a more complete 
framework for understanding the general process of European integration. It does 
so by widening the scope and the explanatory power of this theoretical paradigm.
Because of interaction effects, tinkering with one variable will not statically shift 
the equilibrium point. Instead, this happens in a dynamic process, bouncing back 
and forth until an equilibrium point is reached. The short overview, earlier in this 
section, of the competing interpretations over which level is more important in 
determining international relations shows that it is not fruitful to look for a
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simple causal relationship. Instead, international relations only derive their 
meaning and dynamics from the constant interaction of these different levels. It 
is, of course, impossible for any article that deals with the EU to take all levels 
and their interactions into account. However, the research should still be placed 
within the wider framework of the multi-level game that is being played if it is to 
avoid the mistakes and weaknesses of some of the earlier approaches. For this 
reason, integrating the principal-agent approach within the context of the three- 
level game greatly enhances the scope for its application. Like most traditional 
integration theories, the principal-agent approach (as applied to the study of the 
EU) mainly focuses on the national and supranational level and their interactions. 
This thesis has tried to shift the angle to the international and supranational level 
and it was shown how the provisions and characteristics of the international level 
can impact on the lower levels by influencing the discretion, the scope for 
shirking, that the Commission enjoys vis-a-vis the Member States. The 
importance of this is the conclusion that the principal-agent approach can also be 
a good framework for understanding the European integration process when it 
comes to the EC’s complicated external relations, as long as the interactions 
between the international and the supranational level are taken into account.
7.4. Policy repercussions
In the previous chapters, several claims have been put forward regarding the 
interaction between the national, European and international level. This section 
explores some practical aspects, i.e. policy repercussions, o f the findings of the 
thesis. What are the possible consequences and implications of the explanations 
that this thesis offered? If the interpretations that were presented over the course 
of the previous chapters hold some truth, what does it entail for other policy 
areas? And what effect does the predicted strategy of the European actors on the 
international stage have for the international institutions and organisations? Some 
of these questions are tackled here. This section looks beyond the points that the
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thesis set out to prove and gives a glimpse of how these findings impact on and 
shape the real world.
Issues to do with the repercussions of the findings of the thesis regarding the role 
and position of the EU and the Commission in international organisations are 
discussed later, when topics for further research are identified. Another important 
set of questions, which is tackled here, concerns the repercussions of the 
strategies and actions of the Commission for the international organisations 
themselves. Within the context of WTO negotiations, for example, the 
institutional interpretation put forward in this thesis would predict that the EC 
would have a preference for broad negotiation rounds and that this is not likely to 
change any time soon. On the one hand, there are some internal reasons for this. 
Most notably the difficulties involved in reaching a common position with 15 or 
25 Member States. In principle, a qualified majority of Member States suffices to 
approve a negotiating mandate. A negotiating mandate covering many topics is 
therefore much more likely to accommodate the interests of a sufficiently large 
group of Member States. In practice, unanimity among the Member States is 
desirable in order not to undermine the negotiating position of the Commission 
from the outset. However, it follows from the findings of the thesis that the 
Commission itself will also have a preference for broad negotiation rounds. This 
will allow it to include issues over which it would like to gain influence within 
the strong institutional framework of the WTO. Examples of this strategy that 
were discussed in this thesis are the Commission’s attempts to include the topics 
of investment and environment into the WTO-framework.
These strategies are induced by elements that are exogenous from the WTO’s 
point of view. However, they carry a clear danger for the WTO, in that 
repeatedly and consistently overloading trade negotiation rounds might pose a 
threat to the effectiveness of the organisation. The events of the past couple of 
years, and the last three Ministerial Meetings (Seattle, Doha and Cancun) in 
particular, already seem to point in that direction. Some groups of developing 
and transition countries have become disillusioned by the lack of results of
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previous (broad) negotiation rounds and insist the ‘left-over’ issues from those 
rounds (and not in the least the full implementation of previous agreements) are 
dealt with first before moving on to talk about other ones. This is at least partially 
responsible for the many deadlocks and the difficult progress in the current round 
of negotiations (the Doha-round). Ironically, the danger in the ‘natural’ strategy 
of the Commission to favour broad negotiation rounds is that it undermines the 
opportunities that the WTO has to offer to the Commission. Again, the cases of 
the Singapore issues and the relationship between trade and environment can be 
referred to as examples. Most of the Singapore issues -  including investment, 
which the Commission was so keen to include -  are now unambiguously dead 
and buried in the ongoing negotiations. This is also the case for the discussions 
about the relationship between trade and environment within the WTO. Robin 
Ratchford referred to the discussions on this issue as “clinically dead” (interview 
with Robin Ratchford). While the committee still meets at regular intervals, its 
reports are limited to summarising the discussions and the different viewpoints of 
the WTO members, without any decisions being made or suggestions put 
forward (see for example WTO, 2003). Therefore it does indeed seem fair to say 
that the activities of the Trade and Environment Committee are effectively put on 
hold. In conclusion, on the one hand the EC in general, and the Commission in 
particular, has an incentive to try and introduce new issues into the WTO. On the 
other hand, however, there is a risk of overburdening the institutional capacity of 
the WTO, thereby undermining the effectiveness of this strategy in the first 
place.
The fact that the rationale for the EC to opt for broad negotiation rounds is 
largely internal, means that it will be much more difficult for the EC to adjust 
this strategy in order to prevent the WTO from losing credibility as an effective 
and inclusive forum. It also means that interpretations and criticisms of the EC’s 
drive to incorporate new issues into the WTO as being solely aimed at being used 
as trade-offs or bargaining chips in order to protect its agricultural interests are 
too cynical. These interpretations, while they might very well contain some 
degree of accuracy, ignore some of the internal forces driving the EC and the
252
Commission (as the EC negotiator). This matters since it indicates that possible 
alternative package deals, which might make everyone better off, are not being 
explored seriously enough. This misunderstanding about the driving forces of the 
EC could also prove important in the scenario where a crisis caused by the 
overburdening of the WTO has to be handled. It is very hard to find to a solution 
to a problem if the perception of the causes of the problem diverge.
An example of the possible difficulties that could be caused if  negotiating parties 
at the international level ignore the internal dynamics of the EC is to be found in 
the negotiations over the Montreal Protocol (see chapter six). After the 
transformation of the Montreal Protocol into EC legislation, the Commission 
(prodded by the European Parliament) was pushing very hard for more stringent 
criteria to tackle CFC emissions (see Jachtenfuchs, 1990). The EC was so keen 
on taking the lead on tackling climate change that it adopted legislation that even 
went beyond what was required by the Montreal Protocol. In his book on the 
Montreal Protocol and its negotiations, the chief US negotiator, Richard 
Benedick, brushes this EC activism off as being an attempt in trying to outdo the 
US -  the real leader in the creation of the Montreal Protocol (Benedick, 1991). 
The reason why this is regarded as such a cynical move by the EC, and why the 
Commission is frowned upon by Benedick is the implementation deficit in the 
EC. It is very easy for the Commission to claim the moral and rhetorical high 
ground by proposing farther-ranging measures, so the argument goes, because it 
will not have to bear the cost. This is because the responsibility for 
implementation lies with the Member States and is not easily enforceable. A 
country like the US, on the other hand, cannot hide behind such an 
implementation gap and has to bear the full cost of these expensive promises. 
Again, this misses an important aspect of how the EC functions. The 
Commission will want to push for these more stringent measures, not only to 
claim the moral high ground, but also to make the issue as technical as possible 
and to draw it as much as possible into its sphere of expertise and competence. 
This will make it easier for the Commission to act on behalf of the EC in other 
parts of the negotiations, where it would have found it difficult to do so without
253
this linkage. This example illustrates the importance of a good understanding of 
the internal motives for the EC’s position in international negotiations so as to 
avoid, for example, unnecessary tensions and misunderstandings between the 
negotiators.
Ultimately, the source of these tensions is the open-ended nature of the EU as a 
political system. This allows for many views on the dynamics of the European 
integration process. Eurosceptic tabloids often see it as a cynical struggle 
between, on the one hand, a power-hungry Commission that is intent on 
establishing a ‘European super-state’ in which it would wield disproportionate 
power and, on the other hand, states that are jealously guarding their sovereignty, 
having become increasingly weary about losing any more of their powers to 
unelected Brussels bureaucrats. Other sources more sympathetic to the idea of 
European integration will point out that increased cooperation between European 
countries is necessary in order for them to remain meaningful players in a game 
that is becoming increasingly global in scope. The transfer of sovereignty to 
supranational institutions, such as the Commission, is the price you pay for 
making these arrangements binding and more effective. What these views do 
have in common is the fact that they can both be made simultaneously because of 
the open-ended nature, the lack of a stated political end-goal of the European 
integration process. The fact that the question ‘Quo vadis the EU?’ is -  and for 
the foreseeable future will probably remain -  unanswered, means that it is 
politically very difficult to agree on any codification of the division of 
competences between the European and the national level.
The absence of such a framework gives the Commission an incentive to shirk. 
The result is a lack of direction, i.e. the limits of European integration will be ad 
hoc and more difficult to foresee. This is in turn closely related to what was 
coined the ‘capability-expectations gap’ (Hill, 1993). If the Commission has an 
incentive to shirk, and if there is no overarching framework governing the 
division of competences to manage this, then there is an inherent risk that the 
Commission will, at a certain point, become overstretched. This would
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undermine its credibility and the effectiveness of its role as external 
representative of the EU. This poses a problem for the Commission as well as for 
the Member States if competences have become entrenched by then. That is, if 
the Commission has become the default policy centre, or better: centre of 
expertise, in a particular area. In such cases, there is usually a decline in the 
expertise/experience the Member States retain in these areas since it would make 
more sense for them to use their scarce resources in other areas where they could 
have more of an impact. An example of an issue area where this process seems to 
have taken place is trade. Because of the strong and established position the 
Commission enjoys in this area, the national officials dealing with this issue tend 
not to be as experienced as their Commission counterparts (interview with Lothar 
Ehring and Soren Schonberg). The result is that the Member States rely heavily 
on the Commission. Overstretching of the Commission’s resources would be 
particularly damaging in those issue areas where competences are entrenched 
since the Member States would not be able to take over some functions of the 
Commission here.
7.5. Broader questions deriving from the thesis and avenues for further 
research
This chapter started off by giving a brief summary of the main argument of the 
thesis. It then offered some clarifications on methodology and pointed out the 
limitations of the research, before moving on to discuss how the findings of the 
thesis contribute to the enhancement of our understanding of the European 
integration process. The previous section went slightly off the academic track to 
reflect on some policy repercussions. This leaves one question unanswered and 
that question is, as the -  unfortunately -  fictitious President Bartlet likes to put it: 
“What’s next?”. The end of a thesis is a place that should encourage the author to 
move on. But in order to do so, it is important to map out some possible roads to 
which the thesis might lead. This means identifying the core questions that 
remain unanswered, identifying new questions that are raised by the findings of
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the research, and pointing out elements that need to be examined in more detail. 
This section sets out to map some of these avenues for further research.
The central research finding of this thesis was that the Commission is in a 
stronger position to shirk domestically, i.e. vis-a-vis the Member States, if  the 
institutional framework of the international regime is more rules-based. Chapter 
two introduced the major driving forces behind this process: the need for 
technical expertise, the importance of experience and the economic benefits of 
being a ‘big’ country. These are all fundamental factors that favour action by the 
Commission in rules-based systems. The problem is that the situation can differ 
quite substantially from one issue area to another. Often, this variation originates 
from the complexity of the EU. The differences in the competence base of the 
external powers of the EU in different areas or in closely related areas, for 
example, can make it difficult to compare two sets of cases. This, in turn, renders 
distinguishing between facilitating factors (that make shirking by the 
Commission easier) and structural factors (enabling the Commission to shirk in 
the first place) much more difficult. To complicate matters further, there are also 
substantial differences between issue areas on the international level. This was 
clearly illustrated by the fundamentally different way of tackling disputes within 
the World Trade Organisation compared to environmental agreements. 
Environmental regimes generally rely on soft approaches, whereas it is the hard 
approach that is prevalent in the trade regime (OECD, 1998). More research on 
the impact of the institutional provisions on Commission-Member State relations 
in more areas of international cooperation is therefore needed to better map out 
and further refine the conditions under which the possibilities for the 
Commission to shirk increase.
More research into different areas of the EU’s external relations is also needed 
for another reason. While the Commission’s negotiating efforts to incorporate 
environmental concerns into the trade regime was discussed extensively in 
chapter six, the Commission does not seem to be limiting itself to the WTO 
negotiations to try and achieve its goal. There are indications that it is actively
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making linkages between different forms and forums of international 
cooperation. One case in point is the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, where the 
Commission played a pivotal role in working out and pushing through the 
inclusion of the precautionary principle in the text. Earlier, it was exactly this 
principle that proved the major sticking point in the contentious Beef Hormones 
case in the framework of the WTO. Here, the Appellate Body rejected the 
Commission’s use of the precautionary principle. By integrating it within other, 
softer, international agreements, the Commission was actually supporting its 
claim that this principle is a “full-fledged and general principle of international 
law” as it had already argued in its Communication on the precautionary 
principle (Commission, 2000a: p. 10). This looks like a devious way of trying to 
incorporate this principle into the legal framework of the WTO through the 
backdoor. Also on a general level, Falkner has pointed out that “[T]he EU’s 
position has been strengthened by the Protocol: while the Treaty does not add 
significantly to the EU’s existing regulatory system, it does provide it with 
greater international legitimacy” (Falkner, 2000: p.313). Such cross-fertilisation 
and inventive use of different forums by the Commission to bring about linkages 
between different areas makes it all the more important for more research to be 
done so as to be able to better map these efforts.
The need for more research into other areas of international cooperation becomes 
even more pronounced when the Commission’s drive for profiling itself on the 
international stage is considered. Over the course of the past couple of years, the 
Commission seems to have found renewed energy to start an offensive for 
gaining a more prominent role in various international organisations. In 
September 2003, for example, the Commission tried to seize upon the SARS- 
epidemic in South-East Asia to strengthen its role in the World Health 
Organisation, an organisation to which it only has observer status. A 
Commission press release states that “The European Commission is calling for 
the EU to play a central role in World Health Organisation (WHO) negotiations 
to reinforce international rules on the control of infectious diseases and other 
health threats” (Commission, 2003b: p. 1). In chapter six, the Commission’s
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attempts to play a more important role in international environmental 
negotiations were interpreted as a bid to strengthen its position in external 
environmental relations. In this light, this eagerness to play a role in these WHO 
negotiations might point to a desire to take on a more important external role 
when it comes to health issues. This should be followed up by further research.
Similar elements can be distinguished in the Commission’s drive for better 
representation and participation in the United Nations (UN) system (for a more 
general discussion of the EU and the United Nations, see Jorgensen and 
Laatikainen, 2004; regarding EU coordination on human rights issues in the UN, 
see Smith, 2006). Also in September 2003, the Commission published a 
Communication on the EU’s position in the UN (Commission, 2003c), in which 
it calls for, among other things, a considerable strengthening of its institutional 
position at the UN. The Commission states, for example, that “[T]he EC should 
be given the possibility to participate fully in the work of UN bodies where 
matters of Community competence are concerned” (Commission, 2003c: p. 23). 
It then goes on to give some specific examples, including the need for the EC to 
be able to “participate effectively” in international environmental negotiations 
“to which the EC must later become a Party” and in “UN bodies dealing with 
refugee and asylum issues” (ibid.). The Commission communication expresses 
frustration with the fact that the EC still only has observer status in the UN. 
While this was meaningful in 1974 (when it was granted) because back then the 
EC “was almost alone in having permanent observer status” (Commission, 
2003c: p. 22), today -  among 40 other ‘permanent observers’ -  it does not reflect 
the importance and special position of the EC in the international system any 
more. Or, in other words, “the EC’s overall status in the UN no longer reflects 
the level of integration the Community has attained” (ibid.). The press release 
accompanying the Communication is rather blunter, expressing the need to 
establish “direct EC representation in fora that deal with issues of Community 
competence” (Commission, 2003d: p. 1). This fits in with the EC’s full 
membership of, for example, the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), and 
the Commission’s recommendation to the Council for the same status in the
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International Civil Aviation Authority and the International Maritime 
Organisation (Commission, 2003c). Again, it would be interesting, in the light of 
the findings of this thesis, to analyse the Commission’s negotiating position as 
well as the different institutional frameworks of the organisations to see to what 
extent they have an impact on the respective roles that the Commission and the 
Member States have to play within these institutional frameworks.
Another (long-standing) issue on which more research is needed is that of 
preference formation in the Commission. In order to come to a better 
understanding of the Commission’s actions, a better insight into the nature and 
origin of the Commission’s preferences is needed. How did the Commission 
learn that strong institutions bring it certain advantages in the first place? Did this 
insight grow with the Commission’s evolving role in the GATT, the CCP being 
the only external Community action with enough coherence so as to resemble a 
policy? Or did this awareness grow because of the Commission’s role within the 
institutional system of the EU itself? After all, the EU has a highly legalistic and 
constitutional structure, making it the strongest rules-based system of 
international cooperation in place (see for example Jackson, 2000: p. 272; 1975: 
p.79). And how and where exactly within the Commission did these preferences 
come about? This automatically leads to the issue of intra-commission politics, 
which was touched upon in this thesis, although not discussed extensively. More 
research regarding the formation of preferences (and hence intra-Commission 
politics) in the Community’s external relations is therefore needed in order to 
come to a better understanding of the Commission’s position in international 
negotiations and organisations.
CONCLUSION
This chapter started by giving an overview and a summary of the main argument 
of the thesis. After defending some of the methodological choices made in the 
research design, it then moved on to discuss the relevance o f the findings of the
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thesis in the light of existing integration theories and it pointed out the 
contribution that the thesis makes to the understanding of the European Union. 
The most important finding is that there are elements at the international level 
that cause this level to have a more structural impact on the balance of power 
within the EU than is accounted for in the more traditional integration theories. 
In particular, the empirical research provided very strong evidence for the claim 
that the institutional structure of the international regimes is one of those 
elements, enabling the Commission to exploit this and strengthen its position 
externally as well internally. Since the major integration theories, including the 
promising principal-agent approach as applied to the EU, are all rather inward- 
looking, they tend to largely lose sight of these complex interactions between the 
‘domestic’ and ‘international’ levels, focussing on the internal dynamics of the 
European integration process instead. Approaches to the EU’s external relations 
do take the impact of the international level more seriously, but most studies in 
this mould also focus on very specific policies, thereby leaving the question 
about a more structural impact of the international level and the conditions under 
which this might take place unanswered.
The importance of the finding that the institutional structure of the international 
regime has such a profound impact on the role and position of the Commission 
lies not only in a better theoretical understanding of certain developments in the 
European integration process (such as the Commission’s surprisingly dominant 
role regarding TRIPS issues within the WTO, for example). It also points to 
potential pitfalls that lie ahead, as was discussed in the section on policy 
repercussions and it raises many questions. What is the impact of the EU’s policy 
preferences on the future of the WTO? Is there a danger of an overstretched 
Commission not being able to keep up with its tasks? And will this lead to a 
deterioration of the relative position of the EC as a world player? These are all 
important policy questions that derive from the theoretical contributions of this 
thesis. This, in turn, opens up further avenues for research. Are the same 
dynamics also at play in areas where the EC is only recently emerging as an 
international actor and where it barely has any competence at all? Notable
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examples that come to mind here are the Commission’s position in the other 
Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, IMF -  especially in the context of the 
pending IMF reform), or in the UN system. And what are the policy 
repercussions?
While this leaves us with more questions that we started with, it also opens up a 
promising research agenda. After all, if the structural impact of the institutional 
structure of the international level can be incorporated into future analyses of the 
process of European integration, then this will lead not only to a better 
understanding of Commission-Member State relations in specific cases, but also 
to a more coherent framework for studying the European integration process 
more generally.
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